近日,特许通讯公司(Charter Communications)与迪士尼公司(Disney)的22亿美元纠纷一案吸引了不少人的关注。作为美国最大的有线电视运营商,由于它迟迟无法与迪士尼达成协议,美国将有约1,500万观众无法在电视上收看ESPN的节目和体育赛事的实况转播。9月7日,特许通讯的首席执行官克里斯·温弗瑞在出席高盛集团(Goldman Sachs)的一次活动时被问到特许通讯是否会放弃体育节目,他表示这种可能性“越来越有可能成为现实”。这无疑给迪士尼传达了一个带有威胁性的信号。
从9月1日起,特许通讯采取了前所未有的措施,在其电视机顶盒上屏蔽了迪士尼的所有频道。特许通讯表示,希望迪士尼允许观众免费访问它的各种流媒体服务——比如Disney+和ESPN+等等。理由是在当下这个有线电视垂死挣扎的时代,传统的有线电视营利模式,也就是制片人从有线公司收取费用,再将它转嫁给消费者那套办法已经早已不适合实际了。
温弗瑞说:“我们必须强调,应该适可而止了,否则我们只能转向另一种模式。”
迪士尼向《财富》杂志提供的一份声明显示,特许通讯已经多次拒绝了迪士尼关于延长谈判和保留其频道的提议。
温弗瑞称,如果特许通讯真的不再使用迪士尼的频道,那么它的有线电视套餐就将精简成一个更小也更便宜的“普通娱乐套餐”。这样做的一个重要原因是,如果没有了迪士尼的重磅产品ESPN,温弗瑞对特许通讯上线的其他体育节目能否更新也将不抱任何信心。届时这对整个电视行业都将是一个巨大的变化。可以说,来自有线电视行业的合同构成了体育和电视这两个行业的生存基础——例如最大的一笔体育赛事转播合同,就是美国国家橄榄球联盟(NFL)与美国三大有线运营商和ESPN以及亚马逊(Amazon)Prime签订的价值1,100亿美元的合同。
对于整整一代人来说,ESPN都是他们在有线电视上看得最多的节目。来自Sportico公司的数据显示,ESPN会向每个有线电视用户收取9.42美元的月费,哪怕你这个月压根没有收看一场比赛。实际上,以ESPN为代表的一众强制性高消费的有线频道,正是导致观众愤而放弃有线电视并转投流媒体服务的主要推手。由此才带来了Netflix的诞生、流媒体服务大战,从而才有了今日有线电视行业行将就木的格局。
温弗瑞声称,这场纠纷拖得越久,特许通讯对与迪士尼达成协议的兴趣就越小。他的理由是,在此期间,就算是有顾客流失了,这对特许通讯也是有好处的,这会让公司知道谁是真正想看体育节目的人,谁才是公司的“核心普通观众群”。对于前一部分用户,能够通过流媒体服务或者点播服务为其提供体育节目。这样一来,特许通讯公司就可以“使那些真正寻找体育内容并且愿意为其付费的消费者拥有自行选择的权利”。
按照温弗瑞设想的方案,公司应该将有线电视和流媒体捆绑在一起。他表示,传统媒体公司迫于华尔街的压力,往往将流媒体和有线电视业务一分为二。“他们非常关注直接面向消费者的业务,就好像它们是两个完全独立的业务一样,但我并不认为它们是独立的业务,你必须把它们综合起来看,这样才能建立统一的现金流。”
他还指出,像迪士尼这样的老牌媒体公司,为了追求流媒体服务的盈利,甚至不惜让自己的“有线电视节目付之一炬”。温弗瑞认为,这是一种失败的做法,因为这些公司将最好的内容都放在了流媒体上,使得本就陷入困境的有线电视业务每况愈下。而最吃亏的还是消费者,因为消费者必须交两笔费用,才可以收看自己想看的所有节目。他说:“那种把所有东西都打包进套餐里,不管消费者想不想要、重不重视、负担不负担得起的做法,以后不会再管用了。”
温弗瑞还表示,他对迪士尼有两个主要的担忧:一是它的涨价速度超过了消费者价格指数,二是它有最低家庭消费门槛,这对消费者具有一定的强迫性。
当被问到双方的谈判取得了哪些进展时,温弗瑞直言不讳地说:“如果我有什么实质性进展需要强调,我一定会的。这样你就会知道我们在做什么。”(财富中文网)
译者:朴成奎
近日,特许通讯公司(Charter Communications)与迪士尼公司(Disney)的22亿美元纠纷一案吸引了不少人的关注。作为美国最大的有线电视运营商,由于它迟迟无法与迪士尼达成协议,美国将有约1,500万观众无法在电视上收看ESPN的节目和体育赛事的实况转播。9月7日,特许通讯的首席执行官克里斯·温弗瑞在出席高盛集团(Goldman Sachs)的一次活动时被问到特许通讯是否会放弃体育节目,他表示这种可能性“越来越有可能成为现实”。这无疑给迪士尼传达了一个带有威胁性的信号。
从9月1日起,特许通讯采取了前所未有的措施,在其电视机顶盒上屏蔽了迪士尼的所有频道。特许通讯表示,希望迪士尼允许观众免费访问它的各种流媒体服务——比如Disney+和ESPN+等等。理由是在当下这个有线电视垂死挣扎的时代,传统的有线电视营利模式,也就是制片人从有线公司收取费用,再将它转嫁给消费者那套办法已经早已不适合实际了。
温弗瑞说:“我们必须强调,应该适可而止了,否则我们只能转向另一种模式。”
迪士尼向《财富》杂志提供的一份声明显示,特许通讯已经多次拒绝了迪士尼关于延长谈判和保留其频道的提议。
温弗瑞称,如果特许通讯真的不再使用迪士尼的频道,那么它的有线电视套餐就将精简成一个更小也更便宜的“普通娱乐套餐”。这样做的一个重要原因是,如果没有了迪士尼的重磅产品ESPN,温弗瑞对特许通讯上线的其他体育节目能否更新也将不抱任何信心。届时这对整个电视行业都将是一个巨大的变化。可以说,来自有线电视行业的合同构成了体育和电视这两个行业的生存基础——例如最大的一笔体育赛事转播合同,就是美国国家橄榄球联盟(NFL)与美国三大有线运营商和ESPN以及亚马逊(Amazon)Prime签订的价值1,100亿美元的合同。
对于整整一代人来说,ESPN都是他们在有线电视上看得最多的节目。来自Sportico公司的数据显示,ESPN会向每个有线电视用户收取9.42美元的月费,哪怕你这个月压根没有收看一场比赛。实际上,以ESPN为代表的一众强制性高消费的有线频道,正是导致观众愤而放弃有线电视并转投流媒体服务的主要推手。由此才带来了Netflix的诞生、流媒体服务大战,从而才有了今日有线电视行业行将就木的格局。
温弗瑞声称,这场纠纷拖得越久,特许通讯对与迪士尼达成协议的兴趣就越小。他的理由是,在此期间,就算是有顾客流失了,这对特许通讯也是有好处的,这会让公司知道谁是真正想看体育节目的人,谁才是公司的“核心普通观众群”。对于前一部分用户,能够通过流媒体服务或者点播服务为其提供体育节目。这样一来,特许通讯公司就可以“使那些真正寻找体育内容并且愿意为其付费的消费者拥有自行选择的权利”。
按照温弗瑞设想的方案,公司应该将有线电视和流媒体捆绑在一起。他表示,传统媒体公司迫于华尔街的压力,往往将流媒体和有线电视业务一分为二。“他们非常关注直接面向消费者的业务,就好像它们是两个完全独立的业务一样,但我并不认为它们是独立的业务,你必须把它们综合起来看,这样才能建立统一的现金流。”
他还指出,像迪士尼这样的老牌媒体公司,为了追求流媒体服务的盈利,甚至不惜让自己的“有线电视节目付之一炬”。温弗瑞认为,这是一种失败的做法,因为这些公司将最好的内容都放在了流媒体上,使得本就陷入困境的有线电视业务每况愈下。而最吃亏的还是消费者,因为消费者必须交两笔费用,才可以收看自己想看的所有节目。他说:“那种把所有东西都打包进套餐里,不管消费者想不想要、重不重视、负担不负担得起的做法,以后不会再管用了。”
温弗瑞还表示,他对迪士尼有两个主要的担忧:一是它的涨价速度超过了消费者价格指数,二是它有最低家庭消费门槛,这对消费者具有一定的强迫性。
当被问到双方的谈判取得了哪些进展时,温弗瑞直言不讳地说:“如果我有什么实质性进展需要强调,我一定会的。这样你就会知道我们在做什么。”(财富中文网)
译者:朴成奎
Charter Communications CEO Chris Winfrey has a message for Disney in the companies’ $2.2 billion dispute over cable television. With an estimated 15 million missing out on ESPN and live sports since the country’s largest cable carrier was unable to agree on terms with one of the dominant content providers, Winfrey was asked at a Goldman Sachs event on Thursday about a sportsless future. He called the possibility “more and more of a potential reality.”
As of September 1, Charter took the unprecedented step of blacking out all Disney-owned channels on its cable boxes. Charter wants Disney to grant its customers free access to the Magic Kingdom’s various streaming services, such as Disney+ and ESPN+, arguing that the current financial model of cable television, where programmers receive a fee from cable companies who then pass the cost on to their consumers, no longer works in the days of a dying cable business.
“We had to say enough is enough, or else we’re gonna have to move on to a different model,” Winfrey said.
Disney says Charter rejected multiple offers to extend negotiations and keep its channels on Charter’s airwaves, according to a company statement provided to Fortune.
If Charter were indeed to move forward without Disney’s channels, its cable package would be a smaller, cheaper “general entertainment” package, Winfrey says. One of the main reasons for the pared-down version of cable is that without Disney’s sports juggernaut ESPN, Winfrey doesn’t think Charter would renew most of its other sports offerings. This would be a dramatic change for the TV business, as sports contracts from cable TV—led by the NFL’s $110 billion package with three major networks, ESPN and Amazon Prime—form the backbone of both the sports and TV industries.
ESPN has been the big dog in cable TV for over a generation, commanding an average carrier fee of $9.42 per month, according to Sportico, from every cable subscriber, whether they actually watch the 24-7 sports channel or not. In fact, the high fees that ESPN commanded in the cable TV “bundle,” from sports and non-sports fans alike, was a major contributor to the cord-cutting era, the birth of Netflix, the streaming wars, and the epic entertainment saga that led to this moment.
Winfrey claims that the longer the dispute drags on, the less interest Charter has in reaching a deal with Disney at all. Winfrey reasons that any loss of customers in the meantime will actually help Charter’s business by revealing those who want a sports offering, which Charter can offer through either streaming or video-on-demand services, and its core general audience. In that scenario, he said, Charter would “be self-selecting for customers who are actually looking and willing to pay that type of price for sports content.”
Winfrey essentially envisions a hybrid future for television in which streaming and linear are bundled together. He says legacy media companies—under pressure from Wall Street—cleaved their streaming and linear television business in two. “They’re focused on direct-to-consumer businesses as if it was a completely separate business,” Winfrey said. “I don’t think it’s a separate business. You have to take a look at the two together; you have a consolidated set of cash flows.”
Incumbents like Disney pursued the holy grail of a profitable streaming service by letting their “linear programming house burn to the ground,” he says. In what Winfrey considers to be a losing effort, those companies put their best content exclusively on their streaming services, thereby leaving the already struggling cable business even more impoverished—while consumers ended up worse off because they had to pay subscription fees for both cable and streaming services to watch everything they wanted. “The value of the big expanded package with everything loaded in and forcing it on customers who don’t want, don’t value, or can’t afford that content is not going to work anymore,” he said.
Winfrey outlined two other principal concerns with Disney: that programmers raise prices at a rate that’s faster than the consumer price index; and that rigid household minimums mean contracts force certain channels on consumers.
When asked what progress the two parties had made, Winfrey was blunt. “If I had anything material to highlight, I would. That should tell you something in terms of you know how we’re doing.”