过去几年,美国公司成了他们自己股票的最大买主,购买额遥遥领先。据高盛11月的一份研究,从2016到2019年,美国的大市值企业重购股票金额达令人咂舌的2.5万亿美元。去年标普500企业的分红和回购达4800亿美元,超过这些公司的现金流总额——顺便提一句,目前回购金额远超分红,因为美国公司青睐所谓的“现金回归股东”金融工具。
在两种情况下,回购确实是好主意。首先,大型成熟的公司拥有充沛的收入,但可能无法找到可盈利的项目进行再投资,从汽车制造商到消费品提供商都存在这种情况。其次,管理层将股票当作交易。比如,公司股票达19倍市盈率,而管理层认为真实价值应该在22倍市盈率,那么如果他们是对的,通过折价回购股票的方式让每个股东拥有更多的股份,将在未来给他们创造收益。这种做法遵循了沃伦·巴菲特的信条:当股价低于其内在价值时,重购是明智的。
但要记住,当投资者每年卖出其股票的比例,等于回购所降低的公司股票数的比例,投资者只是把回购转成了现金。我不提复杂的数学公式,举个例子解释。比如你拥有XYZ公司的股票,而管理层去年回购了5%的股票,那么你可以卖出你股票的5%获得现金,而你仍旧拥有去年你在XYZ的股票比例额。
但这个神奇的公式,只有在估值合理、公司确实回购了,且不在股票低位时重置才有效。
我们刚刚经历这样一次史诗般的重新定价。2月19日在史上最高点,标普的市盈率高达24。而当股市3月16日周一收盘时,已经跌到17,这是基于创纪录收益的数字,也将很快消褪,但看起来仍有泡沫。
记住,回购的目的是提高每股收益和让投资者获得资本回报。作为一个投资者,如果你每年卖出你拥有股票的一部分,并将收益存起来,你的日子要比一直持有所有股票好得多。如果你一直不卖,最终你会拥有比如XYZ公司的越来越大比例的股份,如果XYZ公司目前市值比三周前少了30%,这股价跌掉的部分,远超你股份增加的利益。由于抛售程度很深,范围很广,自2017年8月开始的1.25万亿美元回购收益的很大一部分,在标普达到今天的水平时,已经蒸发掉了。
所以,突然间回购看似坏交易,至少短期内如此。长期看,形势还不明朗。比如一些大银行,包括摩根大通、美国银行和富国银行,他们在市盈率处于低到中的个位数时进行了回购,尽管目前的市盈率惨不忍睹,但看未来几年,他们的回购还是不错的交易。(目前,最大的8家银行宣布暂停股票回购,以释放资金借贷给企业和消费者)。
另一方面,四家大型航空公司,美联航、西南航空、达美航空和美国航空,从2015至2019年的五个财政年度里,大笔花费了310亿美元回购自家的股票,相当于他们净收入的三分之二。每家公司在这个5年期初始时的股价都高于今天的股价,基本要高得多,美国航空和美联航的股价跌了70%。由于这些年的股票回购,他们所拥有的股票数都超过2015初始时。如果有人坚决地持有这些股票,而不是每年卖掉一些,那么他们将很难从这场回购盛宴中分到一杯羹。
结论:市场已经调整了价格,因为大家都看到,目前的世界比三周前风险更大。这使得管理层这些年标榜的好交易,在今日看来是很糟糕的。多数情况下,首席执行官和董事会应该更知情,并应该将这数十亿美元回归到分红中。大抛售揭示了股票回购的阴暗面。当股票被重新定价,回购的收益瞬间消失,在多数情况下,看不到赚回来的希望。(财富中文网)
译者:宣峰
过去几年,美国公司成了他们自己股票的最大买主,购买额遥遥领先。据高盛11月的一份研究,从2016到2019年,美国的大市值企业重购股票金额达令人咂舌的2.5万亿美元。去年标普500企业的分红和回购达4800亿美元,超过这些公司的现金流总额——顺便提一句,目前回购金额远超分红,因为美国公司青睐所谓的“现金回归股东”金融工具。
在两种情况下,回购确实是好主意。首先,大型成熟的公司拥有充沛的收入,但可能无法找到可盈利的项目进行再投资,从汽车制造商到消费品提供商都存在这种情况。其次,管理层将股票当作交易。比如,公司股票达19倍市盈率,而管理层认为真实价值应该在22倍市盈率,那么如果他们是对的,通过折价回购股票的方式让每个股东拥有更多的股份,将在未来给他们创造收益。这种做法遵循了沃伦·巴菲特的信条:当股价低于其内在价值时,重购是明智的。
但要记住,当投资者每年卖出其股票的比例,等于回购所降低的公司股票数的比例,投资者只是把回购转成了现金。我不提复杂的数学公式,举个例子解释。比如你拥有XYZ公司的股票,而管理层去年回购了5%的股票,那么你可以卖出你股票的5%获得现金,而你仍旧拥有去年你在XYZ的股票比例额。
但这个神奇的公式,只有在估值合理、公司确实回购了,且不在股票低位时重置才有效。
我们刚刚经历这样一次史诗般的重新定价。2月19日在史上最高点,标普的市盈率高达24。而当股市3月16日周一收盘时,已经跌到17,这是基于创纪录收益的数字,也将很快消褪,但看起来仍有泡沫。
记住,回购的目的是提高每股收益和让投资者获得资本回报。作为一个投资者,如果你每年卖出你拥有股票的一部分,并将收益存起来,你的日子要比一直持有所有股票好得多。如果你一直不卖,最终你会拥有比如XYZ公司的越来越大比例的股份,如果XYZ公司目前市值比三周前少了30%,这股价跌掉的部分,远超你股份增加的利益。由于抛售程度很深,范围很广,自2017年8月开始的1.25万亿美元回购收益的很大一部分,在标普达到今天的水平时,已经蒸发掉了。
所以,突然间回购看似坏交易,至少短期内如此。长期看,形势还不明朗。比如一些大银行,包括摩根大通、美国银行和富国银行,他们在市盈率处于低到中的个位数时进行了回购,尽管目前的市盈率惨不忍睹,但看未来几年,他们的回购还是不错的交易。(目前,最大的8家银行宣布暂停股票回购,以释放资金借贷给企业和消费者)。
另一方面,四家大型航空公司,美联航、西南航空、达美航空和美国航空,从2015至2019年的五个财政年度里,大笔花费了310亿美元回购自家的股票,相当于他们净收入的三分之二。每家公司在这个5年期初始时的股价都高于今天的股价,基本要高得多,美国航空和美联航的股价跌了70%。由于这些年的股票回购,他们所拥有的股票数都超过2015初始时。如果有人坚决地持有这些股票,而不是每年卖掉一些,那么他们将很难从这场回购盛宴中分到一杯羹。
结论:市场已经调整了价格,因为大家都看到,目前的世界比三周前风险更大。这使得管理层这些年标榜的好交易,在今日看来是很糟糕的。多数情况下,首席执行官和董事会应该更知情,并应该将这数十亿美元回归到分红中。大抛售揭示了股票回购的阴暗面。当股票被重新定价,回购的收益瞬间消失,在多数情况下,看不到赚回来的希望。(财富中文网)
译者:宣峰
For the past several years, America's corporations have been by far the biggest buyers of their own stock. From 2016 through 2019, our big cap enterprises repurchased a staggering $2.5 trillion in shares, according to a November study by Goldman Sachs. Last year's outlays of $480 billion in dividends and buybacks by the S&P 500 amounted to over 100% of their free cash flow––and by the way, buybacks now far exceed dividends as corporate America's favored vehicle for what's known as "returning cash to shareholders."
Buybacks are indeed a good idea under two conditions. First, the company can't find profitable ways to reinvest part of its ample earnings, generally the case with big, mature businesses from automakers to consumer goods purveyors. Second, management perceives their shares as a bargain. For example, if their stock is selling at an 19 price-to-earnings multiple, and the brass believes that its real value is more like 22 time earnings, then if they're correct, handing each shareholder a bigger ownership stake through buying back shares at a discount will enhance their returns in the future. That practice follows Warren Buffett's maxim that repurchases are smart when a stock is selling below its "intrinsic value."
But keep in mind, investors themselves only translate buybacks into cash if each year they sell the percentage of their shares that equals the percentage by which the buybacks lowered the company's share count. I'll save you from all the math, but if you own stock in XYZ Corp, and management repurchased 5% of its shares last year, you could sell 5% of your shares, pocket the cash, and still own the same percentage of XYZ you held the year before.
But this marvelous formula only works if valuations were reasonable when companies did the gorging, and don't reset at much lower levels.
We've just experienced just such an epic repricing. At its all-time high on February 19, the S&P traded at a lofty P/E of 24. As of the market close on Monday, March 16, that benchmark has dropped to 17.0, a number that based on record earnings that will soon retreat, still looks frothy.
Remember, the purpose of buybacks is to raise earnings per share and hand investors capital gains. As an investor, if you'd sold a portion of your holdings every year and banked the gains, you'd be a lot better off than if you'd held all of your stock. If you didn't sell anything, you've ended up owning a bigger and bigger percentage of, say, XYZ, and XYZ is now worth 30% less than than it was three weeks ago. The fall in the share price far outweighed the increase in your stake. Because the selloff is so steep and broad, a giant portion of the erstwhile benefits of the $1.25 trillion in buybacks since August of 2017, when the S&P stood at today's levels, have evaporated.
So repurchases suddenly look like a raw deal, at least in the short term. In the long-run, it's not yet clear. For example, the big banks, including J.P. Morgan, Bank of America and Wells Fargo, were purchasing at PEs in the low to middle single digits, and incredible as it may seem today, those buys may look well founded a couple of years from now. (For now, eight of the largest banks announced they are suspending buybacks to free up capital to lend to businesses and consumers.)
On the other hand, the big four airlines, United Continental, Southwest, Deltaand American, lavished $31 billion on their own shares from the start of fiscal 2015 through 2019, equal to two-thirds of their net earnings. In every case, their shares were higher when at the start of that five year period than they are today, generally by a lot; shares are down around 70% at both American and United. Their shares were mostly above the 2015 starting point during the entire time they were buying in all that stock. It's unlikely that staunch loyalists who didn't cash in shares each year will ever see any benefits from that buyback extravaganza.
Conclusion: Markets have reset prices based on the view that the world is a much riskier place than it appeared just three weeks ago. That makes what management touted as great deals for years look terrible today. In many cases, CEOs and boards should have known better, and returned those billions in dividends instead. The selloff has revealed the dark side of buybacks. When stocks get repriced, the gains from repurchases vanish in a hurry, with in many cases, little prospect of returning.