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尽管信心低落,消费者支出却十分坚挺

美国家庭净财富较去年增长了20%以上。

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提着购物袋的旧金山行人。作者写道:“尽管信心低迷,但消费者仍选择继续推动经济增长。”图片来源:DAVID PAUL MORRIS/BLOOMBERG VIA GETTY IMAGES

2021年让人意外地将在一片阴霾中结束。11月,一项重要的消费者信心调查结果不及2020年新冠疫情危机最严重时的水平;事实上,那些消费信心数据甚至还不如全球金融危机期间有些时候的水平。其他指标也显示出消费者信心走弱。如果只拿消费者信心来评估经济状况,你可能会认为我们正处于衰退时期。

普遍的悲观情绪不能简单归咎于经济状况。经济复苏连续第二年超出预期,经济产出明显高于疫情前的水平。而且复苏也绝对是广泛性的。尽管人们都在谈论“K型”复苏,但与2008年金融危机后的情况相比,当前的复苏所触及的社会阶层范围要广泛得多。

消费者信心低迷背后,可能有两个主因需要认真审视,即:当前的通货膨胀,以及让人愈发感觉永远都不会结束的疫情。虽然二者都有可能一直让人觉得经济不容乐观,但都不太可能会在2022年阻碍经济的扩张势头。因此,消费者支出可能会维持在高位水平,尽管消费者信心不高。

复苏超出预期

今年,美国经济表现再次轻松超出预期。全美失业率预计在2022年将达到5%,但目前已经下降至4.2%。GDP年增长率可能将达到5.5%,高于彭博社编制的年初预测中值(3.9%)。 2020年同样出现强势复苏,当时疫情的爆发引发悲观情绪四处弥漫,以至于后来经济呈现强有力的V型反弹,也没有引起多大的关注。

撇开增长率不谈,目前美国的经济产出高于疫情前的水平,除非再次遭遇衰退冲击,否则很有可能超过疫情前的势头,这意味着未来的产出可能会高于疫情危机来袭前的预期。

与此同时,千千万万家庭也从经济复苏中受益。现金存款比疫情前高出2万亿美元以上,家庭净财富增长了20%以上。

没那么K型

关于经济表现和民众情绪之间脱节的一种普遍说法是,这种复苏是不均衡的,大部分人口都享受不到。然而,广为流传的K型复苏(复苏仅惠及少数人)说法并不那么站得住脚。虽然许多人仍处于经济困境当中,且这一情况还远未有结束的迹象,但认为经济复苏仅让一小部分人受益是错误的。

的确,收入金字塔顶部的20%人群净财富增长尤其强劲(增幅超过17万亿美元),但收入最低的20%人群也迎来了超过3000亿美元的财富增长。这与2008年后的复苏形成鲜明对比,当时尽管金融危机已经过去多年,低收入群体仍因净财富萎缩而苦苦挣扎。因此,虽然疫情期间不平等现象可能会加剧,但总的来看,各个社会阶层都迎来了净财富增长。

中间阶层群体的情况也值得注意。他们的资产基础——尤其受到住房价值的影响——在2008年之后遭受重创,复苏十分缓慢(尽管他们没有像处于底层人群那样长时间深陷泥沼)。而疫情期间并没有发生这样的崩盘——恰恰相反,房地产价值不断走高,大幅提升了业主的资产财富。

收入最高群体的净资产更多地与股票和企业所有权相关,2008年金融危机爆发后其资产恢复要比其他群体来得轻松得多,2020年更是几乎没花什么时间便收复失地。他们的财富反弹最快,涨幅最大。虽然每次经济复苏都加剧了财富不平等,但伴随底层财富下降的不平等加剧与伴随底层财富同样强劲增长的不平等加剧是截然不同的。

劳动力市场紧俏

有人说,家庭经济状况仅由政府刺激措施驱动,改善只是暂时性的,最终会消失。但这一观点也是错误的。劳动力市场是几乎所有人的主要收入来源,它正在蓬勃发展。失业率迅速下降,以至于劳动力市场正濒临“吃紧”——劳动力市场竞争十分激烈,也使得工作者迎来长足的工资增长。2008年经济衰退之后,历时90多个月,美国失业率才下降至劳动力市场紧俏的水平以下——而这一次,这种情况仅仅18个月后就出现了。

更重要的是,低薪劳动力市场尤其吃紧,低教育水平、低技能的工人薪资增长比高教育水平、高技能的工人更快——这种情况非常罕见。这种情况可能会持续下去,因为在酒店业等行业,职位空缺尤其严重,仍接近历史最高水平,远远高于疫情前的水平。

那消费者为什么信心低迷呢?

有人可能会说,GDP增长率和净资产的分配是宏观意义上的东西,并不能为普通大众所切实感知。但到处可见的“招人”告示是看得见摸得着的,股票价格和工资增长也是如此。

值得注意的是,脱节不仅仅存在于经济表现和消费者信心之间。它还存在于消费者信心和消费者支出之间。疫情爆发后,零售和食品服务销售额处于很高的水平,名义上2021年比2019年的月度水平超出1000亿美元,实际增长13%。鉴于储蓄、资产负债表和劳动力市场目前的状况,这种支出很可能会持续下去,而不是像消费者信心报告让人觉得的那样——出现支出崩溃。

因此,如果我们能够感受到经济的强劲势头,消费者也确实在花钱,那么就需要找其他的因素来解释消费者的低迷情绪。有两大因素造成了人们对经济前景的悲观看法:居高不下的通胀率以及感觉没完没了的疫情。如今,二者都是经济发展的阻碍因素,但我们有充分的理由相信,它们有望在2022年得到缓解,如果不是完全缓解的话。

首先,通胀率正处于数十年来的高位。虽然价格上涨并未影响到所有的商品服务,但汽油、汽车等价格飙涨的品类,确实让家庭收入受到了挤压。此外,普通大众的看法可能会受到激烈的公开辩论和频繁报道物价飞涨的新闻媒体的影响。

然而,美国家庭对通胀的预期并没有发生变化,并没有预期物价增长会持续下去。 他们预期,未来一年物价将会显著上行,但未来五年只会出现小幅的变化。换句话说,美国家庭目前并不认为通胀是结构性的、永久性的。

无论主流媒体如何大肆渲染通胀问题,我们都有充分的理由相信这将成为事实。与经济强劲复苏相关的需求剧增所引发的冲击,推动了通胀,而产品和劳动力市场出现的瓶颈问题,又加剧了通胀。 这种冲击性通胀目前无法自我维持,可能会在2022年显著放缓。尽管如此,即使物价增长放缓,伴随经济强劲复苏而来的劳动力市场紧俏现象也仍将持续,这意味着工资增长可能仍将强劲。2022年,名义工资的强劲增长可能会转化为可观的实际工资增长。

这会改变消费者信心吗?不一定。往往被人遗忘的一点是,通货膨胀是一个反映变化率的概念,而不是影响消费者信心的价格水平。以天然气价格为例。要降低对通胀的贡献,它停止上涨即可——通胀率下降不需要它下降。然而,只要价格水平每周都能让人们感受到涨价的痛苦,就能让他们的消费信心持续低迷。值得注意的是,直到2014年底和2015年初天然气价格大幅下跌,后全球金融危机周期才迎来消费者信心的提升。

第二个因素是疫情倦怠症。疫情期间,经济给生活带来的种种不确定性和不稳定性无疑是令人沮丧的,相信人们都深有体会。学校什么时候停课,旅行计划是否需要取消,要不要再进行一次核酸检测……这些问题让许多家庭都笼罩在疑云中。

然而,我们不应一旦担心2020年初的经济混乱会重演。新冠病毒与经济之间已经在很大程度上脱钩,因为大多数经济体已经懂得如何与病毒的社区传播共存,而没有一味实施持续而广泛的封锁措施。这种脱钩是真实的,已在近期的多波疫情中得到证明——再次在美国大范围蔓延的新冠病毒让增长领域发生了转移,而没有破坏当前的经济扩张势头。颠覆性病毒变异的剩余风险一直存在,但2022年,新变异毒株很可能不会对经济造成什么影响,不会引发经济恐慌。

零售销售或更强劲

虽然我们无法完全解释消费者信心与消费者支出之间的脱节,但这种脱节本身就让我们有理由为2022年的到来感到高兴。尽管信心低迷,但消费者仍选择继续推动经济增长。2022年,随着导致消费情绪低落的一些原因可能会消退,零售销售可能会变得更加强势,让经济表现更加强劲。(财富中文网)

菲利普·卡尔森-斯莱扎克是波士顿咨询公司纽约办事处的董事总经理兼合伙人,也是该公司的全球首席经济学家。保罗·斯沃茨是波士顿咨询公司旗下亨德森研究所的董事和高级经济学家。

译者:万志文

2021年让人意外地将在一片阴霾中结束。11月,一项重要的消费者信心调查结果不及2020年新冠疫情危机最严重时的水平;事实上,那些消费信心数据甚至还不如全球金融危机期间有些时候的水平。其他指标也显示出消费者信心走弱。如果只拿消费者信心来评估经济状况,你可能会认为我们正处于衰退时期。

普遍的悲观情绪不能简单归咎于经济状况。经济复苏连续第二年超出预期,经济产出明显高于疫情前的水平。而且复苏也绝对是广泛性的。尽管人们都在谈论“K型”复苏,但与2008年金融危机后的情况相比,当前的复苏所触及的社会阶层范围要广泛得多。

消费者信心低迷背后,可能有两个主因需要认真审视,即:当前的通货膨胀,以及让人愈发感觉永远都不会结束的疫情。虽然二者都有可能一直让人觉得经济不容乐观,但都不太可能会在2022年阻碍经济的扩张势头。因此,消费者支出可能会维持在高位水平,尽管消费者信心不高。

复苏超出预期

今年,美国经济表现再次轻松超出预期。全美失业率预计在2022年将达到5%,但目前已经下降至4.2%。GDP年增长率可能将达到5.5%,高于彭博社编制的年初预测中值(3.9%)。 2020年同样出现强势复苏,当时疫情的爆发引发悲观情绪四处弥漫,以至于后来经济呈现强有力的V型反弹,也没有引起多大的关注。

撇开增长率不谈,目前美国的经济产出高于疫情前的水平,除非再次遭遇衰退冲击,否则很有可能超过疫情前的势头,这意味着未来的产出可能会高于疫情危机来袭前的预期。

与此同时,千千万万家庭也从经济复苏中受益。现金存款比疫情前高出2万亿美元以上,家庭净财富增长了20%以上。

没那么K型

关于经济表现和民众情绪之间脱节的一种普遍说法是,这种复苏是不均衡的,大部分人口都享受不到。然而,广为流传的K型复苏(复苏仅惠及少数人)说法并不那么站得住脚。虽然许多人仍处于经济困境当中,且这一情况还远未有结束的迹象,但认为经济复苏仅让一小部分人受益是错误的。

的确,收入金字塔顶部的20%人群净财富增长尤其强劲(增幅超过17万亿美元),但收入最低的20%人群也迎来了超过3000亿美元的财富增长。这与2008年后的复苏形成鲜明对比,当时尽管金融危机已经过去多年,低收入群体仍因净财富萎缩而苦苦挣扎。因此,虽然疫情期间不平等现象可能会加剧,但总的来看,各个社会阶层都迎来了净财富增长。

中间阶层群体的情况也值得注意。他们的资产基础——尤其受到住房价值的影响——在2008年之后遭受重创,复苏十分缓慢(尽管他们没有像处于底层人群那样长时间深陷泥沼)。而疫情期间并没有发生这样的崩盘——恰恰相反,房地产价值不断走高,大幅提升了业主的资产财富。

收入最高群体的净资产更多地与股票和企业所有权相关,2008年金融危机爆发后其资产恢复要比其他群体来得轻松得多,2020年更是几乎没花什么时间便收复失地。他们的财富反弹最快,涨幅最大。虽然每次经济复苏都加剧了财富不平等,但伴随底层财富下降的不平等加剧与伴随底层财富同样强劲增长的不平等加剧是截然不同的。

劳动力市场紧俏

有人说,家庭经济状况仅由政府刺激措施驱动,改善只是暂时性的,最终会消失。但这一观点也是错误的。劳动力市场是几乎所有人的主要收入来源,它正在蓬勃发展。失业率迅速下降,以至于劳动力市场正濒临“吃紧”——劳动力市场竞争十分激烈,也使得工作者迎来长足的工资增长。2008年经济衰退之后,历时90多个月,美国失业率才下降至劳动力市场紧俏的水平以下——而这一次,这种情况仅仅18个月后就出现了。

更重要的是,低薪劳动力市场尤其吃紧,低教育水平、低技能的工人薪资增长比高教育水平、高技能的工人更快——这种情况非常罕见。这种情况可能会持续下去,因为在酒店业等行业,职位空缺尤其严重,仍接近历史最高水平,远远高于疫情前的水平。

那消费者为什么信心低迷呢?

有人可能会说,GDP增长率和净资产的分配是宏观意义上的东西,并不能为普通大众所切实感知。但到处可见的“招人”告示是看得见摸得着的,股票价格和工资增长也是如此。

值得注意的是,脱节不仅仅存在于经济表现和消费者信心之间。它还存在于消费者信心和消费者支出之间。疫情爆发后,零售和食品服务销售额处于很高的水平,名义上2021年比2019年的月度水平超出1000亿美元,实际增长13%。鉴于储蓄、资产负债表和劳动力市场目前的状况,这种支出很可能会持续下去,而不是像消费者信心报告让人觉得的那样——出现支出崩溃。

因此,如果我们能够感受到经济的强劲势头,消费者也确实在花钱,那么就需要找其他的因素来解释消费者的低迷情绪。有两大因素造成了人们对经济前景的悲观看法:居高不下的通胀率以及感觉没完没了的疫情。如今,二者都是经济发展的阻碍因素,但我们有充分的理由相信,它们有望在2022年得到缓解,如果不是完全缓解的话。

首先,通胀率正处于数十年来的高位。虽然价格上涨并未影响到所有的商品服务,但汽油、汽车等价格飙涨的品类,确实让家庭收入受到了挤压。此外,普通大众的看法可能会受到激烈的公开辩论和频繁报道物价飞涨的新闻媒体的影响。

然而,美国家庭对通胀的预期并没有发生变化,并没有预期物价增长会持续下去。 他们预期,未来一年物价将会显著上行,但未来五年只会出现小幅的变化。换句话说,美国家庭目前并不认为通胀是结构性的、永久性的。

无论主流媒体如何大肆渲染通胀问题,我们都有充分的理由相信这将成为事实。与经济强劲复苏相关的需求剧增所引发的冲击,推动了通胀,而产品和劳动力市场出现的瓶颈问题,又加剧了通胀。 这种冲击性通胀目前无法自我维持,可能会在2022年显著放缓。尽管如此,即使物价增长放缓,伴随经济强劲复苏而来的劳动力市场紧俏现象也仍将持续,这意味着工资增长可能仍将强劲。2022年,名义工资的强劲增长可能会转化为可观的实际工资增长。

这会改变消费者信心吗?不一定。往往被人遗忘的一点是,通货膨胀是一个反映变化率的概念,而不是影响消费者信心的价格水平。以天然气价格为例。要降低对通胀的贡献,它停止上涨即可——通胀率下降不需要它下降。然而,只要价格水平每周都能让人们感受到涨价的痛苦,就能让他们的消费信心持续低迷。值得注意的是,直到2014年底和2015年初天然气价格大幅下跌,后全球金融危机周期才迎来消费者信心的提升。

第二个因素是疫情倦怠症。疫情期间,经济给生活带来的种种不确定性和不稳定性无疑是令人沮丧的,相信人们都深有体会。学校什么时候停课,旅行计划是否需要取消,要不要再进行一次核酸检测……这些问题让许多家庭都笼罩在疑云中。

然而,我们不应一旦担心2020年初的经济混乱会重演。新冠病毒与经济之间已经在很大程度上脱钩,因为大多数经济体已经懂得如何与病毒的社区传播共存,而没有一味实施持续而广泛的封锁措施。这种脱钩是真实的,已在近期的多波疫情中得到证明——再次在美国大范围蔓延的新冠病毒让增长领域发生了转移,而没有破坏当前的经济扩张势头。颠覆性病毒变异的剩余风险一直存在,但2022年,新变异毒株很可能不会对经济造成什么影响,不会引发经济恐慌。

零售销售或更强劲

虽然我们无法完全解释消费者信心与消费者支出之间的脱节,但这种脱节本身就让我们有理由为2022年的到来感到高兴。尽管信心低迷,但消费者仍选择继续推动经济增长。2022年,随着导致消费情绪低落的一些原因可能会消退,零售销售可能会变得更加强势,让经济表现更加强劲。(财富中文网)

菲利普·卡尔森-斯莱扎克是波士顿咨询公司纽约办事处的董事总经理兼合伙人,也是该公司的全球首席经济学家。保罗·斯沃茨是波士顿咨询公司旗下亨德森研究所的董事和高级经济学家。

译者:万志文

Surprisingly, 2021 is ending with an abundance of gloom. In November, a prominent survey of consumer confidence was lower than it was at the depths of the COVID crisis in 2020; indeed, there were even times during the Global Financial Crisis that also had better confidence data. Weakening sentiment shows up in other gauges too. If we were to assess the economy on grump alone, one could think we’re in recessionary territory.

The economy cannot be blamed for the pervasive pessimism. The recovery is beating expectations for a second year in a row, with output easily above pre-pandemic levels. The rebound is also decidedly broad-based. For all the talk of a “K-shaped” recovery, this one has reached much broader segments of society than was the case post-2008.

To explain the extra unhappiness, then, two main suspects require closer inspection: current-year inflation and the growing sense of a forever pandemic. While each has the potential to sustain perceptions of economic malaise, neither is likely to undermine the ongoing expansion in 2022. That makes it likely that consumer spending will stay high—despite exceptional levels of grump.

The outperforming recovery

This year again, the U.S. economy is comfortably outperforming expectations. The unemployment rate was expected to be 5% in 2022, but is already down to 4.2%. Year-over-year GDP growth is likely to come in at 5.5%—compared to a median forecast of 3.9% at the start of the year, as compiled by Bloomberg. This year’s strength follows the outperforming recovery of 2020, when the onset of the pandemic triggered universal gloom that obscured the arrival of a vigorous V-shaped recovery.

Growth rates aside, today U.S. output is above pre-pandemic levels and—barring another recessionary shock—stands a good chance of overshooting its pre-pandemic trend, meaning that output is likely to be higher in the future than was expected before the COVID crisis struck.

Households, meanwhile, have not been left out of this recovery. Cash balances are more than $2 trillion higher than pre-pandemic, and net wealth of households has risen by more than 20%.

Not so K-shaped

A commonly cited narrative for the disconnect between economic performance and popular sentiment is the idea that this recovery is uneven, leaving behind large parts of the population. Yet, the much-invoked narrative of a K-shaped recovery, where some rise but many lose, does not hold up that well. While economic hardship continues for many, and the struggles are far from over, it would be wrong to think the recovery has benefited only small segments of the population.

Yes, the top 20% of the income distribution grew their net wealth particularly strongly (by more than $17 trillion), but the bottom 20% also grew their wealth—by over $300 billion. That stands in stark contrast to the post-2008 recovery, when many years after the financial crisis, that lower income cohort was still struggling with shrinking net wealth. So, while inequality likely went up during the pandemic, the whole distribution has received a net wealth lift.

The middle of the income distribution is also noteworthy. Their asset base—particularly exposed to housing values—got hit hard after 2008 and then made a painfully slow recovery (although they didn’t endure as long a slump as those at the bottom). No such collapse happened during COVID—quite the reverse is true, as rising real estate values lifted housing wealth for owners quite significantly.

The top of the distribution, whose net worth is far more exposed to equities and business ownership, had a far less difficult time recovering after 2008 and recovered in next to no time in 2020. Their wealth rebounded the fastest and gained the most. While each recovery exacerbated wealth inequality, rising inequality when the bottom is falling is quite different from rising inequality when the bottom is also gaining strongly.

Don’t forget the labor market

Neither is it true that households’ economic situation is driven only by stimulus and is thus a one-off that will dissipate. The labor market, the main source of income for nearly everyone, is booming. Unemployment has fallen so rapidly that the economy is now on the verge of “tightness”—a labor market so competitive that workers see meaningful wage gains. After the 2008 recession, it took over 90 months for unemployment to fall below a level considered to be a tight labor market—this time the economy is there after just 18 months.

What’s more, the market is particularly tight at the low end of the wage spectrum where less educated and lower-skilled workers are seeing faster wage gains than higher educated and higher-skilled workers—a very rare occurrence. And this dynamic may persist as job openings, which remain near record highs and dramatically higher than pre-pandemic, are particularly extreme in sectors such as hospitality.

Why are people so grumpy then?

It might be argued that GDP growth rates and the distribution of net worth are fairly technical and not tactile to the general public. But “help wanted“ signs are tactile, as are stock prices, and rising wages.

Of note, the disconnect is not merely between economic performance and consumer sentiment. It is also between consumer sentiment and consumer spending. Retail and food services sales are in a post-pandemic overshoot, nominally running nearly $100 billion above their monthly 2019 pace in 2021—which is 13% higher in real terms. With savings, balance sheets, and labor markets where they are, that spending is very likely to persist rather than collapse in line with what sentiment reports could have us believe.

So, if the strength of the economy can be felt, and money is being spent, we need to look for other drivers to explain extra grump. Two shapers of gloomy economic perceptions stand out: current inflation and the feeling of a forever pandemic. Each of these are real dampers today, but there are good reasons to believe they may ease, if not completely, in 2022.

First, inflation is running at a pace not seen in a generation. And while price growth hasn’t infected the full range of goods and services, it is true that household incomes are getting squeezed in areas where prices are up strongly—such as at the gas pump or in car sales. Additionally, household perceptions may be influenced by a heated public debate and press coverage that has relentlessly covered price spikes.

However, household expectations of inflation have not inflected to expect permanently higher price growth. Expectations are up significantly on the one-year horizon, but five-year expectations have moved only modestly. In other words, households do not currently think inflation is structural or permanent.

There are some good reasons to believe that’s true, no matter the frenzied tone in headlines. Inflation is being driven by the shock from a demand overshoot linked to the strong recovery and compounded by the bottlenecks that have arisen in product and labor markets. This shock inflation is not—at this point—self-sustaining and is likely to slow significantly in 2022. That said, even as price growth moderates, the tight labor market that a strong recovery delivered will persist, meaning wage gains are likely to remain robust. 2022 is likely the year when strong nominal wage gains translate into respectable real wage gains.

Will that change consumer sentiment? Not necessarily. Often forgotten, inflation is a concept that captures the rate of change—not the price levels that impact consumer sentiment. To illustrate, consider gas prices. For their contribution to inflation to moderate, they simply have to stop rising—they do not need to fall for inflation to fall. Yet, as long as price levels remind people each week of price pain, that has the power to sustain their grump. Note that it wasn’t until late 2014 and early 2015, when gas prices fell sharply, that the post-GFC cycle saw a boom in consumers‘ expectations.

The second factor is pandemic fatigue. The uncertainty and instability of living in the COVID economy is unquestionably a downer—just ask yourself. Wondering when school will close or if your travel plans will need to be scrapped, or simply having to take another COVID test, contributes to a dark cloud over many households.

However, the recurrent fears of a repeat of the economic chaos of early 2020 are misplaced. The linkage between the virus and the economy has largely decoupled as (most) economies have learned to live with community spread rather than impose sustained and broad lockdowns. Such decoupling has been true and proven through many recent waves—the resurging virus shifts out growth, rather than breaking an ongoing economic expansion. There is always residual risk of a game-changing mutation, but 2022 may well be the year when new variants are taken with an economic shrug rather than economic terror.

Not too grumpy to spend

While we cannot account fully for the disconnect between consumer sentiment and consumers’ spending, that disconnect itself gives some reason for cheer about 2022. Consumers have chosen to continue to drive economic growth despite their grump, and as some of the reasons for grumpiness may fade, retail sales may be more robust—delivering an even stronger economy in 2022.

Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak is a managing director and partner in BCG’s New York office and the firm’s global chief economist. Paul Swartz is a director and senior economist at the BCG Henderson Institute in New York.

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