为什么说上市不一定能提高公司透明度

    精品投资银行Moelis & Co.上周提交IPO时，这家自2007年以来已经为价值1万亿美元的交易提供过咨询服务的公司踏上了Lazard Ltd. 、Evercore Partners和 Greenhill & Co. 等类似咨询公司成功上市的道路。

    据汤森路透（Thomson Reuters）数据显示，由于去年美国IPO市场异常强劲，并购活动升温，Moelis & Co.等精品投资银行参与了去年10大交易中80%的交易。但对于曾经在瑞银（UBS）创造过辉煌、后来又创立了这家投资银行的肯•莫里斯来说还有一个更好的消息，Moelis & Co.公司IPO之后，他仍将（通过每股拥有10倍投票权的超级股票）获得超过过半数的公司掌控权。因而，这家公司未来不必遵循大多数公开市场投资者所期盼的传统公司治理标准。其中包括，独立董事不会占据董事会的多数席位，也不用被迫纵容维权投资者的行为。

    而且，钻这个IPO漏洞的公司也并不是只有Moelis & Co.一家。达维法律事务所(Davis Polk)进行的一项调研显示，IPO上市公司中70%设立了分级董事会，78%的IPO上市公司通过书面许可禁止股东采取行动，57%的公司拒绝对董事长与CEO职责进行分割——普遍认为，所有这些都是公开上市公司有效的公司治理行为。

    这样的内部控制对精品投资银行是有益的。为了继续获得成功，Moelis & Co.需要保持自己独特的文化：小型交易团队、不受其他利益影响的独立建议，为银行家提供显著高于特大型投资银行同行的薪酬【2013年， Moelis & Co.将64%的收入作为公司银行家的薪酬，相比之下，高盛（Goldman Sachs）仅将37%的收入支付给了自己的银行家】。如果存在外部的干预，这些做法可能很难维持下去。

    从投资者角度而言，Moelis & Co.可以继续创造极大的利润的原因恰恰是因为，作为一家公开上市的公司，它从根本上仍旧以一家私有公司的形式进行运作。肯•莫里斯能享有的自主决定权将确保他能在获得战略资本的同时保有使其公司具备竞争力的能力。

    但要记住的重要一点是，精品投资银行的这种活力不一定可以拓展到其他行业的其他公司中，而且IPO的这个漏洞确保管理层免遭公开市场股东的实际审查，这一点对于投资者是非常危险的行为。

    公开市场的存在是为公司成长提供资本，但它也意味着要求公司提高运作透明度，加强公司治理，从而使得投资者获益。如果一家公司获得了公开上市交易的地位，同时又不用不承担所处地位应当承担的基本义务，这个目标就完全落空了。这一点对于小投资者不利，也不利于在公司内部打造战略性的规章制度。

    鉴于这家投资银行辉煌的经营业绩，毫无疑问，肯•莫里斯和公司联合创始人杰夫•瑞科（我曾在上世纪90年代中期与他在PaineWebber短暂共事过一段时间)将交出一份令投资者满意的答卷，但美国证券交易委员会（Securities and Exchange Commission）应当至少考虑对这类IPO重新进行分类，以向公众投资者提供更为全面和透明的信息。（财富中文网）

    本文作者是一位政治和商业评论家。他曾在知名投行Lazard Freres和Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein就职，并曾服务于对冲基金Ramius。作者现任中型广播电台运营商Davidson Media Group的董事。他拥有哥伦比亚商学院的MBA学位，同时也是两本惊险小说的作者。

    When Moelis & Co., the boutique investment bank that has advised on $1 trillion of transactions since 2007, filed for an IPO last week, it was following in the footsteps of similar advisory firms like Lazard Ltd. (LAZ), Evercore Partners (EVR), and Greenhill & Co. (GHL), all of whom have done well as public companies.

    The timing is also good given that last year was exceptionally strong for U.S. IPOs, merger activity is up, and 80% of the top 10 deals last year involved boutique banks like Moelis & Co. according to Thomson Reuters. But what is even better for Ken Moelis, the former UBS rainmaker who founded the bank, is that he gets to keep majority control after the IPO (through ownership of super-voting shares which will carry 10 votes for every share) and hence will not have to conform to traditional corporate governance standards that most public investors expect. This includes not having a majority of independent directors on the board or having to indulge activist investors.

    Nor is Moelis & Co. the only firm to enjoy this IPO loophole. According to a survey conducted by law firm Davis Polk, 70% of IPO companies had classified boards, 78% prohibited shareholder action by written consent, and 57% refused to divide the roles of Chairman and CEO -- all widely considered to be good corporate governance practices for public companies.

    For a boutique investment bank, such inside control is beneficial. In order to remain successful, Moelis & Co. needs to retain its unique culture of small deal teams, independent advice uncompromised by other interests, and considerably higher compensation for its bankers than their counterparts at bulge bracket firms (Moelis & Co. paid 64% of revenues to bankers as compensation in 2013 vs. only 37% at Goldman Sachs), which can be hard to maintain with outside interference.

    From an investor's standpoint, Moelis & Co. can continue to generate outsize profits precisely because it will be able to access the capital markets freely as a public company while essentially continuing to function as a private one. The decision-making autonomy that Ken Moelis will enjoy will ensure that he can deploy capital strategically while preserving the qualities that make his firm competitive.

    But it is important to remember that the dynamic of boutique banking does not necessarily extend to other companies in other industries, and the IPO loophole that enables management to avoid real outside scrutiny by public shareholders can be dangerous for investors.

    Public markets are there to provide companies with capital for growth, but they are also meant to benefit investors by requiring greater transparency and better corporate governance. That purpose is defeated when a company can attain public status without shouldering the basic responsibilities that go with the territory. It can be bad for smaller investors as well as for creating strategic discipline within companies.

    Given their stellar track record, there is little doubt that Ken Moelis and his co-founder Jeffrey Raich (whom I worked with briefly in the mid-1990s at PaineWebber), will do a great job for their investors, but the Securities and Exchange Commission should at least consider reclassifying such IPOs to provide better information to the public.

    Sanjay Sanghoee is a political and business commentator. He has worked at investment banks Lazard Freres and Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, as well as at hedge fund Ramius. Sanghoee sits on the Board of Davidson Media Group, a mid-market radio station operator. He has an MBA from Columbia Business School and is also the author of two thriller novels.