别傻了,美国一样爱搞保护主义
周一,西门子(Siemens )提高了对阿尔斯通(Alstom)能源业务的报价,目的不光是要打动这家公司,更重要的是还要打动法国政府。 法国国会议员一直在干预这项交易,目的是为法国争取最大的利益,包括让西门子在工作机会、研究中心以及核电站汽轮机问题上做出承诺。 不过,今年对国际性企业活动施加压力的并不是只有法国政府。 在辉瑞(Pfizer)斥资1170亿美元收购阿斯利康(AstraZeneca)的过程中,英国议会迫使辉瑞在就业机会方面做出了承诺。据报道,美国政府已经威胁要对法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas)处以高达100亿美元的罚款,原因是后者在伊朗进行经营活动。 政治对企业活动施加干预并不新鲜。想想看,2001年欧盟委员会(European Commission)否决了霍尼韦尔(Honeywell)和通用电气(GE)的合并计划,意大利国家电力公司(Enel)2006年入股苏伊士集团(Suez)比利时子公司的计划同样受阻。 美国喜欢把自己视为自由市场资本主义的大本营。奥巴马总统最近还在鼓吹美国的自由不受限制: 由于美国政府指责法国巴黎银行在伊朗开展业务并威胁要处以罚款,法国方面也插手了这件事,同时对美国施压。对此,奥巴马总统回应道:“我并没有告诉司法部长怎样就这些已经出现的案件提起诉讼。我已经就此和奥朗德总统进行了沟通。” 奥巴马总统还说:“在不同的国家,人们的立场可能不同。” 真相是,实施干预并非欧洲兄弟的独有技能。按照一系列“纯”美国政策,涉足,或者用人们喜欢的任何其他委婉叫法,都是合理行为。 对企业行为加以斥责的做法始于1996年的《赫尔姆斯-伯顿法》(Helms-Burton Act)。这项法案让美国政府可以自由地对和古巴做生意的公司施加官方惩罚,同时为针对其他国家的禁令设定了标准。由于美国企业的规模和经济实力,这些禁令最终产生了国际性的影响。 美国经济发展委员会(Committee for Economic Development)研究负责人约瑟夫•米纳里克说:“美国觉得自己是世界警察,有责任警告别人。” 虽然美国总统奥巴马冠冕堂皇地宣称美国是自由企业的国度,但对于威胁美国工业实力或军事能力的企业活动,美国政府总是出重拳予以打击。 这方面最著名的事例莫过于中国国有企业中海油(China National Offshore Oil Co.)于2005年出价185亿美元收购美国石油公司加州联合石油(Unocal)。这项收购遇了巨大的政治阻力,美国国会就此展开了无休止的辩论。议员们担心,中国企业拥有一家美国石油公司会威胁到美国的能源供应,同时还会影响美国的工业生产。 这种保护主义起了作用。中海油最后放弃了这次收购,而总部设在加州圣拉蒙的雪佛龙(Chevron)以170亿美元的折扣价胜出。皇冠上的明珠仍然属于美国。 9年前,中海油对此事评价道:“这种政治环境给我们精确地评估成功的几率带来了非常大的困难。” 尽管美国鼓吹自由买卖,但只要合适,保护主义看来就会成为美国的传统政策。 “如果一个国家皇冠上的明珠即将被卖给别的国家,就连自由主义政府也会就产业政策展开辩论,”美国外交关系协会(Council on Foreign Relations)莫里斯•格林伯格地缘经济研究中心(Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies)主任塞巴斯蒂安•马拉比说。“不过,背后的动机会因为政治文化的影响而出现差异。”(财富中文网) 译者:Charlie |
Siemens sweetened its bid for Alstom’s energy unitsMonday in an effort to finally woo not only the company, but also, more importantly, French officials. Lawmakers in the European country have been meddling in the deal to get the best outcome for French interests, including promises of jobs, research centers and turbines for nuclear plants. But the French aren’t the only officials putting pressure on global corporate deals this year. The U.K. parliament pressured Pfizer for employment promises on top of its $117 billion AstraZeneca bid. And the U.S. has reportedly threatened BNP Paribas with fines as high as $10 billion for business dealings in Iran. Political interference in business deals is not new. Consider, for example, the European Commission’s vetoing of the Honeywell-GE merger in 2001, or Italian gas-company Enel’s thwarted interest in Suez’s Belgian unit in 2006. The U.S. likes to think of itself as the bastion of free market capitalism. President Obama has recently touted the nation’s freedom from interference: “I do not tell the Attorney General how to prosecute cases that have been brought. I have communicated that to President Hollande,” said President Obama in response to French pressure to intervene in U.S. threats to fine BNP Paribas over alleged business dealings in Iran. “Perhaps it is a different position to those taken in different countries,” he added. The truth is, meddling isn’t the sole expertise of our European brethren. Dabbling, or whatever euphemism one might prefer, is justified under a series of all-American policies. The practice of corporate reprimanding started with the Helms-Burton act of 1996. The act gave the U.S. government the freedom to officially punish foreign companies doing business with Cuba, setting the standard that would extend to other country-specific embargoes. These U.S. restrictions ended up extending internationally because of the size and economic might of American industry. “U.S. has a sense that we are the global policeman,” said Joseph Minarik, the director of research for the Committee for Economic Development. “We have the whistle.” Despite President Obama’s lofty, high-minded statements that America is the land of free enterprise, our hand has fallen heavily on deals that either threaten U.S. industrial strength or its military capabilities. This, most famously, happened when state-owned China National Offshore Oil Co., or CNOOC, bid $18.5 billion to buy oil-producer Unocal in 2005. The deal faced fierce political opposition and countless Congressional debates, and lawmakers voiced fear that Chinese ownership of a U.S. oil company would endanger national energy supplies and stymy industrial production. The protectionism worked. CNOOC dropped its bid, and San Ramon, Calif.-based Chevron paid a discounted $17 billion to win over Unocal. The crown jewel remained stateside. CNOOC’s response nine years ago: “This political environment has made it very difficult for us to accurately assess our chance of success.” Despite the American rhetoric of free-wheeling buying and selling, protectionism, whenever it is convenient, appears to be traditional U.S. policy. “Even a laissez-faire government is going to have a debate about industrial policy if one of its crown jewels is going to be sold to a foreign country,” said Sebastian Mallaby, director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “And those motives will vary by political culture.” |