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这家制造业巨头 70 年来从未裁员,但其他公司恐怕学不来

GEOFF COLVIN
2023-07-24

林肯电气不但从不裁员,还一直保持了行业领先地位。

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焊工用氧-乙炔割炬切割轨道轨条。图片来源:TRISTAN SAVATIER—GETTY IMAGES

没有人确切知道林肯电气(Lincoln Electric)最近一次裁员是什么时候。首席执行官克里斯托弗·梅普斯认为是在20世纪50年代。副总裁阿曼达·巴特勒认为是在20世纪40年代末。文件显示,最近一次裁员时间不晚于1951年,可能早在1925年。无论最近一次裁员何时发生,如今林肯电气的员工没有人亲眼目睹,甚至在最近一次裁员时都未出生。

裁员是商业常态。根据美国劳工统计局(Bureau of Labor Statistics)的数据,每月有超过100万美国员工被裁。因此,对于一家公司来说,在20世纪80年代初的通货膨胀、2000年至2001年的股市暴跌、2008年至2009年的金融危机以及疫情期间都能避免裁员似乎是不合常理的。为了避免裁员,该公司必然要牺牲财务业绩。诚然,该公司会向那些厌恶工作、到点下班的员工支付低于标准的工资(其不裁员政策必然会吸引这样的员工)。

但事实恰恰相反。根据1975年哈佛商学院关于林肯电气的案例研究——哈佛商学院的一位发言人表示,这是该学院有史以来最畅销的案例之一——林肯电气竞争激烈,以至于它“促使几家大公司[包括通用电气(General Electric)]退出该行业”。该公司去年的营收为38亿美元,是全球最大的弧焊设备和耗材生产商之一(有些竞争对手是私营企业,不公布营收)。据美国劳工统计局报告,其财务报表显示,林肯电气在克利夫兰地区主要生产基地的生产人员的工资高于制造业平均水平,约为每周1,075美元。值得注意的是,作为一家老牌制造商,林肯电气并没有成立工会。该公司成立于1895年,于1995年上市。从那时起,标准普尔500指数上涨了740%,而林肯电气的股价则上涨了3834%。

在过去的20年时间里,美国制造业产出一直停滞不前,但林肯电气的营收却增长了15倍。其他公司纷纷叫嚣着学习林肯电气的成功之道,尤其是在经济衰退可能即将到来、裁员焦虑日益加剧的情况下。但答案并不像其他雇主希望的那么简单。林肯电气为了避免裁员,遵循特有的、有着几十年历史的制度,这一制度要求员工和公司在清醒的情况下做出牺牲,各自向对方做出承诺,而这需要相互信任。这一制度在林肯文化中行之有效,但很少有其他公司能够成功实施,甚至林肯电气也不可能在所有业务中都执行这一制度。对于如今的雇主来说,该制度是更具创意的方案,还是可望而不可及的解决方案?

“计划”

梅普斯说:“本周,我收到一封来自美国一家年收入略高于10亿美元的制造公司的电子邮件。该公司希望与我会面,以了解我们的计划。这种情况经常发生。”该公司表示,每三到四个月就会有一次。

林肯电气的制度在内部被称为“计划”,该制度既激进,又看起来不那么简单。生产部门的员工同意让林肯电气根据客户需求在一定范围内增加或减少工时(标准工作时间为每周40小时)。他们按件计酬,而不是按时计酬,并根据每位员工的表现分配年终奖。公司则承诺不会因为业务欠佳而解雇他们。

当首席执行官们与梅普斯会面了解更多情况时,他首先会问他们为什么要采用林肯电气的制度。如果只是为了提高生产率,他说:“从根本上说,这可能不足以成为其生存的基础”。该制度令人印象深刻的结果,只是其总体管理理念中最明显的要素。这种管理理念引导着该公司渡过顺境和逆境,而来访者通常并不了解这一全面战略。他告诉来访者:“如果不了解这一点,从长远来看,你们可能无法在该计划中保持韧性。这将是一个昙花一现的计划”。

这一倡议所蕴含的理念(详尽阐述版)来自一个具有传奇色彩的人物,詹姆斯·F·林肯。他是创始人最小的弟弟,在1914年到1975年期间掌管公司,之前从未管理过任何事务。他不太可能是米尔顿·弗里德曼、伯尼·桑德斯和当今最狂热的利益相关主义传道者的结合体,对工会、总统富兰克林·罗斯福和大多数企业高管不屑一顾。极具表演者天赋的他不遗余力地推广焊接技术,曾赞助过一次征文比赛,并为获胜者提供焊接钢支票。在那个银行通过打孔来取消已付支票的年代,林肯用冲锋枪在焊接支票上打孔。

然而林肯认为工厂工人受到了严重虐待。他在《激励管理》(Incentive Management)一书中写道:“如果一个经理在收入、安全、晋升和尊严等问题上得到与小时工相同的待遇,他很快就会明白管理的真正问题所在。”1914年,他成立了员工咨询委员会,至今仍在运作,并接受了该委员会提出的诸多建议,包括减少工时和增加工资。

该委员会制定了两项至今仍然有效且对整个制度至关重要的变革性政策。第一项是1914年实行的计件工资制,即按个人产出而不是按小时支付工人工资。即使在当时,计件工资制也常常被认为是野蛮,且具有剥削性质的政策,但林肯认为,只要管理得当,计件工资制可以使工人和公司都受益。计件工资制必须做到公平,这样以合理的速度工作(在工人看来)就能得到与计时工资(在该镇从事同样工作)大致相同的报酬。至关重要的是,除非工作方式发生改变,比如公司引进更高效的机器,否则单件工资也不会降低。这种制度激励员工提高技能,埋头苦干,这样他们的收入就会比其他公司从事同样工作的工人高得多。在林肯电气位于克利夫兰地区的工厂里,大约有3,000名工人,他们中的大多数人仍然按这种方式支付工资(少数人的工作与制造产品没有直接关系,如制作工具和模具,他们的工资按小时支付)。

第二项变革性政策于1934年实施,即给当时所有工厂工人发放年终奖——这一概念简单明了,但极不寻常,而且林肯电气的做法也远非如此简单。奖金的丰厚程度令人惊叹,通常相当于基本工资的50%,有时甚至更高,在业绩突出的年份甚至达到100%。这一比例由高管决定,他们的奖金来自另一个资金池。去年是林肯电气业绩表现突出的一年,公司称平均奖金约为37,500美元,相当于普通员工55,970美元基本年薪的67%。总薪酬达到93,470美元。

但奖金并不是平均分配的。主管每年两次根据产出、质量、可靠性和合作情况对每位员工进行评分,决定每位员工应得的份额。这些评分按钟形曲线分布,即平均值必须为100分。每有一名员工被评为110分,就必须有其他员工被评为90分。梅普斯说:“你不能说'我们都是领头羊'。”因此,奖金会相应地进行分配。

这一奖金制度的实施效果令詹姆斯·林肯以外的所有人都感到震惊。在1934年采用该制度后的10年中,他几乎每年都提高奖金总额在基本工资中所占的比例,直到第二次世界大战期间提高到基本工资的100%以上。在此期间,包括奖金在内,每位员工的年均总薪酬增长了170%。该公司认为,在20世纪40年代中期,它支付的制造业工资是世界上最高的。它之所以能够负担得起这样做,是因为每位员工的美元产出也惊人地增加了170%,利润飙升。

这些结果表明,林肯找到了一个更好的办法,但他希望保守这个秘密。他会大致描述实施的制度,但对那些令人瞠目的数字严加保密,直到1944年《财富》杂志在一篇文章中披露了这些数字。林肯电气很快成为佼佼者。哈佛商学院在1948年撰写了一篇关于该公司的案例研究,这是众多案例研究的开山之作。

公司在没有实施不裁员政策的情况下取得了这些成就,但林肯最终得出结论,正如他在《激励管理》一书中所写的那样,“持续就业”是实现“工业效率最大化”的关键。工厂工人经常担心,如果他们的生产力过高,有些人就会失去工作;生产力的提高意味着实现同样的产出所需的工人数量减少,因此有些人会被解雇。但如果他们知道自己的工作有保障,林肯推断,他们会接受新方法和技术。林肯公司于1951年试行了“保证持续雇佣计划”,并于1958年成为公司的正式政策,该计划将涵盖成功通过试用期的所有员工(目前的试用期为三年)。

巨大的代价

不裁员政策有很大的局限性。

该制度涵盖了俄亥俄州东北部的多家工厂(最初是为这些工厂制定的),但无法在林肯电气最近扩张的工厂实施,特别是在国际市场(大多数员工目前工作的地方)。在这其中的许多市场,尤其是欧洲和南美,该制度的某些要素可能违反当地法律或法规。例如,荷兰对绩效薪酬施加了限制。在委内瑞拉,该公司不能采用计件工资制或酌情发放奖金。

理论上讲,在某些地方,如果没有实施全套制度,裁员是有可能发生的,但是否发生过裁员则关乎如何定义裁员。林肯电气的部分增长是通过收购实现的,过去也曾在这些公司实施裁员,包括 2017 年在法国液化空气集团(Air Liquide)的焊接业务部门实施裁员。在林肯看来,这并不是因为目标公司人浮于事而裁员。这是在解决前任雇主的问题。但林肯电气近年来也对其欧洲业务进行了重组,关闭了一些工厂,以便将业务转移到其他地方。大多数人会称之为裁员,这就带来了另一大局限性。詹姆斯·林肯承诺不会因为业务欠佳而裁减生产人员,却没有提及其他潜在原因。林肯电气在其原有的美国业务中避免了以任何理由进行裁员,但在那些阻碍全面实施该计划的地方,詹姆斯·林肯的承诺就变得模棱两可了。

一位发言人表示,无论公司在哪里运营,林肯都会使用当地允许的激励机制要素,比如某种浮动奖金。尽管如此,梅普斯说:“如果我能在林肯电气的每个工厂都实施这项计划,我会这么做的。”

这一计划的实施并不依赖于魔法。工人要为工作得到保障付出代价。焊接业务时好时坏,在经济低迷时期,该公司可以将工人的工作时间减少到每周标准工作时间的75%(30小时)。在经济繁荣时期,工人必须接受加班以满足需求,但他们的工资也会增加。无论哪种情况,员工得到的好处都是工作有保障。

对该公司来说,好处是它可以比大多数雇主更容易、更迅速地即时调整产量和劳动力成本。梅普斯说:“我们的团队每天都在车间进行调整。“我们能够灵活调整看似固定的成本,并在每日轮班的基础上使其更具灵活多变性,这为我们带来了巨大的竞争优势。”

当2020年疫情爆发时,对工业设备的需求骤减,美国的失业率在数周内从3.5%飙升至14.7%。“有多少公司在看到需求下降时迅速做出决定(将劳动力视为固定成本),进行裁员,并关闭工厂?”梅普斯问道。“我们没有这样做。”相反,正如梅普斯所说,公司“撬动了杠杆”,减少了工作时间,为员工提供了数周的无薪自愿休假,并将受到严重打击的业务部门的交叉培训工人调往需求更旺盛的地区。当需求以比预期更快的速度反弹时,这一决定得到了回报。该公司表示,在所有人齐心协力的情况下,该公司可以在竞争对手无法交付产品时交付产品。该公司总就业人数在2020年下降了不到3%,主要是由于自然流失和员工自愿离职,然后在2021年出现反弹。

埋头苦干以获得报酬

林肯电气在俄亥俄州欧几里得的90号州际公路旁有一家生产焊机的大型工厂,占地34英亩。沿着高速公路开一小段路,另一家林肯工厂大量生产焊丝,这些焊丝在焊枪6500度的电弧中熔化,有助于熔化金属件。机器每天生产约35,000英里的焊丝,足够绕地球1.4圈。

现年50岁的马龙·巴恩斯在林肯电气工作了两年,是机械厂的一名装配工。他说:“很长一段时间以来,我一直想来林肯电气工作。我之前的工作都是在餐馆。这里的压力要小得多。”

去年12月,他拿到了第一笔全年奖金。他说:“我尽量不去想奖金会有多少。当我看到奖金时,我震惊了。”有多少?“3万美元多一点。”考虑到林肯电气的计件工资制度,我问他,和他交谈是否会让他的工资减少。他没有说不会。他说:“没关系。”

负责克利夫兰业务的副总裁埃德·克劳斯后来告诉我,没有人的工作日程安排会紧张到不能交谈几分钟。但是,毫无疑问,离开工作岗位意味着产量减少,从而也意味着工资减少。在最近的一次员工咨询委员会会议(每四至六周举行一次)上,一些员工抱怨说,餐厅里的一台微波炉坏了,耽误了他们的工作时间,降低了生产速度。公司很快又购买了一台微波炉。

52岁的比尔·瓦格纳是一名卷线工,他从海军退役后加入林肯电气,已经在这里工作了30年。他承认:“我们埋头苦干。但是,如果你想获得高薪,就必须埋头苦干。我试着告诉年轻员工,你需要磨练。你不能只经受一次。你需要一直经受磨练。”比尔说他喜欢这份工作,并希望再干10年。

即使有不裁员政策,也不是每个人都适合在林肯电气工作。在Glassdoor、Indeed或其他求职网站上查看员工对该公司的评价,你会发现很多批评意见。林肯电气的支持者喜欢高薪和工作有保障,而批评者则不喜欢工作时间的不确定性,而且可能会觉得他们的主管在给员工评分时厚此薄彼。

不裁员政策会持续下去吗?林肯电气并没有保证会持续实施该政策。相反,该公司在其美国证券交易委员会年度报告中指出,“当公司继续正常运营的能力受到不可抵抗力的严重限制时,‘保证持续雇佣计划’就无法继续实施下去。”此外,该公司可以在年底无理由终止该计划,但需提前六个月通知员工。

宝贵的艺术品

更大的问题是,为什么其他雇主不效仿林肯电气的计划。梅普斯说他经常被问到这个问题。“我只是不知道其他公司是否有能力在其业务中建立这种程度的信心。”他指的是员工的信心,即他们会得到公正的评价,获得奖金,并避免被裁。相比之下,梅普斯说,林肯电气有“90年的计划实施经验”。据林肯电气所知,没有一家公司引进了全套计划。

自詹姆斯·林肯时代以来,世界已经发生了变化。该公司表示,其人员流动率低于行业平均水平,但远高于过去。该公司不愿透露其人员流动率。在20世纪60年代,每月的人员流动率不到1%。公司高管认为,一些新员工对拿到奖金没有信心,或者只是不想等到年底,所以他们离职去找底薪更高的工作。在劳动力市场紧张的今天,这样的工作很容易找到。

也许持续雇佣计划已经成为一件宝贵的艺术品,一件只有在很久以前才能创造出的令人钦佩的作品。也许再也不会有其他雇主效仿了。也许有一天,就连林肯电气也不得不放弃它。但就目前而言,作为一个独有的,也许是不可复制的制度的一部分,詹姆斯·林肯的计划仍能起到事半功倍的效果。(财富中文网)

译者:中慧言-王芳

没有人确切知道林肯电气(Lincoln Electric)最近一次裁员是什么时候。首席执行官克里斯托弗·梅普斯认为是在20世纪50年代。副总裁阿曼达·巴特勒认为是在20世纪40年代末。文件显示,最近一次裁员时间不晚于1951年,可能早在1925年。无论最近一次裁员何时发生,如今林肯电气的员工没有人亲眼目睹,甚至在最近一次裁员时都未出生。

裁员是商业常态。根据美国劳工统计局(Bureau of Labor Statistics)的数据,每月有超过100万美国员工被裁。因此,对于一家公司来说,在20世纪80年代初的通货膨胀、2000年至2001年的股市暴跌、2008年至2009年的金融危机以及疫情期间都能避免裁员似乎是不合常理的。为了避免裁员,该公司必然要牺牲财务业绩。诚然,该公司会向那些厌恶工作、到点下班的员工支付低于标准的工资(其不裁员政策必然会吸引这样的员工)。

但事实恰恰相反。根据1975年哈佛商学院关于林肯电气的案例研究——哈佛商学院的一位发言人表示,这是该学院有史以来最畅销的案例之一——林肯电气竞争激烈,以至于它“促使几家大公司[包括通用电气(General Electric)]退出该行业”。该公司去年的营收为38亿美元,是全球最大的弧焊设备和耗材生产商之一(有些竞争对手是私营企业,不公布营收)。据美国劳工统计局报告,其财务报表显示,林肯电气在克利夫兰地区主要生产基地的生产人员的工资高于制造业平均水平,约为每周1,075美元。值得注意的是,作为一家老牌制造商,林肯电气并没有成立工会。该公司成立于1895年,于1995年上市。从那时起,标准普尔500指数上涨了740%,而林肯电气的股价则上涨了3834%。

在过去的20年时间里,美国制造业产出一直停滞不前,但林肯电气的营收却增长了15倍。其他公司纷纷叫嚣着学习林肯电气的成功之道,尤其是在经济衰退可能即将到来、裁员焦虑日益加剧的情况下。但答案并不像其他雇主希望的那么简单。林肯电气为了避免裁员,遵循特有的、有着几十年历史的制度,这一制度要求员工和公司在清醒的情况下做出牺牲,各自向对方做出承诺,而这需要相互信任。这一制度在林肯文化中行之有效,但很少有其他公司能够成功实施,甚至林肯电气也不可能在所有业务中都执行这一制度。对于如今的雇主来说,该制度是更具创意的方案,还是可望而不可及的解决方案?

“计划”

梅普斯说:“本周,我收到一封来自美国一家年收入略高于10亿美元的制造公司的电子邮件。该公司希望与我会面,以了解我们的计划。这种情况经常发生。”该公司表示,每三到四个月就会有一次。

林肯电气的制度在内部被称为“计划”,该制度既激进,又看起来不那么简单。生产部门的员工同意让林肯电气根据客户需求在一定范围内增加或减少工时(标准工作时间为每周40小时)。他们按件计酬,而不是按时计酬,并根据每位员工的表现分配年终奖。公司则承诺不会因为业务欠佳而解雇他们。

当首席执行官们与梅普斯会面了解更多情况时,他首先会问他们为什么要采用林肯电气的制度。如果只是为了提高生产率,他说:“从根本上说,这可能不足以成为其生存的基础”。该制度令人印象深刻的结果,只是其总体管理理念中最明显的要素。这种管理理念引导着该公司渡过顺境和逆境,而来访者通常并不了解这一全面战略。他告诉来访者:“如果不了解这一点,从长远来看,你们可能无法在该计划中保持韧性。这将是一个昙花一现的计划”。

这一倡议所蕴含的理念(详尽阐述版)来自一个具有传奇色彩的人物,詹姆斯·F·林肯。他是创始人最小的弟弟,在1914年到1975年期间掌管公司,之前从未管理过任何事务。他不太可能是米尔顿·弗里德曼、伯尼·桑德斯和当今最狂热的利益相关主义传道者的结合体,对工会、总统富兰克林·罗斯福和大多数企业高管不屑一顾。极具表演者天赋的他不遗余力地推广焊接技术,曾赞助过一次征文比赛,并为获胜者提供焊接钢支票。在那个银行通过打孔来取消已付支票的年代,林肯用冲锋枪在焊接支票上打孔。

然而林肯认为工厂工人受到了严重虐待。他在《激励管理》(Incentive Management)一书中写道:“如果一个经理在收入、安全、晋升和尊严等问题上得到与小时工相同的待遇,他很快就会明白管理的真正问题所在。”1914年,他成立了员工咨询委员会,至今仍在运作,并接受了该委员会提出的诸多建议,包括减少工时和增加工资。

该委员会制定了两项至今仍然有效且对整个制度至关重要的变革性政策。第一项是1914年实行的计件工资制,即按个人产出而不是按小时支付工人工资。即使在当时,计件工资制也常常被认为是野蛮,且具有剥削性质的政策,但林肯认为,只要管理得当,计件工资制可以使工人和公司都受益。计件工资制必须做到公平,这样以合理的速度工作(在工人看来)就能得到与计时工资(在该镇从事同样工作)大致相同的报酬。至关重要的是,除非工作方式发生改变,比如公司引进更高效的机器,否则单件工资也不会降低。这种制度激励员工提高技能,埋头苦干,这样他们的收入就会比其他公司从事同样工作的工人高得多。在林肯电气位于克利夫兰地区的工厂里,大约有3,000名工人,他们中的大多数人仍然按这种方式支付工资(少数人的工作与制造产品没有直接关系,如制作工具和模具,他们的工资按小时支付)。

第二项变革性政策于1934年实施,即给当时所有工厂工人发放年终奖——这一概念简单明了,但极不寻常,而且林肯电气的做法也远非如此简单。奖金的丰厚程度令人惊叹,通常相当于基本工资的50%,有时甚至更高,在业绩突出的年份甚至达到100%。这一比例由高管决定,他们的奖金来自另一个资金池。去年是林肯电气业绩表现突出的一年,公司称平均奖金约为37,500美元,相当于普通员工55,970美元基本年薪的67%。总薪酬达到93,470美元。

但奖金并不是平均分配的。主管每年两次根据产出、质量、可靠性和合作情况对每位员工进行评分,决定每位员工应得的份额。这些评分按钟形曲线分布,即平均值必须为100分。每有一名员工被评为110分,就必须有其他员工被评为90分。梅普斯说:“你不能说'我们都是领头羊'。”因此,奖金会相应地进行分配。

这一奖金制度的实施效果令詹姆斯·林肯以外的所有人都感到震惊。在1934年采用该制度后的10年中,他几乎每年都提高奖金总额在基本工资中所占的比例,直到第二次世界大战期间提高到基本工资的100%以上。在此期间,包括奖金在内,每位员工的年均总薪酬增长了170%。该公司认为,在20世纪40年代中期,它支付的制造业工资是世界上最高的。它之所以能够负担得起这样做,是因为每位员工的美元产出也惊人地增加了170%,利润飙升。

这些结果表明,林肯找到了一个更好的办法,但他希望保守这个秘密。他会大致描述实施的制度,但对那些令人瞠目的数字严加保密,直到1944年《财富》杂志在一篇文章中披露了这些数字。林肯电气很快成为佼佼者。哈佛商学院在1948年撰写了一篇关于该公司的案例研究,这是众多案例研究的开山之作。

公司在没有实施不裁员政策的情况下取得了这些成就,但林肯最终得出结论,正如他在《激励管理》一书中所写的那样,“持续就业”是实现“工业效率最大化”的关键。工厂工人经常担心,如果他们的生产力过高,有些人就会失去工作;生产力的提高意味着实现同样的产出所需的工人数量减少,因此有些人会被解雇。但如果他们知道自己的工作有保障,林肯推断,他们会接受新方法和技术。林肯公司于1951年试行了“保证持续雇佣计划”,并于1958年成为公司的正式政策,该计划将涵盖成功通过试用期的所有员工(目前的试用期为三年)。

巨大的代价

不裁员政策有很大的局限性。

该制度涵盖了俄亥俄州东北部的多家工厂(最初是为这些工厂制定的),但无法在林肯电气最近扩张的工厂实施,特别是在国际市场(大多数员工目前工作的地方)。在这其中的许多市场,尤其是欧洲和南美,该制度的某些要素可能违反当地法律或法规。例如,荷兰对绩效薪酬施加了限制。在委内瑞拉,该公司不能采用计件工资制或酌情发放奖金。

理论上讲,在某些地方,如果没有实施全套制度,裁员是有可能发生的,但是否发生过裁员则关乎如何定义裁员。林肯电气的部分增长是通过收购实现的,过去也曾在这些公司实施裁员,包括 2017 年在法国液化空气集团(Air Liquide)的焊接业务部门实施裁员。在林肯看来,这并不是因为目标公司人浮于事而裁员。这是在解决前任雇主的问题。但林肯电气近年来也对其欧洲业务进行了重组,关闭了一些工厂,以便将业务转移到其他地方。大多数人会称之为裁员,这就带来了另一大局限性。詹姆斯·林肯承诺不会因为业务欠佳而裁减生产人员,却没有提及其他潜在原因。林肯电气在其原有的美国业务中避免了以任何理由进行裁员,但在那些阻碍全面实施该计划的地方,詹姆斯·林肯的承诺就变得模棱两可了。

一位发言人表示,无论公司在哪里运营,林肯都会使用当地允许的激励机制要素,比如某种浮动奖金。尽管如此,梅普斯说:“如果我能在林肯电气的每个工厂都实施这项计划,我会这么做的。”

这一计划的实施并不依赖于魔法。工人要为工作得到保障付出代价。焊接业务时好时坏,在经济低迷时期,该公司可以将工人的工作时间减少到每周标准工作时间的75%(30小时)。在经济繁荣时期,工人必须接受加班以满足需求,但他们的工资也会增加。无论哪种情况,员工得到的好处都是工作有保障。

对该公司来说,好处是它可以比大多数雇主更容易、更迅速地即时调整产量和劳动力成本。梅普斯说:“我们的团队每天都在车间进行调整。“我们能够灵活调整看似固定的成本,并在每日轮班的基础上使其更具灵活多变性,这为我们带来了巨大的竞争优势。”

当2020年疫情爆发时,对工业设备的需求骤减,美国的失业率在数周内从3.5%飙升至14.7%。“有多少公司在看到需求下降时迅速做出决定(将劳动力视为固定成本),进行裁员,并关闭工厂?”梅普斯问道。“我们没有这样做。”相反,正如梅普斯所说,公司“撬动了杠杆”,减少了工作时间,为员工提供了数周的无薪自愿休假,并将受到严重打击的业务部门的交叉培训工人调往需求更旺盛的地区。当需求以比预期更快的速度反弹时,这一决定得到了回报。该公司表示,在所有人齐心协力的情况下,该公司可以在竞争对手无法交付产品时交付产品。该公司总就业人数在2020年下降了不到3%,主要是由于自然流失和员工自愿离职,然后在2021年出现反弹。

埋头苦干以获得报酬

林肯电气在俄亥俄州欧几里得的90号州际公路旁有一家生产焊机的大型工厂,占地34英亩。沿着高速公路开一小段路,另一家林肯工厂大量生产焊丝,这些焊丝在焊枪6500度的电弧中熔化,有助于熔化金属件。机器每天生产约35,000英里的焊丝,足够绕地球1.4圈。

现年50岁的马龙·巴恩斯在林肯电气工作了两年,是机械厂的一名装配工。他说:“很长一段时间以来,我一直想来林肯电气工作。我之前的工作都是在餐馆。这里的压力要小得多。”

去年12月,他拿到了第一笔全年奖金。他说:“我尽量不去想奖金会有多少。当我看到奖金时,我震惊了。”有多少?“3万美元多一点。”考虑到林肯电气的计件工资制度,我问他,和他交谈是否会让他的工资减少。他没有说不会。他说:“没关系。”

负责克利夫兰业务的副总裁埃德·克劳斯后来告诉我,没有人的工作日程安排会紧张到不能交谈几分钟。但是,毫无疑问,离开工作岗位意味着产量减少,从而也意味着工资减少。在最近的一次员工咨询委员会会议(每四至六周举行一次)上,一些员工抱怨说,餐厅里的一台微波炉坏了,耽误了他们的工作时间,降低了生产速度。公司很快又购买了一台微波炉。

52岁的比尔·瓦格纳是一名卷线工,他从海军退役后加入林肯电气,已经在这里工作了30年。他承认:“我们埋头苦干。但是,如果你想获得高薪,就必须埋头苦干。我试着告诉年轻员工,你需要磨练。你不能只经受一次。你需要一直经受磨练。”比尔说他喜欢这份工作,并希望再干10年。

即使有不裁员政策,也不是每个人都适合在林肯电气工作。在Glassdoor、Indeed或其他求职网站上查看员工对该公司的评价,你会发现很多批评意见。林肯电气的支持者喜欢高薪和工作有保障,而批评者则不喜欢工作时间的不确定性,而且可能会觉得他们的主管在给员工评分时厚此薄彼。

不裁员政策会持续下去吗?林肯电气并没有保证会持续实施该政策。相反,该公司在其美国证券交易委员会年度报告中指出,“当公司继续正常运营的能力受到不可抵抗力的严重限制时,‘保证持续雇佣计划’就无法继续实施下去。”此外,该公司可以在年底无理由终止该计划,但需提前六个月通知员工。

宝贵的艺术品

更大的问题是,为什么其他雇主不效仿林肯电气的计划。梅普斯说他经常被问到这个问题。“我只是不知道其他公司是否有能力在其业务中建立这种程度的信心。”他指的是员工的信心,即他们会得到公正的评价,获得奖金,并避免被裁。相比之下,梅普斯说,林肯电气有“90年的计划实施经验”。据林肯电气所知,没有一家公司引进了全套计划。

自詹姆斯·林肯时代以来,世界已经发生了变化。该公司表示,其人员流动率低于行业平均水平,但远高于过去。该公司不愿透露其人员流动率。在20世纪60年代,每月的人员流动率不到1%。公司高管认为,一些新员工对拿到奖金没有信心,或者只是不想等到年底,所以他们离职去找底薪更高的工作。在劳动力市场紧张的今天,这样的工作很容易找到。

也许持续雇佣计划已经成为一件宝贵的艺术品,一件只有在很久以前才能创造出的令人钦佩的作品。也许再也不会有其他雇主效仿了。也许有一天,就连林肯电气也不得不放弃它。但就目前而言,作为一个独有的,也许是不可复制的制度的一部分,詹姆斯·林肯的计划仍能起到事半功倍的效果。(财富中文网)

译者:中慧言-王芳

No one is sure when Lincoln Electric had its most recent layoff. CEO Christopher Mapes thinks it was in the 1950s. Vice president Amanda Butler believes it was the late 1940s. Documents suggest it was no later than 1951 and could have been as long as 1925. Whenever it was, no one at Lincoln Electric today was there to witness it, or maybe even alive when it happened.

Layoffs are a fact of business life. Over 1 million U.S. workers lose their jobs that way every month, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. So for a company to avoid layoffs through the towering inflation of the early 1980s, the stock market plunge of 2000-2001, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, and the pandemic seems abnormal. To avoid layoffs, surely such a company must sacrifice financial performance. Surely it pays substandard wages to work-averse, clock-watching employees its no-layoffs policy must attract.

But the reality is just the opposite. Lincoln Electric is ferociously competitive, so much so that it “encouraged the exit of several major companies (including General Electric) from the industry,” according to a 1975 Harvard Business School case study on Lincoln—one of the best-selling cases the school has ever produced, says an HBS spokesperson. The company, which reported revenue of $3.8 billion last year, is among the world’s largest producers of arc welding equipment and supplies (some competitors are privately held and don’t publish revenues). Financial statements show that Lincoln’s production employees at its primary manufacturing sites in the Cleveland area receive pay above the manufacturing industry average—around $1,075 a week, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported. And remarkably, for an old manufacturer, Lincoln Electric isn’t unionized. Founded in 1895, the company went public in 1995. Since then, the S&P 500 is up 740%, while Lincoln Electric stock is up 3,834%.

U.S. manufacturing output has stagnated over the past 20 years, but Lincoln’s revenue has grown 15-fold. Other companies clamor to learn how Lincoln does it, especially as layoff anxiety mounts with a recession perhaps on the horizon. But the answer isn’t as easy as other employers might wish. Lincoln avoids layoffs by following a unique, decades-old system that requires sobering sacrifices by employees and the company, each making promises to the other that require mutual trust. That system works within the Lincoln culture, but few, if any, other companies have implemented it successfully—and even Lincoln can’t execute it in every part of its business. Is the system an innovative answer for today’s employers, or is it a tantalizing solution just out of reach?

‘The program’

“I got an email this week from a manufacturing company in the United States, slightly over a billion dollars in annual revenue. Wanted to meet with me to talk about our program,” says Mapes. “It happens a lot.” Once every three or four months, the company says.

The Lincoln Electric system, known internally as “the program,” is radical and deceptively simple. Production employees agree to let Lincoln increase or decrease their standard 40-hour workweek within limits based on customer demand. They get paid by piecework instead of the hour and receive a year-end bonus reflecting each worker’s performance. The company, in turn, pledges not to lay them off for lack of business.

When CEOs visit Mapes to learn more, he first asks them why they want to install the Lincoln system. If it’s just to increase productivity, he says, “That may not be enough, foundationally, for it to survive.” The system’s impressive results are only the most visible elements of an overarching philosophy of management that guides the business through good times and bad, a comprehensive strategy that Mapes’s visitors typically don’t understand. Without that, he tells them, “You’re probably not going to have the resilience in the program longer term. It’ll be a flash-in-the-pan program.”

The thoroughly elaborated philosophy that undergirds the initiative comes from a larger-than-life character, James F. Lincoln, the youngest brother of the founder, who ran the company from 1914 to 1975, having never previously managed anything. An unlikely amalgam of Milton Friedman, Bernie Sanders, and today’s most fervent stakeholder evangelists, he disdained labor unions, President Franklin Roosevelt, and most corporate executives. He tirelessly promoted welding with a showman’s flair, once sponsoring an essay contest and paying winners with welded-steel checks. Back in those days, when banks canceled paid checks by perforating them, Lincoln had his welded checks perforated with submachine guns.

Yet Lincoln thought factory workers were grievously mistreated. He wrote in his book Incentive Management, “If a manager received the same treatment in matters of income, security, advancement, and dignity as the hourly worker, he would soon understand the real problem of management.” He established an employee advisory board in 1914, still in operation, and accepted many of its suggestions, including reducing hours and increasing wages.

Two transformational policies, still in force and vital to the overall system, resulted from that board. The first was the adoption in 1914 of a piecework system, paying workers not by the hour but by individual output. Even then, piecework was often considered barbaric and exploitative, but Lincoln thought that, properly managed, it could benefit workers and the company. The pay per piece had to be fair so that working at a reasonable pace (in the worker’s view) would pay about the same as the hourly wage for that job in that town. Crucially, the pay per piece also couldn’t be reduced unless the way of doing the job changed, for example, if the company introduced more efficient machines. The system incentivized workers to improve their skills and work hard, in which case they could earn much more than their counterparts at the same job in other companies. Most workers at Lincoln Electric’s Cleveland-area factories, some 3,000, are still paid this way (a few whose jobs aren’t related directly to building the product, such as making tools and dies, are paid hourly).

The second transformational policy, adopted in 1934, was a year-end bonus for all factory workers at the time–straightforward in concept but highly unusual and far from simple as practiced at Lincoln Electric. The bonus can be stunningly generous, often equaling 50% of base pay and occasionally much more, even 100% in outstanding years. The proportion is decided by the top executives, whose bonuses come from a different pool of money. Last year, an excellent year for Lincoln, the average bonus was about $37,500, the company says, equaling some 67% of the average employee’s annual base pay of $55,970. Total pay works out to $93,470.

But the bonuses aren’t doled out equally. Twice-yearly ratings from their supervisor determine each employee’s portion based on output, quality, dependability, and cooperation. Those ratings are distributed on a bell curve, meaning they must average 100. For every worker rated 110, some other worker must be rated 90. “You’re not allowed to say, ‘We’re all A players,’” Mapes says. The bonus pool is allocated accordingly.

The results of implementing this bonus system would have astounded anyone other than James Lincoln. In the 10 years after the system’s adoption in 1934, he increased the bonus pool as a percentage of base pay almost every year until it rose above 100% of base pay during World War II. Including bonuses, the total annual average pay per worker increased 170% in that period. The company believes it paid the highest manufacturing wages in the world at that time, in the mid-1940s. It could afford to do so because, remarkably, dollar output per worker also increased 170%, and profits rocketed.

As those results showed, Lincoln had found a better way, and he wanted to keep it a secret. He would broadly describe his system but kept the eye-popping numbers closely guarded until Fortune revealed them in a 1944 article. Lincoln Electric quickly became a corporate celebrity. The Harvard Business School wrote a case study about the company in 1948, the first of many.

The company achieved all this without a no-layoffs policy, but Lincoln eventually concluded that “continuous employment” was essential to achieving “maximum efficiency in industry,” as he wrote in Incentive Management. Factory workers often fear that if they become too productive, some will lose their jobs; increased productivity means fewer workers can produce the same output, so some will get fired. But if they know their job is secure, Lincoln reasoned, they’ll embrace new methods and technologies. Lincoln adopted the Guaranteed Continuous Employment Plan on a trial basis in 1951, and it became official company policy in 1958, covering employees after they had come successfully through a trial period, currently set at three years.

Big tradeoffs

The no-layoffs policy comes with significant limitations.

It covers the multiple northeast Ohio factories for which it was originally created but can’t be instituted at the locations where Lincoln has expanded recently, especially in the international markets where most employees now work. In many of those markets, notably Europe and South America, some elements of the system would violate local laws or regulations. The Netherlands imposes restrictions on pay for performance, for example. In Venezuela, the company can’t use piecework pay or discretionary bonuses.

Layoffs are theoretically possible in some locations without the full system in place, though whether any have occurred is a matter of definition. Lincoln has grown in part by acquisition and has laid off employees at those companies in the past, including France’s Air Liquide welding business in 2017. In Lincoln’s view, that isn’t a layoff because the target company was overstaffed. It’s fixing a previous owner’s problems. But Lincoln Electric has also restructured its European operations in recent years, closing some locations in order to move operations elsewhere. Most people would call that a layoff, which brings up another limitation. James Lincoln promised not to lay off production workers for lack of business, leaving other potential causes unmentioned. Lincoln Electric has avoided layoffs for any reason in its original U.S. operations, but in locales that hinder the full program’s use, the spirit of James Lincoln’s guarantee becomes murky.

Wherever the company operates, a spokesperson says, Lincoln uses locally permissible elements of its incentive system, such as some kind of variable bonus. Still, Mapes says, “If I could put the program everywhere at Lincoln Electric, I would.”

The program doesn’t rely on magic. Workers pay a price for job security. The welding business booms and busts, and in downturns, the company can cut workers’ hours to as little as 75% (30 hours) of the workweek. In booms, workers must accept overtime to meet demand, but their pay also increases. The employee benefit in either scenario is that they keep their jobs.

The upside for the company is that it can instantly adjust output and tweak its labor costs more easily and quickly than most employers. “Our team makes adjustments daily, right on the shop floor,” Mapes says. “Our ability to flex what looks like fixed cost and make it more variable on a daily shift-by-shift basis gives us a huge competitive advantage.”

When the pandemic hit in 2020, and demand for industrial equipment plunged, U.S. unemployment spiked from 3.5% to 14.7% in weeks. “How many companies quickly went in when they saw demand drop, and they attacked labor as fixed costs, laid people off, shut down facilities?” Mapes asks. “We didn’t.” Instead, the company “pulled our levers,” as Mapes says, reducing work hours, offering employees a few weeks of unpaid voluntary time off, and transferring cross-trained workers in badly hit operations to areas with stronger demand. That decision paid off when demand surged back faster than anticipated. With all hands on deck, the company says it could deliver products when competitors couldn’t. Total employment declined less than 3% in 2020, mostly by attrition and employees accepting voluntary buyouts, then rebounded in 2021.

Working hard to get paid

The vast factory where Lincoln Electric makes welding machines just off I-90 in Euclid, Ohio, occupies 34 acres under one roof. A short drive up the highway, another Lincoln factory produces huge quantities of the wires that melt in the welding torch’s 6,500-degree electric arc and help fuse metal pieces. Machines shoot out some 35,000 miles of wire a day, enough to go around the world 1.4 times.

Marlon Barnes, 50, who has been at Lincoln for two years, is an assembler in the machine plant. “I’d been trying to get a job at Lincoln for a long time,” he says. “My previous jobs had been at restaurants. The stress level here is way less.”

Last December, he received his first full-year bonus. “I tried not to think about what it would be,” he says. “When I saw it, I was shocked.” How much? “A little over $30,000.” In light of Lincoln’s piecework pay system, I ask if I’m costing him money by talking with him. He doesn’t say no. He says, “It’s okay.”

Ed Crouse, vice president for Cleveland operations, tells me later that no one is so tightly scheduled that they can’t talk for a few minutes. But, yes, time away from the task means less production and, thus, less pay. At a recent employee advisory board meeting (held every four to six weeks), some employees complained that one of the microwaves in the lunchroom wasn’t working, cutting into their work time and slowing production. The company quickly brought in another microwave.

Bill Wagner, 52, a coil winder, has been at Lincoln for 30 years, joining after leaving the Navy. “We work hard,” he admits. “But you have to work hard if you want to get paid well. I try to tell the younger employees that you need discipline. You can’t just do it once. You need to have it all the time.” Bill says he enjoys his job and wants to stay another 10 years.

Even with a no-layoffs policy, working at Lincoln Electric isn’t for everyone. Examine employee ratings of the company at Glassdoor, Indeed, or other job sites, and you’ll find plenty of criticism. Its fans like the pay and job security, while critics dislike the uncertainty of when they’ll be working and may feel their supervisor plays favorites when rating workers.

Will the no-layoffs policy survive? Lincoln doesn’t promise it will. On the contrary, the company states in its annual SEC report that the Guaranteed Continuous Employment Plan “does not guarantee employment when the Company’s ability to continue normal operations is seriously restricted by events beyond the control of the Company.” In addition, the company can terminate the plan at year-end without reason and with six months’ notice.

A valuable artifact

The larger question is why other employers don’t replicate Lincoln’s program. Mapes says he’s often asked that question. “I just don’t know whether other companies have the ability in their business to build that level of confidence.” He’s referring to employees’ faith that they’ll be rated fairly, receive bonuses, and dodge layoffs. By contrast, Mapes says, Lincoln has “90 years of running the program.” Lincoln does not know of any company that has imported the full system.

The world has changed since James Lincoln’s day. The company says its turnover rate, which it won’t disclose, is lower than the industry average but much higher than it used to be. In the 1960s, it was less than 1% monthly. Company executives believe some new employees aren’t confident they’ll receive bonuses or just don’t want to wait until year-end, and they leave for jobs with higher base pay. Such jobs are easy to find in today’s tight labor market.

Maybe the continuous employment plan has become a valuable artifact, an admired creation that could have been built only in some long-ago era. Maybe no other employer will ever copy it. Maybe, someday, even Lincoln Electric might have to abandon it. But for now—as one part of a unique and perhaps irreproducible system—James Lincoln’s program is still working extraordinarily well.

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