谷歌患上微软综合症，产品集成管理埋隐患

    从建立之初，谷歌就决定不只做搜索业务。谷歌的业务结构有不少可取之处，其中最了不起的一个是其分散化管理：经过深思熟虑，谷歌决定放弃协同作业，放权给各产品小组，使其拥有充分的思考和行动的自由；正是本着这种管理理念，无论在产品变化还是产品创新上它都取得了巨大的成功。在谷歌，不仅各产品小组定位清晰，而且公司重视并鼓励新颖独特的思维方式，并因此开发出了Gmail、谷歌应用（Google Apps）、和谷歌地图（Google Maps）等杰出的产品。即使用户开始并不认同各大公司鼓吹的协同作业的价值，他们却由衷地喜爱这些谷歌产品。

    但是，谷歌高层却日渐无法抵御强烈的诱惑，而将产新品开发纳入庞大的“协同”共同体中。按理说，将新产品集成到现有产品中，可以充分利用现成的用户群和产品现有营销计划，对新产品来说这些优势不言而喻，更不用说，这么做还相应增强了“战略”和“平台”价值，实际上就意味着锁定了客户。

    我理解这种做法的魅力所在，而且原则上说也合情合理。但是，谷歌改变管理模式的趋势令人担忧，原因在于此举牺牲的恰是谷歌最了不起的精髓所在：专注于以尽可能简单的产品满足用户需求。事实上，越来越多的谷歌产品正以附加功能包的形式，被整合到大型产品中。

    这种做法的弊端在于：新产品从一开始就始终生存在核心产品的影响之下，有时这种影响并不恰当；有些新产品原本可以成为绝佳的的独立产品，最终却在集成模式下却被淹没了。因此，在如今的谷歌，原本杰出的思想最终产生结果往往只能算的上差强人意。如果延续这种削弱新产品的做法，谷歌的创新将难以为继，谷歌在新兴的社交网络领域取得成功的难度也将日益增大。

    这方面的一个经典案例是Google Buzz：它从诞生之初就没有满足互联网用户的实际需求。MG• 西格勒在科技博客TechCrunch上撰文称：“Google Buzz跟Gmail同根生，恰是这种方式令人感到不舒服。”我母亲教导我，对于拥有高级学位的人要有崇敬之心，因此，眼见得无数谷歌博士们将Buzz集成到Gmail中而错失良机，我只有目瞪口呆的份儿了。谷歌忘了多数在线的的人其实根本不会保持Gmail的登录状态，这虽然听起来有些遗憾，但却完全属实。既然多数人并不时时在线，那Buzz的价值也随之一落千丈。因此，它非但没有成为了不起的、定位明确的社交产品，反而成为附加在Gmail上的一个目的不明且颇具争议的特性而已。

    随着谷歌正式推出Google+项目，这类产品集成、协同、以及既有用户群优势等问题会比以往任何时候都更为突出。

    仅仅依托谷歌搜索产品，Google+无法取得成功。无论它能引得多少用户趋之若鹜，到头来仍会像Buzz和SearchWikis等谷歌搜索的其它特性一样胎死腹中。谷歌首款新社交产品发布仅一个月，据报道就已经有2,000多万注册用户，因而很容易被认为已经是个成功的开始。但是，几乎所有用户之所以选择使用该产品，原因都在于他们本身已经是谷歌的用户，而不是因为借助Google+，他们可以利用朋友网络中的内容改变自己的生活。

    尽管发挥现有业务和搜索用户群的优势看似明智，但这种优势转移战略带来的结果将极为有限。为了争夺迅猛增长的消费者在线注意力，眼下一场社交网络战争正在如火如荼地展开。企图将用户的搜索体验延伸到社交领域的做法既不会有助于在Facebook即将发起的反击中捍卫谷歌已经取得的地位，亦不会为谷歌捕获各种新机会。因此，“发挥并增强核心产品优势”的战略虽然执行起来很容易，而且初期效果显著，但着实短视。

    谷歌的这种模式并不新鲜，过去10年中，我在家乡西雅图，还曾在微软（Microsoft）王国中亲身体验过。虽然我在微软的朋友们供职于不同的部门，但他们知道自己每周都能按时领取薪水，而这均得益于Windows和Office产品的巨大销量。无论他们开发的是什么产品，无论是机顶盒还是手机操作系统，所有目标都必须让位于刺激Windows和Office销量这一需求。在微软的各类会议上，10几名与会者的唯一目标就是将自己的产品最大程度地成到Windows 和Office中。如今这已经是无人不晓的事实。Office Web Apps和Windows Live SkyDrive等杰出的产品非但没能独立销售，反而注定要成为那些赚钱的核心品牌的影子，也就是马特•罗索夫最近所言的“战略税收”的牺牲品。

    随着谷歌日渐成熟壮大，它是否愈来愈像微软了？颇具讽刺意味的是，正是由于微软彼时专注于协同，从而给谷歌和苹果（Apple）等后来者留下了巨大的可乘之机，并进而独占了应用、音乐和设备等领域。微软这一失败综合症尤其令人不解，因为很明显，它当时拥有足够的人才和经验，能更快更好地在这些领域有所建树，除非如果甘愿脱离于时代。

    如果谷歌不重新解放自己，与外部现实世界展开竞争，很快它便会发现，自己已心甘情愿地成了微软综合症的牺牲品。很长时间内，其业务可能依然庞大无比，但是从战略上看，却没有出路可言；另一方面，它也可能发现自己正与下一波互联网洪流——社交——失之交臂。

    谷歌需要做的是绝不仅仅是提供一套搜索引擎的附属产品，相反，现在它恰恰需要发挥宽广、深远、且分散的创新性，利用新兴的社交网络来满足人们的潜在需求。谷歌需要确保，与之前的谷歌应用、谷歌搜索、Gmail、以及谷歌地图一样，Google+项目也是个完整的、独立的产品，有能力在开放的网络上与其他产品展开竞争，并开创出一片新天地。Facebook在社交领域占有绝对优势，这点固然不假，但只要谷歌迅速采取行动，避免重蹈微软覆辙，它在这一领域仍然有机会。

    艾罗维兹是媒体公司Wetpaint的联合创始人兼首席执行官。

    译者：大海

    From early on, Google seemed determined to be more than a search company. And one of the most admirable traits of Google's structure has been its decentralization: The company's deliberate decision to forego synergies to give product groups the freedom of independent thought and action has created tremendous product variation and innovation. Distinct product groups and a culture that prized fresh original thinking created great products like Gmail, Google Apps, and Google Maps; and all of these products delighted users even as they initially passed up the value of synergies that big companies often tout.

    And yet, it seems that those at the Googleplex are increasingly giving in to the temptation to integrate new product development into a "synergistic," if monstrous, whole. Integrating new products into existing ones, the story goes, should give a new product a boost with a built-in user base and in-product feature merchandising, not to mention enhanced "strategic" and "platform" value, which basically translates to customer lock-in.

    I understand the attraction of this. And it makes sense in principle. But the trend is concerning, because it sacrifices the essence of Google's (GOOG) greatness: its focus on the simplest possible product to meet user needs. Instead, products are increasingly being morphed into tack-on feature sets of bigger products.

    But the downside here is that the influence of the core product consistently invades – even where it shouldn't – and this overwhelms what could be a terrific new stand-alone product. As a result, great now too often becomes good at Google. And, if this new-product dilution and diminution continues, it will be increasingly difficult for the company to successfully innovate and take advantage of the burgeoning social Web.

    One classic example: instead of solving a real need for all the Web's users, Google Buzz was, as MG Siegler noted at TechCrunch, "shoved in everyone's face by way of its somewhat unnatural home in Gmail." My mother has taught me to put people with advanced degrees on pedestals, so I can't help but be stunned that legions of Googly Ph.D.'s missed this by integrating Buzz into Gmail. It's pathetic, but true: Google forgot that most connected people aren't even on Gmail. And, obviously, the value of the network is far lower when most people aren't on it. So, instead of being a great social product with a clear use case, Google Buzz became a controversial feature with ambiguous purpose that was added on as an appendage to Gmail.

    With the launch of the Google+ Project, these questions of product integration, synergy, and installed-base leverage are more crucial than ever.

    Google+ will not succeed on the back of Google's search product alone. No matter how many users it may garner, it will turn out like the other stillborn features in Google's search, e.g. Buzz and SearchWikis. Already, it would be easy to consider Google's first new social product launch a success, based on the 20 million or more reported users who have signed up for it. But nearly all of those users have joined on the basis of their existing relationship with Google, rather than for the sake of any life-altering content from their friend networks.

    And, while leveraging its existing business and user base in search may sound like a smart corporate strategy, the results of such migration will be limited. The battle for the social Web is being waged for a prize of exploding consumer attention online. Adding line extensions to users' search experience will neither defend Google from Facebook's coming attack, nor offensively capture new and emerging opportunities for Google. So, the "leverage-and-enhance-the-core-product" strategy is an easy reach to execute, and offers appealing initial momentum, but it is short-sighted.

    We've all seen this pattern before; and I've lived it as part of the Microsoft (MSFT) world here in my home of Seattle for the last decade. No matter what part of the company they work in, my friends at Microsoft know their paycheck comes every week, thanks to product sales of Windows and Office. And no matter what product they work in, whether it's set-top boxes or mobile phones, their objectives are overwhelmed by the need to sell more copies of Windows and Office. Meetings at Microsoft have become famous for having a dozen-plus attendees – all in order to maximize integration with, you guessed it, Windows and Office. Rather than being marketed independently, great products like Office Web Apps and Windows Live SkyDrive seem destined to become mere shadows of their moneymaking core brands, victims of what Matt Rosoff recently referred to as the "strategy tax."

    As Google matures, is it becoming more and more like its original nemesis? Ironically, it's Microsoft's focus on synergy that has left such huge room for entrants like Google and Apple to come in and dominate sectors including apps, music and devices. Microsoft's failure syndrome was especially perplexing because it clearly had the talent and experience to build these categories better and faster – if it had been willing to obsolete itself.

    If Google doesn't give itself back the freedom to compete with the reality of the outside world, it will quickly find itself a self-imposed victim of the Microsoft Syndrome. It may ride its own large, but strategically dead-ending, business for a long time; but it could also find itself missing out on the huge next wave of the Internet -- social.

    The required response from Google is not just a set of adjunct products that build on search. Instead, this is exactly the time that Google needs broad, far-reaching, and decentralized creativity to solve real people's still-latent needs via the emerging social Web. Google needs to make sure its Google+ Project is a complete stand-alone product that – like Google Apps, Google Search, Gmail, and Google Maps before it – can compete on the open Web and break new ground. Facebook has outsize traction in the social sphere, but it's not too late for Google, as long as the company quickly takes action to avoid falling into the trap that has caught its first major rival.

    -- Elowitz is co-founder and CEO of media company Wetpaint.