对于塑造公众对美国经济看法的悲观主义者来说,2023年的经济走势并不友好。尽管人们一致预测经济衰退“不可避免”,但美国经济的韧性使得经济增长预测在临近年底时被不断上调,上调幅度达到了惊人的2个百分点。同样,他们的看法也极其悲观,一致认为美国经济衰退的可能性在今年的大部分时间都保持在65%的水平,但随着劳动力市场不断升温,美国经济从未接近于衰退。
如今,值得注意的是,那些押注美国经济衰退的悲观人士在2024年加倍下注。他们一致预测经济增长率将维持在1.2%(经济低迷,低于一年前的水平),经济陷入衰退的可能性为50%。
这是无可救药的悲观主义吗?或者说,2023年的超预期表现并非基于基本面优势,而是拉动需求带来的侥幸事件——衰退推迟了,而不是避免了——这种观点是否有道理?
我们认为悲观情绪过甚,有理由坚持一年多来所持的更为乐观的立场。是的,明年的经济增长将是温和的,而且伴随着脆弱性和风险。但否认2023年的基本面优势能够持续下去,并无视通胀的大幅放缓(通胀本身曾一度被视为结构性失控问题),在我们看来是一种顽固的悲观主义。悲观的经济预测符合经济学的传统,但我们应该提醒自己,每一次真正的危机背后,都有许多虚假警报。
对“软着陆”的反常否认
尽管经济强劲,但人们仍然不愿承认美国经济会实现软着陆。今年早些时候,有人断然否定了通胀率会下降、劳动力市场会在美联储一系列激进加息措施的影响下得到缓解的观点。拉里·萨默斯等持怀疑态度的人说,失业率保持在6%的情况下需要5年时间才能降低通胀,因此美国经济实现软着陆与理论和经验“相悖”。
事实上,美国经济实现软着陆已有一年半的时间了。通胀率下降了6个百分点,由于雇主填补职位空缺和删除招聘信息,导致职位空缺减少了330万,劳动力市场明显降温。从历史上看,职位空缺的大幅减少意味着失业率的大幅上升,这也是那些预测经济衰退的人的主要论据。然而,失业率一直保持在几十年来的低点附近。
这并不意味着软着陆会持续下去——但它实际上是可以持续下去的。悲观主义者喜欢把矛头指向利率水平,认为高利率带来的影响正在显现,通胀将被证明是顽固的。这都是有可能的——但我们应该认识到,2023年面临的挑战比2024年预期面临的挑战更为严峻。整个2023年,通胀率要高得多,政策利率持续大幅走高。相比之下,2024年的通胀率可能会接近2%的政策目标,并最终实现降息。
这看起来更像是软着陆的第三阶段,而不是挥之不去的软着陆是否会到来的问题。将软着陆定义为经济的永久扩张是在转移目标。当然,总会有“下一次衰退”。但事实仍然是,美国经济已经度过了软着陆的第一阶段(利率快速上升),并有望度过第二阶段(利率受到限制期)。第三阶段的成功意味着,利率正常化,趋向中性水平,从而实现经济持续增长。这远非不可能。
韧性“耗尽”?
面对消费者今年表现出的非凡韧性,许多末日论者将其归因于疫情期间积累的过剩储蓄,而这些储蓄将不可避免地耗尽。按照这种说法,占美国国内生产总值约70%的消费者支出将在2023年逼近悬崖边缘。但消费者支出下降从未出现过,悲观主义者已经悄然将“悬崖边缘”移到了2024年。
但是,将韧性视为一种可耗尽的储备存在严重缺陷。它还与再生流动有关。家庭储蓄并不像一个塞满现金的鞋盒,会被花光。就此而言,(总)储蓄率必须为负值。如今,尽管储蓄率可能很低,但它仍是正值,达到了3.8%。
储蓄率低有充分的理由:家庭财富接近历史最高水平。财富越多,家庭储蓄越少(反之亦然)。相对于异常强劲的财富水平,如今的储蓄率并不罕见。当然,总量数据掩盖了个人超额储蓄的分布情况,因此,我们有理由认为储蓄的逐渐消失会导致经济增长放缓,但将其视为突然中止则不太合理。
因此,风险并不在于消费者会因为动用储蓄而集体耗尽资金。相反,风险在于他们开始增加储蓄,从而减少支出。然而,我们发现很难相信,家庭自主紧缩有一个具体的时间表,而且紧缩强度大到导致2024年出现经济衰退。请牢记劳动力市场的强劲势头:就业人数仍在增长,总薪酬也在增长。
至关重要的是,2024年还将出现越来越多的韧性来源。目前,通货膨胀率低于工资增长,从而带来了实际工资增长(劳动力市场紧缩也往往使劳动力市场中的低收入阶层受益最大)。这种影响可能会超过释放过剩储蓄带来的阻力。是的,存量很重要,但资金流也很重要。2023年伊始,实际工资在下降(通胀高于工资增长),但超常水平的招聘抵消了这一影响(新发工资)。到2024年,招聘将更加温和,但实际工资增长将更加重要。
软着陆的硬伤
尽管经济具有韧性,但软着陆也有硬伤。经济的许多领域都受到了伤害。这并不一定是矛盾的:总体和组成部分并不一定是亦步亦趋的。事实上,近年来各组成部分之间的差异比有史以来任何一次经济扩张都要大。
实物商品的消费大幅放缓(尽管是与后疫情时期的超高峰值相比)。与此同时,约为商品消费规模两倍的服务业仍在增长,以恢复到疫情前的趋势。这种多元化推动了整体的韧性——即使这与许多经济领域的痛苦并存。
软着陆也带来了更多的硬伤。通胀率(综合指标)下降的另一面意味着经济主体企业的定价能力减弱。通胀并不是结构性的制度转变,而是需求(过多)和供给(过少)的明显错配。所有企业都可以在不失去市场份额的情况下提高价格。但随着供需正常化,定价能力逐渐减弱,这是因为企业重新开始保护和争夺市场份额。这也会影响到利润率和利润。利润曾以两位数强劲增长,因此利润负增长也会(即使利润水平处于历史高位)让人感觉是一种挫败。
虽然这些硬伤在很大程度上已被消化,但其他一些硬伤却更加顽固:较高的利率推高了家庭和企业的借贷成本,可能会继续保持相对较高的水平。即使即将降息,2024年的利率也将远远高于疫情前的水平。事实上,除非出现经济衰退,否则利率仍将远高于近期的(人们认为的)“中性”水平(约2.5%)。
这将继续给一些家庭(想想抵押贷款利率超过7%)和企业带来痛苦,企业的破产率正在上升。但我们不能草率地根据这些不利因素进行推断。请记住,加息的目的是减缓经济增长。经济活动减少才是关键。即使破产率上升也是一种预期结果:借贷成本提高将促使资源(包括劳动力)得到更好的配置。虽然美国的破产案例有所增加,但这仍是历史最低水平,远未达到目前的困境水平。
下一次衰退总是在路上
悲观主义者有一点是对的:经济会再次陷入衰退。在足够长的时间内,这一预测终将实现。然而,2024年是否会出现衰退还远不确定,而且在我们看来,衰退的可能性比持续增长的可能性要小。
此外,考虑衰退的可能性不如考虑衰退的类型更有助益。衰退有三种类型。首先是所谓的“政策失误”,即央行加息速度过快,幅度过大,导致经济崩盘。尽管这种风险依然存在,但最糟糕的时期显然已经过去。其次,当银行体系陷入危机,信贷停止流向经济时,就会出现金融衰退。今年春天硅谷银行(Silicon Valley Bank)的倒闭有力地提醒了我们,金融体系蕴藏着无数不透明的风险,但这也提醒我们,强有力的政策能够取得什么样的效果。
这就剩下了第三种类型的衰退——冲击或实体投资泡沫破裂导致周期结束。由于经济增长缓慢,2024年当然不能排除这种可能性,但没有理由将其作为基本情况。在2024年,我们将更看好经济发展前景。(财富中文网)
菲利普·卡尔松-斯莱扎克(Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak)是波士顿咨询公司(BCG)纽约办事处的董事总经理兼合伙人,也是该公司的全球首席经济学家。保罗·斯沃茨(Paul Swartz)是位于纽约的波士顿咨询公司亨德森研究所(BCG Henderson Institute)的董事兼高级经济学家。
译者:中慧言-王芳
对于塑造公众对美国经济看法的悲观主义者来说,2023年的经济走势并不友好。尽管人们一致预测经济衰退“不可避免”,但美国经济的韧性使得经济增长预测在临近年底时被不断上调,上调幅度达到了惊人的2个百分点。同样,他们的看法也极其悲观,一致认为美国经济衰退的可能性在今年的大部分时间都保持在65%的水平,但随着劳动力市场不断升温,美国经济从未接近于衰退。
如今,值得注意的是,那些押注美国经济衰退的悲观人士在2024年加倍下注。他们一致预测经济增长率将维持在1.2%(经济低迷,低于一年前的水平),经济陷入衰退的可能性为50%。
这是无可救药的悲观主义吗?或者说,2023年的超预期表现并非基于基本面优势,而是拉动需求带来的侥幸事件——衰退推迟了,而不是避免了——这种观点是否有道理?
我们认为悲观情绪过甚,有理由坚持一年多来所持的更为乐观的立场。是的,明年的经济增长将是温和的,而且伴随着脆弱性和风险。但否认2023年的基本面优势能够持续下去,并无视通胀的大幅放缓(通胀本身曾一度被视为结构性失控问题),在我们看来是一种顽固的悲观主义。悲观的经济预测符合经济学的传统,但我们应该提醒自己,每一次真正的危机背后,都有许多虚假警报。
对“软着陆”的反常否认
尽管经济强劲,但人们仍然不愿承认美国经济会实现软着陆。今年早些时候,有人断然否定了通胀率会下降、劳动力市场会在美联储一系列激进加息措施的影响下得到缓解的观点。拉里·萨默斯等持怀疑态度的人说,失业率保持在6%的情况下需要5年时间才能降低通胀,因此美国经济实现软着陆与理论和经验“相悖”。
事实上,美国经济实现软着陆已有一年半的时间了。通胀率下降了6个百分点,由于雇主填补职位空缺和删除招聘信息,导致职位空缺减少了330万,劳动力市场明显降温。从历史上看,职位空缺的大幅减少意味着失业率的大幅上升,这也是那些预测经济衰退的人的主要论据。然而,失业率一直保持在几十年来的低点附近。
这并不意味着软着陆会持续下去——但它实际上是可以持续下去的。悲观主义者喜欢把矛头指向利率水平,认为高利率带来的影响正在显现,通胀将被证明是顽固的。这都是有可能的——但我们应该认识到,2023年面临的挑战比2024年预期面临的挑战更为严峻。整个2023年,通胀率要高得多,政策利率持续大幅走高。相比之下,2024年的通胀率可能会接近2%的政策目标,并最终实现降息。
这看起来更像是软着陆的第三阶段,而不是挥之不去的软着陆是否会到来的问题。将软着陆定义为经济的永久扩张是在转移目标。当然,总会有“下一次衰退”。但事实仍然是,美国经济已经度过了软着陆的第一阶段(利率快速上升),并有望度过第二阶段(利率受到限制期)。第三阶段的成功意味着,利率正常化,趋向中性水平,从而实现经济持续增长。这远非不可能。
韧性“耗尽”?
面对消费者今年表现出的非凡韧性,许多末日论者将其归因于疫情期间积累的过剩储蓄,而这些储蓄将不可避免地耗尽。按照这种说法,占美国国内生产总值约70%的消费者支出将在2023年逼近悬崖边缘。但消费者支出下降从未出现过,悲观主义者已经悄然将“悬崖边缘”移到了2024年。
但是,将韧性视为一种可耗尽的储备存在严重缺陷。它还与再生流动有关。家庭储蓄并不像一个塞满现金的鞋盒,会被花光。就此而言,(总)储蓄率必须为负值。如今,尽管储蓄率可能很低,但它仍是正值,达到了3.8%。
储蓄率低有充分的理由:家庭财富接近历史最高水平。财富越多,家庭储蓄越少(反之亦然)。相对于异常强劲的财富水平,如今的储蓄率并不罕见。当然,总量数据掩盖了个人超额储蓄的分布情况,因此,我们有理由认为储蓄的逐渐消失会导致经济增长放缓,但将其视为突然中止则不太合理。
因此,风险并不在于消费者会因为动用储蓄而集体耗尽资金。相反,风险在于他们开始增加储蓄,从而减少支出。然而,我们发现很难相信,家庭自主紧缩有一个具体的时间表,而且紧缩强度大到导致2024年出现经济衰退。请牢记劳动力市场的强劲势头:就业人数仍在增长,总薪酬也在增长。
至关重要的是,2024年还将出现越来越多的韧性来源。目前,通货膨胀率低于工资增长,从而带来了实际工资增长(劳动力市场紧缩也往往使劳动力市场中的低收入阶层受益最大)。这种影响可能会超过释放过剩储蓄带来的阻力。是的,存量很重要,但资金流也很重要。2023年伊始,实际工资在下降(通胀高于工资增长),但超常水平的招聘抵消了这一影响(新发工资)。到2024年,招聘将更加温和,但实际工资增长将更加重要。
软着陆的硬伤
尽管经济具有韧性,但软着陆也有硬伤。经济的许多领域都受到了伤害。这并不一定是矛盾的:总体和组成部分并不一定是亦步亦趋的。事实上,近年来各组成部分之间的差异比有史以来任何一次经济扩张都要大。
实物商品的消费大幅放缓(尽管是与后疫情时期的超高峰值相比)。与此同时,约为商品消费规模两倍的服务业仍在增长,以恢复到疫情前的趋势。这种多元化推动了整体的韧性——即使这与许多经济领域的痛苦并存。
软着陆也带来了更多的硬伤。通胀率(综合指标)下降的另一面意味着经济主体企业的定价能力减弱。通胀并不是结构性的制度转变,而是需求(过多)和供给(过少)的明显错配。所有企业都可以在不失去市场份额的情况下提高价格。但随着供需正常化,定价能力逐渐减弱,这是因为企业重新开始保护和争夺市场份额。这也会影响到利润率和利润。利润曾以两位数强劲增长,因此利润负增长也会(即使利润水平处于历史高位)让人感觉是一种挫败。
虽然这些硬伤在很大程度上已被消化,但其他一些硬伤却更加顽固:较高的利率推高了家庭和企业的借贷成本,可能会继续保持相对较高的水平。即使即将降息,2024年的利率也将远远高于疫情前的水平。事实上,除非出现经济衰退,否则利率仍将远高于近期的(人们认为的)“中性”水平(约2.5%)。
这将继续给一些家庭(想想抵押贷款利率超过7%)和企业带来痛苦,企业的破产率正在上升。但我们不能草率地根据这些不利因素进行推断。请记住,加息的目的是减缓经济增长。经济活动减少才是关键。即使破产率上升也是一种预期结果:借贷成本提高将促使资源(包括劳动力)得到更好的配置。虽然美国的破产案例有所增加,但这仍是历史最低水平,远未达到目前的困境水平。
下一次衰退总是在路上
悲观主义者有一点是对的:经济会再次陷入衰退。在足够长的时间内,这一预测终将实现。然而,2024年是否会出现衰退还远不确定,而且在我们看来,衰退的可能性比持续增长的可能性要小。
此外,考虑衰退的可能性不如考虑衰退的类型更有助益。衰退有三种类型。首先是所谓的“政策失误”,即央行加息速度过快,幅度过大,导致经济崩盘。尽管这种风险依然存在,但最糟糕的时期显然已经过去。其次,当银行体系陷入危机,信贷停止流向经济时,就会出现金融衰退。今年春天硅谷银行(Silicon Valley Bank)的倒闭有力地提醒了我们,金融体系蕴藏着无数不透明的风险,但这也提醒我们,强有力的政策能够取得什么样的效果。
这就剩下了第三种类型的衰退——冲击或实体投资泡沫破裂导致周期结束。由于经济增长缓慢,2024年当然不能排除这种可能性,但没有理由将其作为基本情况。在2024年,我们将更看好经济发展前景。(财富中文网)
菲利普·卡尔松-斯莱扎克(Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak)是波士顿咨询公司(BCG)纽约办事处的董事总经理兼合伙人,也是该公司的全球首席经济学家。保罗·斯沃茨(Paul Swartz)是位于纽约的波士顿咨询公司亨德森研究所(BCG Henderson Institute)的董事兼高级经济学家。
译者:中慧言-王芳
2023 has not been kind to the pessimists who shape the public’s perception of the U.S. economy. Despite a widely predicted “inevitable” recession, the resilient U.S. economy forced growth forecast to be revised higher and higher by a staggering 2 percentage points as the year nears its end. Similarly, consensus odds of a U.S. recession were far too negative, remaining at 65% for most of the year, but the economy never came close to one as the labor market went from strength to strength.
Now, remarkably, those who bet on pessimism are doubling down for 2024. Consensus growth forecast remains at a sluggish 1.2% (below where they were a year ago) and recession odds are seen at 50%.
Is this a case of incorrigible pessimism? Or is there merit in the idea that 2023’s outperformance was not grounded in fundamental strengths but rather a lucky fluke of demand pulled forward–a recession delayed, not averted?
We think there is too much pessimism, and we see reason to double down on our own far more optimistic stance we’ve held for over a year. Yes, growth next year will be modest and that comes with vulnerabilities and risks. But to deny that the fundamental strengths of 2023 can persist, and to look past the significant easing of inflation (itself once cast as a structural runaway problem), strikes us as recalcitrant pessimism. Dour economic predictions are in keeping with the discipline’s tradition, but we should remind ourselves that for every true crisis, there are many false alarms.
The curious denial of the ‘soft landing’
Despite the economy’s strength, there remains a reluctance to recognize a soft landing. The idea that inflation could fall and the labor market ease graciously in the face of the Fed’s blistering series of rate hikes was flatly dismissed earlier this year. Skeptics such as Larry Summers said it would take 5 years of 6% unemployment to bring inflation down, and that a soft landing was “at odds” with theory and empirics.
In fact, we are over a year and a half into a soft landing. Inflation has fallen 6 percentage points, the labor market has cooled significantly as seen in 3.3 million fewer job openings as employers filled roles and removed job postings. Historically, a significant decline in job openings has meant a significant rise in the unemployment rate–a key argument of those predicting a recession. However, the unemployment rate has remained near its multi-decade low.
That doesn’t mean the soft landing will persist–but it can. Pessimists like to point to the level of interest rates, that their bite is waiting to take hold, and that inflation will prove stubborn. That’s all possible–but it should be recognized that the challenges of 2023 were more significant than the challenges expected in 2024. Inflation was far higher and policy rates continued to move sharply higher throughout 2023. In contrast, 2024 looks likely to deliver inflation closer to the policy target of 2% and, eventually, enable rate cuts.
That looks more like the third stage of a soft landing than the lingering question if there will be one. Framing a soft landing as a perpetual expansion is moving the goalposts. Of course, there will always be a “next recession.” But the fact remains that the economy has survived stage 1 of the soft landing (rapidly rising rates) and looks set to survive stage 2 (a period when rates are restrictive). The successful completion of a third stage is about continued growth as interest rates normalize towards neutral levels. That is far from impossible.
‘Running out’ of resilience?
Faced with consumers’ remarkable resilience this year, many doomsayers ascribed it to excess savings, amassed during the pandemic, that would inevitably run out. In this telling, consumer spending, which represents around 70% of U.S. GDP, was approaching the cliff edge in 2023. But the fall never happened–and the pessimists have quietly moved the cliff edge into 2024.
But thinking of resilience as a depletable stock has serious flaws. It is also about regenerative flows. Household savings are not like a shoebox stuffed with cash that is being spent down. For that, the (aggregate) savings rate would have to be negative. Today, while the savings rate may be low, it is positive at 3.8%.
And there is a good reason for the savings rate to be low: household wealth is near record highs. When wealth is high, households save less (and vice versa). The savings rate today is not unusual relative to these extraordinarily strong wealth levels. Of course, the aggregates hide the distribution of individual excess savings and it is reasonable to expect their gradual disappearance to be slowing growth–but it is less reasonable to see it as a sudden stop.
The risk, then, is not that consumers would collectively run out of money because they were dissaving. Rather, the risk is that they start saving more and therefore spending less. Yet, we find it hard to believe that self-directed household austerity will occur on a timeline and with an intensity that spells a 2024 recession. Remember the strength of the labor market: employment is still growing and so is total compensation.
Critically, 2024 will also see growing sources of resilience. Inflation is now lower than wage growth, delivering real wage growth (tight labor markets also tend to benefit the lower-income segments of the labor market most). This effect can outweigh the drag from unwinding excess savings. Yes, stocks matter, but so do flows. As 2023 began, real wages were falling (inflation was higher than wage growth) but extraordinary levels of hiring offset that (new paychecks). In 2024, hiring will be more modest, but rising real wage growth will matter more.
The hard edges of the soft landing
Resilience notwithstanding, the soft landing comes with hard edges. Many parts of the economy have been hurting. This need not be contradictory: The aggregate and the components don’t have to agree. In fact, in recent years the components have been more divergent than in any expansion on record.
The consumption of physical goods has seen a significant slowdown (albeit measured against the exalted peaks of the post-pandemic overshoot). Meanwhile, services, which are roughly twice the size of goods consumption, are still growing their way back to their pre-pandemic trend. That diversification has driven aggregate resilience–even if that coexists with pain in many parts of the economy.
And the soft landing comes with additional hard edges. The flipside of declining inflation (an aggregate measure) means waning pricing power for the firms making up the economy. Inflation wasn’t a structural regime shift–it was a brutal mismatch of (too much) demand and (too little) supply. All firms could raise prices without losing market share. But as demand and supply normalized, pricing power waned because firms returned to protecting and fighting for market share. That also feeds through to margins and profits. Profits had grown by strong double digits, so negative profit growth (even if the level of profit was historically strong) feels like a failure.
While these hard edges are largely being digested, others are more persistent: Higher interest rates that have pushed up borrowing costs for households and firms are likely to stay relatively high. Even with rate cuts on the horizon, interest rates will be far higher in 2024 than we were used to before the pandemic. In fact, barring a recession, they will remain far above recent perceptions of “neutral” (around 2.5%).
That will continue to drive pain for some households (think mortgage rates above 7%) and for firms, where bankruptcies are on the rise. But we must not extrapolate carelessly from these headwinds. Remember, the purpose of rising rates was to slow down the economy. Less activity is the point. Even higher bankruptcies are an intended outcome: more expensive capital will nudge toward better allocation of resources (including labor). And though bankruptcies in the U.S. are up, they are so from record-low levels and nowhere near distress levels today.
The next recession is always on its way
The pessimists are right in one way: There will be another recession. Over a long enough period, that prediction will eventually be fulfilled. Yet whether it arrives in 2024 is far from certain, and in our view, less likely than continued growth.
Additionally, thinking of the odds of a recession is less helpful than thinking of its type. Recessions come in three flavors. First, the so-called “policy error” where central banks push up rates too fast too far and the economy cracks. And while that risk remains, the worst is clearly behind us. Second, financial recessions occur when the banking system is in crisis and credit stops flowing to the economy. The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank last spring was a powerful reminder of the myriad and opaque risks the financial system harbors–but it was also a reminder of what forceful policy can achieve.
That leaves the third type of recession–when shocks or bursting real investment bubbles end the cycle. With growth slow, this certainly can’t be ruled out in 2024, but there is little reason to make it the base case. We are doubling down on economic optimism in 2024.
Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak is a managing director and partner in BCG’s New York office and the firm’s global chief economist. Paul Swartz is a director and senior economist at the BCG Henderson Institute in New York.