What's really behind the Toyota debacle

    Most recently that friction has been reflected by a dispute over the role of Toyota Motor North America, the New York-based holding company for North American operations.

    In an effort to speed integration, a respected executive, Jim Press was moved from his job as head of Toyota Motor Sales to head of Toyota Motor North America.

    In September 2006, Press made a presentation to Toyota's corporate board asking that his North American organization be kept informed of quality efforts by strengthening communication with Toyota Motor Sales, Toyota Engineering and Manufacturing, and company headquarters in Japan.

    Presciently, Press was worried about safety. He detected a steady rise in Toyota's safety recalls, which, he warned, were denting customer loyalty.

    To improve the company's relationship with NHTSA, the government's car safety agency, Press argued for better communication between North America and the company's technical side: "We need faster information flow, and more technical support when hot issues arrive."

    Press's plea fell on deaf ears and Press became frustrated. Feeling he had been made into a "window worker," a Japanese term for an older employee with no responsibilities, Press left Toyota to join Chrysler a year later.

    Belatedly, Toyota has shifted more power to Toyota Motor North America by appointing a popular executive, Yoshimi Inaba, to oversee both it and Toyota Motor Sales.

    Inaba is said to have the ear of Toyota President Akio Toyoda. So far, however, any reforms he has put in place have been overwhelmed by the sudden acceleration recall crisis.

    Toyota seems to have learned one lesson from all this: it now moves faster when controversies arise. It halted sales of the Lexus GX 460 within hours after Consumer Reports labeled it a safety risk.

    Now it needs to move just as fast to fix its dysfunctional management structure.