大概一年多以前,我就预测了经济衰退将在2023年下半年开始。这是显而易见的。美国连续多年的零利率政策引发了股市、债市和房市泡沫。2022年6月,为了应对飙升至9%的通胀率,美联储开始提高联邦基金利率——即银行间隔夜拆借利率,以冷却商品和服务需求,目标是将通胀率压至2%。
目前,美国通货膨胀的增长速度达到40年之最。由于工资增长显然赶不上物价上涨的速度,美联储必须采取必要手段缓解老百姓的痛苦。简而言之,工资-物价螺旋上升是一个美丽的神话。更确切地说,它要在几轮通胀周期中才会显现。
为了给经济降温,并且将通胀至到目标水平,美联储去年一整年都在快速提高联邦基金利率。利率也从去年3月的近零利零,迅速上调至今年3月的4.75-5.00的区间。
最近的CPI数据显示,2023年2月,美国的物价同比上涨6%,远高于最新的5%的联邦基金目标利率。从历史上看,美联储一般都将联邦基金利率加息至通胀率以上,以遏制恶性通胀。但杰罗姆·鲍威尔毕竟不是保罗·沃尔克。后者曾在40多年前一口气加息至接近18%,远超12%的通胀率水平。至于接下来的几个月,美联储是否会继续加息控通胀,我们还将拭目以待。
不过就在美联储宣布新的加息目标后,美联储主席鲍威尔在3月23日的新闻发布会上表示,除了控制恶性通胀之外,还有一件事值得担忧——那就是硅谷银行和签名银行的倒闭,让美联储的宏观经济管理目标变得复杂了。美联储一般是通过调控利率来抑制通胀(包括通胀预期)的,而当美国经济滑向衰退时,为了提振经济行为,美联储最有效的武器仍然是调控利率。另外,当有银行倒闭时,美联储还要负责确保金融稳定,防止全国各地出现更多的银行挤兑。虽然鲍威尔坚称美国的银行体系是“坚挺”的,但这话究竟有几分可信,只有时间能告诉我们答案。
问题的真相是,美国彼此割裂的准备金制度、宽松货币政策和联邦存款保险杂糅在一起,酿成了一种道德风险,导致了高风险的银行借贷行为。因此,当一家银行财务状况不稳的传言传开时,挤兑就会发生,这充分体现了美国银行系统脆弱的流动性和资债情况。
美联储面临的困局完全是它自己一手造成的。一旦物价上涨加速,通胀预期就会占主导地位——而一般情况下,美联储就会通过大幅调控利率,来抑制公众的债务需求,从而降低市场需求,进而促进物价上涨放缓甚至是下降。
另外,预示衰退即将到来的最好的指标之一,就是收益率曲线的倒转,尤其是10年期美国国债和3月期美国国债之间的收益率差。这条曲线在2022年10月底曾出现倒转。从历史上看,当短期利率高于长期利率时,经济衰退大约会在一年后开始。有趣的是,当收益率曲线在1998年出现倒转时,经济衰退并未随之而来,直至2000年该曲线再次倒转——当时美联储正在收紧信贷以应对互联网泡沫。换句话说,每个“规则”也都是有例外的。
此外,这条收益率曲线还在2019年3月出现过倒转,当时美联储开始提高联邦基金利率,以应对“过热”的经济和强劲的金融市场。
不过美联储随后就“转向”了。就在2020年大选前,时任总统特朗普批评了美联储的加息行为,收益率曲线也随即“转正”。在美国历史上,历届总统曾多次向“独立履职”的美联储表达对其金融政策的看法,而每逢大选年,美联储也会很“讲政治”地对总统的意愿做出回应。所有总统都希望美联储在他寻求连任时,能够帮忙保持流动性的畅通和低利率,以确保经济运转良好。
2020年,为了应对疫情防控而导致的经济衰退,美国出台了大规模的货币刺激政策,但这也让美国在2022年吃到了恶果。美联储史无前例地从2020年初的3.8万亿美元扩表至2022年末的7.1万亿美元,这也为物价的全面上涨提供了动力。随着近几个月广义货币M2的下降,美联储仍在继续缩表,基本上是在有效地从经济中回收流动性,而这又将对价格、失业率和GDP产生什么影响呢?
首先,我们发现金融和高科技行业的失业率开始上升,这些行业自2008年的全球金融危机以来,一直受益于美联储的宽松货币政策。
高盛一直是华尔街盈利和就业情况的风向标,最近,高盛宣布裁员4000人左右,并将削减奖金。如果说高盛打响了2023年华尔街裁员的第一枪,那么紧接着华尔街还将迎来枪林弹雨,而且这种状况还将蔓延至全美。脸书的母公司Meta和亚马逊最近都宣布将再次大规模裁员。如果未来几个月裁员加速,那么一场衰退就将开始,而这也将是对过去几年的宽松政策的调整 。
目前,美国的就业市场总体上看似乎还很强劲,但从长期失业率来看,裁员往往在商业周期衰退阶段的早期就开始了,然后企业意识到,他们必须削减支出,应对货币紧缩和需求放缓的“新常态”,到了这时,裁员的速度就会明显加快。
当经济处于周期的顶峰时,失业率往往也是最低的,这时它一般会“稳定”在周期的最低水平,然后就会开始重新上升。
而当失业率达到政治上无法容忍的水平时,美联储就会“转向”,开始降低联邦基金利率。又一轮的货币宽松热潮被点燃了。
那么,美联储何时才会转向呢?是2023年,还是2024年,或者更晚?现在下结论还为时过早,但是观察失业率的升高水平,则是预言下一波宽松货币政策和下一轮经济增长的最佳指标。
本文作者Murray Sabrin博士是新泽西州拉马波学院金融学名誉教授。
《财富》网站评论文章仅代表作者个人观点,并不代表《财富》杂志的观点和立场。(财富中文网
译者:朴成奎
大概一年多以前,我就预测了经济衰退将在2023年下半年开始。这是显而易见的。美国连续多年的零利率政策引发了股市、债市和房市泡沫。2022年6月,为了应对飙升至9%的通胀率,美联储开始提高联邦基金利率——即银行间隔夜拆借利率,以冷却商品和服务需求,目标是将通胀率压至2%。
目前,美国通货膨胀的增长速度达到40年之最。由于工资增长显然赶不上物价上涨的速度,美联储必须采取必要手段缓解老百姓的痛苦。简而言之,工资-物价螺旋上升是一个美丽的神话。更确切地说,它要在几轮通胀周期中才会显现。
为了给经济降温,并且将通胀至到目标水平,美联储去年一整年都在快速提高联邦基金利率。利率也从去年3月的近零利零,迅速上调至今年3月的4.75-5.00的区间。
最近的CPI数据显示,2023年2月,美国的物价同比上涨6%,远高于最新的5%的联邦基金目标利率。从历史上看,美联储一般都将联邦基金利率加息至通胀率以上,以遏制恶性通胀。但杰罗姆·鲍威尔毕竟不是保罗·沃尔克。后者曾在40多年前一口气加息至接近18%,远超12%的通胀率水平。至于接下来的几个月,美联储是否会继续加息控通胀,我们还将拭目以待。
不过就在美联储宣布新的加息目标后,美联储主席鲍威尔在3月23日的新闻发布会上表示,除了控制恶性通胀之外,还有一件事值得担忧——那就是硅谷银行和签名银行的倒闭,让美联储的宏观经济管理目标变得复杂了。美联储一般是通过调控利率来抑制通胀(包括通胀预期)的,而当美国经济滑向衰退时,为了提振经济行为,美联储最有效的武器仍然是调控利率。另外,当有银行倒闭时,美联储还要负责确保金融稳定,防止全国各地出现更多的银行挤兑。虽然鲍威尔坚称美国的银行体系是“坚挺”的,但这话究竟有几分可信,只有时间能告诉我们答案。
问题的真相是,美国彼此割裂的准备金制度、宽松货币政策和联邦存款保险杂糅在一起,酿成了一种道德风险,导致了高风险的银行借贷行为。因此,当一家银行财务状况不稳的传言传开时,挤兑就会发生,这充分体现了美国银行系统脆弱的流动性和资债情况。
美联储面临的困局完全是它自己一手造成的。一旦物价上涨加速,通胀预期就会占主导地位——而一般情况下,美联储就会通过大幅调控利率,来抑制公众的债务需求,从而降低市场需求,进而促进物价上涨放缓甚至是下降。
另外,预示衰退即将到来的最好的指标之一,就是收益率曲线的倒转,尤其是10年期美国国债和3月期美国国债之间的收益率差。这条曲线在2022年10月底曾出现倒转。从历史上看,当短期利率高于长期利率时,经济衰退大约会在一年后开始。有趣的是,当收益率曲线在1998年出现倒转时,经济衰退并未随之而来,直至2000年该曲线再次倒转——当时美联储正在收紧信贷以应对互联网泡沫。换句话说,每个“规则”也都是有例外的。
此外,这条收益率曲线还在2019年3月出现过倒转,当时美联储开始提高联邦基金利率,以应对“过热”的经济和强劲的金融市场。
不过美联储随后就“转向”了。就在2020年大选前,时任总统特朗普批评了美联储的加息行为,收益率曲线也随即“转正”。在美国历史上,历届总统曾多次向“独立履职”的美联储表达对其金融政策的看法,而每逢大选年,美联储也会很“讲政治”地对总统的意愿做出回应。所有总统都希望美联储在他寻求连任时,能够帮忙保持流动性的畅通和低利率,以确保经济运转良好。
2020年,为了应对疫情防控而导致的经济衰退,美国出台了大规模的货币刺激政策,但这也让美国在2022年吃到了恶果。美联储史无前例地从2020年初的3.8万亿美元扩表至2022年末的7.1万亿美元,这也为物价的全面上涨提供了动力。随着近几个月广义货币M2的下降,美联储仍在继续缩表,基本上是在有效地从经济中回收流动性,而这又将对价格、失业率和GDP产生什么影响呢?
首先,我们发现金融和高科技行业的失业率开始上升,这些行业自2008年的全球金融危机以来,一直受益于美联储的宽松货币政策。
高盛一直是华尔街盈利和就业情况的风向标,最近,高盛宣布裁员4000人左右,并将削减奖金。如果说高盛打响了2023年华尔街裁员的第一枪,那么紧接着华尔街还将迎来枪林弹雨,而且这种状况还将蔓延至全美。脸书的母公司Meta和亚马逊最近都宣布将再次大规模裁员。如果未来几个月裁员加速,那么一场衰退就将开始,而这也将是对过去几年的宽松政策的调整 。
目前,美国的就业市场总体上看似乎还很强劲,但从长期失业率来看,裁员往往在商业周期衰退阶段的早期就开始了,然后企业意识到,他们必须削减支出,应对货币紧缩和需求放缓的“新常态”,到了这时,裁员的速度就会明显加快。
当经济处于周期的顶峰时,失业率往往也是最低的,这时它一般会“稳定”在周期的最低水平,然后就会开始重新上升。
而当失业率达到政治上无法容忍的水平时,美联储就会“转向”,开始降低联邦基金利率。又一轮的货币宽松热潮被点燃了。
那么,美联储何时才会转向呢?是2023年,还是2024年,或者更晚?现在下结论还为时过早,但是观察失业率的升高水平,则是预言下一波宽松货币政策和下一轮经济增长的最佳指标。
本文作者Murray Sabrin博士是新泽西州拉马波学院金融学名誉教授。
《财富》网站评论文章仅代表作者个人观点,并不代表《财富》杂志的观点和立场。(财富中文网
译者:朴成奎
More than a year ago, I forecast a recession would begin in the second half of 2023. That was a no-brainer. Years of virtually zero interest rates ignited stock markets, bond markets, and housing bubbles. To deal with the spike in the inflation rate to 9% in June 2022, the Federal Reserve began to increase the Fed funds rate–the rate banks lend to each other overnight–expecting to cool demand for goods and services and thus bring the rate of inflation down to its target rate of 2%.
With inflation increasing at the fastest pace in more than 40 years, the Fed had to act to deal with the pain families were feeling as wage increases lagged the rise in the cost of living. In short, the wage-price spiral is a myth. More accurately, a price-wage spiral unfolds during inflationary cycles.
In an effort to cool off the economy and get inflation to its target rate, the Federal Reserve began to increase the Fed funds rate rapidly throughout 2022. Rates increased from virtually zero in March of that year to a target range of 4.75-5.00 for March 2023.
Nevertheless, the latest CPI data reveal prices rose 6% in February 2023 compared with the same month the previous year–well above the new Fed funds target rate of 5%. Historically, the Fed would raise its funds rate above the inflation rate to break the back of inflation. In short, Jerome Powell is no Paul Volcker, who raised the Fed funds rate more than four decades ago to nearly 18%–well above the 12% inflation rate (see above). We will have to wait and see if the Fed will raise the Fed funds rate in coming months to bring the inflation rate down.
However, Chairman Powell has another concern besides tweaking the Fed funds rate to slay the inflation dragon, which he addressed during his Mar. 23 press conference after the Fed announced the new funds rate target. The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank complicates the Fed’s task of “managing” the macroeconomy by moving the Fed funds rate up and down to dampen inflation (and inflation expectations) and boost economic activity when the economy eventually slides into a recession. Additionally, the Fed is responsible for ensuring financial stability when banks fail and preventing more bank runs throughout the country. Only time will tell if Chairman Powell’s assertion that the banking system is “sound” turns out to be true.
The truth of the matter is a combination of fractional reserve banking, easy money, and FDIC depositor insurance has created a moral hazard that promotes risky bank lending. Thus, when a rumor of a bank’s shaky financial condition gains traction, a run unfolds, revealing tenuous liquidity situations and weak balance sheets.
The conundrum the Fed faces is of its own making. Once price inflation accelerates, expectations take hold–and it typically takes a large move in interest rates to dampen the public’s appetite for debt, which would reduce demand and hence cause prices to decelerate, if not actually decline.
Meanwhile, one of the best indicators of an impending recession is the inverted yield curve, particularly the difference between the 10-year Treasury note and the three-month T-bill. The curve inverted at the end of October 2022. Historically, when short-term rates rise above the long-term rate a recession begins about a year later. Interestingly, when the yield curve inverted in 1998, a recession did not follow until the curve inverted again in 2000 when the Fed tightened credit to deal with the dot-com bubble. In other words, there are exceptions to every “rule.”
Furthermore, the yield curve inverted in March 2019, when the Fed began to raise the fed funds rate in response to what was perceived to be an “overheated” economy and robust financial markets.
The Federal Reserve then “pivoted”–and the yield curve went positive after then-president Trump criticized the Fed for raising interest rates before the 2020 election. This is one of many episodes in history of a president making his views known to the “independent” Federal Reserve, which usually responds to a president’s wishes going into an election year. All presidents want the Fed to keep the monetary spigot open and interest rates low to make sure the economy is humming when they seek another term.
The massive monetary stimulus of 2020 to deal with the economy’s implosion because of the COVID-19 lockdown came home to roost in 2022. The Fed’s unprecedented increase in its balance sheet from $3.8 trillion in early 2020 to $7.1 trillion by the end of 2022 provided the fuel to raise prices across the board. With M2 declining in recent months and the Fed continuing to shrink its balance sheet, effectively withdrawing liquidity from the economy, what effect will this have on prices, unemployment, and GDP?
We are witnessing the beginning of increasing unemployment in the financial sector and high-tech, which have benefitted from the Fed’s easy money policies since the Great Recession of 2008.
Recently, Goldman Sachs, a bellwether of Wall Street profitability and employment, announced layoffs of around 4,000 employees and cut bonuses. If Goldman’s announcement is a forerunner of 2023’s Wall Street’s downsizing, then higher unemployment is unfolding in the canyons of lower Manhattan–and soon in the rest of the country as 2023 unfolds. Facebook parent Meta and Amazon recently announced another major downsizing of their workforces. If layoffs accelerate in the next few months, a recession–a readjustment to the end of the easy money policies of the past few years–will be underway.
The job market may seem strong overall–but according to a long-term chart of the unemployment rate (above), layoffs tend to begin early in the recession phase of the business cycle, and then accelerate markedly as companies realize they must cut expenses to deal with the new economic reality of tight money and slowing demand.
When the unemployment rate reaches a trough as the economy peaks, it tends to “stabilize” at the lowest level of the cycle–and then it is off to the races.
When unemployment reaches politically intolerable levels, that’s when the Fed “pivots” and begins to lower the fed funds rate. Another easy money boom is ignited.
When will the Fed pivot? 2023? 2024? Later? It is too early to tell–but watching the unemployment rate ratchet up is the best indicator for the next episode of easy money and the next upswing in the economy.
Murray Sabrin, Ph.D., is emeritus professor of finance, Ramapo College of New Jersey.
The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.
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