今年1月以来,汽车制造商、电子产品生产商一直在设法应对半导体(控制机载计算功能的关键元件)供应短缺问题。出于对芯片供应明显不足的担忧,制造商纷纷增加了芯片订单。而芯片制造商为满足激增的需求,又随之加大投入、扩大产能。但现在,供需失调已出现逆转风险,分析师警告称,芯片供应或由短缺转为过剩。
“包括美国、欧盟、韩国和中国在内,全球各大发达经济体均制定了扩大国内半导体产能的计划,”穆迪(Moody's)副总裁兼高级信贷官莉莉安·李(Lillian Li)表示。
美国拜登政府计划通过国会正在讨论的一项法案为美国半导体产业提供520亿美元的资金支持。欧盟则承诺提供1600亿美元的新冠复兴资金,用于发展本地区的科技能力,以期到2030年将欧盟在全球半导体制造业的份额提升至20%。与此同时,在政府减税政策的刺激下,韩国芯片制造商也承诺将在未来10年投入4500亿美元用于芯片产能建设。
莉莉安表示:“如此巨额的投资或将导致产能过剩及投资配置低效等问题”,她的说法与其他分析师的警告不谋而合。今年6月,贝恩公司(Bain & Company)的分析师就曾表示,扩大产能将“损害供应商的经济效益”,因为当需求减弱时,所有供应商都将无法充分利用自己生产线的产能。
今年4月,行业分析师丹尼尔·尼尼(Daniel Nenni)在接受《财富》采访时表示,除非在当前的恐慌性购买之外出现“半导体需求的大幅增长”,否则市场必将出现供过于求的局面。芯片供应短缺问题始于汽车行业。疫情期间,消费者对新车的需求大幅增加,汽车制造商纷纷增加了自己的芯片组订单,导致出现芯片供不应求、交货延期等现象,进而引发了采购经理的抢购潮,为保障库存,采购代理订购的芯片数量早已超过自己的实际需要。待到恐慌平息之后,芯片过剩几成定局。莉莉安警告称,作为最急于实现芯片国产化的国家,中国可能比其他国家更容易出现供过于求的局面。
穆迪8月2日发布的报告显示,中国去年在半导体研发方面的投入达350亿美元,较2019年增长407%。2020年,中国半导体进口额超过3500亿美元。为打破对进口半导体的依赖,中国政府投入巨资,规模数以10亿美元计。美国曾利用其在半导体行业的主导地位对中国的芯片进口进行限制。
去年5月,美国切断了中国智能手机制造商华为的先进芯片供应渠道,迫使这家总部位于深圳的企业将自己的业务重心从智能手机销售转向其他业务。
但莉莉安表示,中国为推动半导体国产化所付出的努力可能导致某些芯片(如存储芯片)产能过剩,在总体需求低于总体产能时,那些“信贷渠道较少、政府支持不足”的企业将会失去获利空间。
但即便是得到政府大力支持的芯片制造商,也面临着扩张过快的风险。
清华紫光是中国最知名的内存芯片制造商之一,却也面临着破产危机。在中国扩大芯片产能的推动下,清华紫光大幅扩建芯片厂,并在此过程中欠下了约300亿美元的债务。但这些建设成本高达100亿美元的芯片工厂需要数年时间才能建成,投资回报周期较长。去年11月,清华紫光暂停了两家新建工厂的开发项目,并因公司资金紧张无法按时归还欠款。一债权人已将这家违约公司告上法庭,并在推动这家芯片制造商申请破产重组。
莉莉安说:“对中国来说,推动国内半导体产业的发展有利也有弊。好处显而易见,比如可以规避掉地缘政治方面的不确定因素。但产能过剩的风险依然存在。”(财富中文网)
译者:梁宇
审校:夏林
今年1月以来,汽车制造商、电子产品生产商一直在设法应对半导体(控制机载计算功能的关键元件)供应短缺问题。出于对芯片供应明显不足的担忧,制造商纷纷增加了芯片订单。而芯片制造商为满足激增的需求,又随之加大投入、扩大产能。但现在,供需失调已出现逆转风险,分析师警告称,芯片供应或由短缺转为过剩。
“包括美国、欧盟、韩国和中国在内,全球各大发达经济体均制定了扩大国内半导体产能的计划,”穆迪(Moody's)副总裁兼高级信贷官莉莉安·李(Lillian Li)表示。
美国拜登政府计划通过国会正在讨论的一项法案为美国半导体产业提供520亿美元的资金支持。欧盟则承诺提供1600亿美元的新冠复兴资金,用于发展本地区的科技能力,以期到2030年将欧盟在全球半导体制造业的份额提升至20%。与此同时,在政府减税政策的刺激下,韩国芯片制造商也承诺将在未来10年投入4500亿美元用于芯片产能建设。
莉莉安表示:“如此巨额的投资或将导致产能过剩及投资配置低效等问题”,她的说法与其他分析师的警告不谋而合。今年6月,贝恩公司(Bain & Company)的分析师就曾表示,扩大产能将“损害供应商的经济效益”,因为当需求减弱时,所有供应商都将无法充分利用自己生产线的产能。
今年4月,行业分析师丹尼尔·尼尼(Daniel Nenni)在接受《财富》采访时表示,除非在当前的恐慌性购买之外出现“半导体需求的大幅增长”,否则市场必将出现供过于求的局面。芯片供应短缺问题始于汽车行业。疫情期间,消费者对新车的需求大幅增加,汽车制造商纷纷增加了自己的芯片组订单,导致出现芯片供不应求、交货延期等现象,进而引发了采购经理的抢购潮,为保障库存,采购代理订购的芯片数量早已超过自己的实际需要。待到恐慌平息之后,芯片过剩几成定局。莉莉安警告称,作为最急于实现芯片国产化的国家,中国可能比其他国家更容易出现供过于求的局面。
穆迪8月2日发布的报告显示,中国去年在半导体研发方面的投入达350亿美元,较2019年增长407%。2020年,中国半导体进口额超过3500亿美元。为打破对进口半导体的依赖,中国政府投入巨资,规模数以10亿美元计。美国曾利用其在半导体行业的主导地位对中国的芯片进口进行限制。
去年5月,美国切断了中国智能手机制造商华为的先进芯片供应渠道,迫使这家总部位于深圳的企业将自己的业务重心从智能手机销售转向其他业务。
但莉莉安表示,中国为推动半导体国产化所付出的努力可能导致某些芯片(如存储芯片)产能过剩,在总体需求低于总体产能时,那些“信贷渠道较少、政府支持不足”的企业将会失去获利空间。
但即便是得到政府大力支持的芯片制造商,也面临着扩张过快的风险。
清华紫光是中国最知名的内存芯片制造商之一,却也面临着破产危机。在中国扩大芯片产能的推动下,清华紫光大幅扩建芯片厂,并在此过程中欠下了约300亿美元的债务。但这些建设成本高达100亿美元的芯片工厂需要数年时间才能建成,投资回报周期较长。去年11月,清华紫光暂停了两家新建工厂的开发项目,并因公司资金紧张无法按时归还欠款。一债权人已将这家违约公司告上法庭,并在推动这家芯片制造商申请破产重组。
莉莉安说:“对中国来说,推动国内半导体产业的发展有利也有弊。好处显而易见,比如可以规避掉地缘政治方面的不确定因素。但产能过剩的风险依然存在。”(财富中文网)
译者:梁宇
审校:夏林
Since January, automakers and electronics producers have contended with a shortage in semiconductors—the components vital to controlling onboard computing functions. Panicked by an apparent chip drought, manufacturers increased orders to secure future supplies, and chipmakers responded by investing in new capacity. But now the imbalance between demand and supply risks swinging the other way, as analysts warn a chip drought could become a chip glut.
“All the world’s advanced economies, including the U.S., the EU, South Korea, and China have set out plans to advance capacity in the domestic semiconductor industry,” says Lillian Li, vice president and senior credit officer at Moody’s.
In the U.S., the Biden administration plans to allocate $52 billion in incentives for the domestic semiconductor industry via a bill Congress is currently debating. The EU has committed $160 billion of COVID recovery funds to developing regional tech capabilities as it aims to boost the bloc’s share of semiconductor manufacturing to 20% of the global total by 2030. Meanwhile, chipmakers in South Korea, buoyed by government tax breaks, have committed $450 billion over the next 10 years to building chip capacity.
“These major investments could lead to overcapacity and inefficient investment allocation,” Li says, echoing warnings made by other analysts. In June, analysts at consultancy Bain & Company said building capacity would “hurt the economics” of suppliers, since each will likely run production lines below capacity once demand abates.
In April, industry analyst Daniel Nenni told Fortune there would be a glut unless “there is some big boom in semiconductor demand” beyond the current panic buying. The chip shortage began when automakers, surprised by consumer appetite for new cars in the pandemic, increased their orders for chipsets, pushing demand beyond supply and increasing lead times for deliveries. The squeeze on supply sparked panic buying as purchasing agents ordered more chips than they need in an attempt to secure stock. Once the panic subsides, the world could find itself with too many chips. But Li warns that China—the country most desperate to secure a domestic chip supply—could suffer a glut more easily than its peers.
According to a Moody's report published Monday, China spent $35 billion on semiconductor development last year, up 407% from 2019. Beijing is spending billions to break China’s reliance on semiconductor imports, which were worth over $350 billion in 2020. The U.S. has used its dominance in the semiconductor industry to throttle China’s access to chips.
In May last year, the U.S. severed Chinese smartphone maker Huawei Technologies’ access to advanced chips, forcing the Shenzhen-based firm to pivot its business model away from smartphone sales.
But, Li says, Beijing’s push for semiconductor independence could lead to overcapacity in particular chipmaking sectors—such as memory chips—and leave companies with “less access to credit and government support” unprofitable, as total demand falls short of capacity.
But even chipmakers with strong government support are at risk of expanding too aggressively.
One of China’s most prominent memory chipmakers, Tsinghua Unigroup, is facing bankruptcy despite its close ties to the state. Motivated by Beijing’s directive to build chip capacity, Tsinghua Unigroup has racked up some $30 billion in debts as it raced to build chip factories. But chip factories, which cost up to $10 billion to build, take years to complete. The return on investment is slow. In November last year, Tsinghua Unigroup paused two new factory developments and defaulted on credit repayments as the company entered a cash crunch. One of the group’s creditors has taken the defaulting company to court and is pushing the chipmaker to file for bankruptcy and restructure.
“For China, developing domestic semiconductors has pros and cons,” Li says. “The advantages, such as avoiding geopolitical insecurities, are very apparent. But the risk of spurring overcapacity remains.”