默多克的杂牌王国（《财富》经典回顾，1984年）

    去年春天，默多克与IBM、安泰人寿保险公司（Aetna Life）和通信卫星公司（Comsat）联合成立的卫星商业系统公司（Satellite Business Systems）签署了长达五年、价值7，500万的租赁合同，租赁五台异频雷达收发机。该设备可在放大地面信号后，将信号再次发射回地面。他承诺，在通用仪器公司（General Instrument Corp）旗下的联合卫星通信公司（United Satellite Communications Inc.）和其他公司秋季推出类似服务之前，将自己的网络投入运营。

    但默多克很快就发现他高估了自己的能力。在他确定的截止日期之前，设备制造商无法制造足够的卫星天线，收看Skyband的节目。此外，节目制作中心也在犹豫是否要将其电影和电视剧的播放权出售给默多克。而有些人虽然愿意与他讨价还价，但他们要求的价格远远高于向默多克的有线竞争对手要求的价格，而且随着时间拖延，价格也在不断上涨。这些谈判通常会花几个月时间，而当时默多克并没有考虑到这个问题。

    整个夏季和秋初，默多克都在合纵连横，努力寻找盟友，以便实现Skyband计划。此时，该计划已经推迟到1984年中旬。八月份，他试图以1.6亿美元收购美国第二大付费电视订购服务提供商娱乐时间公司（Showtime）。而当时娱乐时间公司正在与华纳美运有线电视公司（Warner Amex）旗下的付费电视服务电影频道（Movie Channel）合并，因此断然拒绝了默多克的收购。他还希望通过收购联合卫星公司（United Satellite），以强化自己在节目制作领域的影响力，但该公司的所有者拒绝了他7，000万美元的出价，控制该公司的如意算盘也随之落空。

    十月份， 默多克依然在毫不气馁的鼓吹Skyband计划，宣称截至1986年底，它将带来3.25亿美元总收入，截至1987年，将为新闻集团增加50%的收入。但几周之后，默多克突然宣布放弃这一计划，事出突然，与当初启动项目时如出一辙。默多克宣布，这次冒险让他损失了2，000万美元。不过他表示，在1986年底，能够向更小、更实惠的碟形天线发送信号的新一代大功率卫星或许将进入轨道，因此Skyband依然会有上升的空间。默多克在美国业务的负责人唐纳德•坎莫费德驳斥了取消Skyband是由于计划不充分的说法。他认为这是一次“谨慎的、计算精确的商业判断”。而默多克的解释更加直白：“我想是因为我临阵退缩了。”

    去年夏天，默多克开始买进华纳公司的股票，当时他的Skyband项目首次遇到麻烦。他的目标是华纳公司的电影资料馆与摄影棚。默多克表示：“我们基本上都认为对华纳公司的收购超出了我们的能力，但也不是铁板一块。我们认定，这样做不会使我们受到伤害，反而会给我们深入了解电影行业的机会。而其他的事情都还太过遥远。”不过他的一位合作伙伴表示，默多克最疯狂的想法是，如果有其他人对华纳公司下手，史蒂夫•罗斯或许会把默多克视为白衣骑士，向他求助。但罗斯却认为，默多克的这次收购，是雅达利（Atari）视频游戏子公司收入暴跌之后最恐怖的噩梦。1983年前九个月，雅达利公司的亏损达5亿美元——使华纳公司的股票从55美元左右暴跌至20美元左右。

    12月29日，罗斯与克里斯•克拉夫特的董事会主席赫伯特•西格尔达成了交易。措手不及的默多克请求联邦通信委员会（Federal Communications Commission）和特拉华州地方法院禁止此次股票交易。但1月18日，交易按计划完成。尽管宣称自己不会服输，但默多克却一反常态，表现得犹豫不决。随着近期华纳股价的上涨，如果他希望将持股比例提高到50%，就必须支付约10亿美元，而目前他在华纳的1.3亿美元投资已经是他最大数额的投资，所以10亿美元并不是小数目。默多克的首席顾问斯坦利•S•舒曼是投资银行Allen & Co. Inc的执行副总裁，他一直在为默多克游说潜在的合作伙伴，以备将来他确定提出要约收购。但默多克对于进行高风险的投标竞争却好像并不热衷。在评估自己能达到的高度时，他说：“雅达利便是最大的未知数。”

    默多克似乎更倾向于发动代理权之争。有关他本人对华纳公司管理层的蔑视，他直言不讳——“那些人只是希望一直被宠着而已”——并且，他认为投资者对罗斯的普遍不满将是自己取胜的关键。罗斯反击道：“默多克想赢？没门。”即便默多克获得多数投票权，也依然不敢保证取得了胜利。华纳公司的章程规定必须获得80%多数票同意，才能在不获得董事会批准的情况下进行资产转移。所以默多克依然需要收购赫伯特•西格尔持有的股份。与此同时，默多克依然在尽最大努力请求最高法院宣布克里斯•卡拉夫特的交易无效，并在努力寻找便捷的途径进军娱乐业。

    鉴于默多克非凡的履历，没有人敢说他毫无机会成长为电子媒体业的巨头。但正如他在Skyband惨败中总结的教训，他不可能复制当初在出版业的那一套做法，进行低廉的收购。他也不能大肆借贷，因为他已经负债累累。除非默多克能寻求合作伙伴，或通过发行新股稀释他在新闻集团的所有权，否则，创建世界上最伟大的通信巨无霸的梦想无疑只能是个梦而已。

    对于投资者而言，默多克对新闻集团的管理，证明了在鲁莽企业家身上押宝，会面临非生即死的巨大风险。对股权的控制让他可以冒极大的风险，按照自己的方式经营自己的资产——其中大部分都取得了成功。但控制也让他沉溺于企业所有人的个人嗜好，把亏损的企业留在手里的时间太长，这无疑会损害公共股东的利益。

    （翻译 刘进龙）

    Last spring Murdoch signed a five-year $75-million lease with Satellite Business Systems (a joint venture of IBM, Aetna Life, and Comsat) for five transponders, the satellite devices that amplify signals from earth and send them back down. He promised to have his new network operating before United Satellite Communications Inc., owned by General Instrument Corp. and others, launched a similar service in the fall.

    But Murdoch quickly found that he had overreached. Equipment manufacturers couldn't make enough satellite dishes to receive Skyband's signals before his deadline. In addition, studios hung back from selling Murdoch rights to broadcast their movies and TV series. Those willing to bargain demanded higher prices than they charged Murdoch's cable competition, and the prices went up as the year dragged on. These negotiations took months that Murdoch had not figured on.

    Through the summer and early fall, Murdoch twisted and turned to form an alliance that would let him deliver Skyband, by then postponed until mid-1984. In August he tried to buy Showtime, the second-largest pay TV subscription service, for $160 million. Showtime, in the midst of merging with the Movie Channel, a pay TV service owned by Warner Amex, rebuffed him. He tried to increase his clout with the studios by exploring a merger with United Satellite, but its owners rejected his tentative offer of $70 million for control of the company.

    In October Murdoch still bravely trumpeted Skyband, asserting it would gross $325 million by the end of 1986 and add 50% to News Corp.'s earnings by 1987. But weeks later Murdoch called it quits, grounding Skyband as abruptly as he had launched it. Murdoch figures the venture cost him some $20 million. He claims Skyband still might go up in late 1986 when a new generation of high-powered satellites capable of beaming signals to smaller, less expensive dish antennas, may be in orbit. Donald Kummerfeld, head of Murdoch's U.S. operation, rejects any notion that the Skyband setback reveals poor planning. He terms it "a prudent and calculated business judgment." Murdoch puts it more plainly: "I guess I just chickened out."

    Murdoch began buying up shares in Warner last summer, about the time he was first having trouble getting programs for Skyband. His objective was Warner's film library and studios. "We basically saw Warner as beyond our capacity, but vulnerable," says Murdoch. "We figured we couldn't get hurt and would learn a lot about the film industry. Anything else was a long, long way off." In his wildest dreams, says an associate, Murdoch thought that if someone else moved on the company, Steve Ross might turn to him as a white knight. But Ross saw Murdoch's purchases as the nightmare he had feared ever since earnings collapsed at his Atari video game subsidiary -- it lost more than $500 million in the first nine months of 1983 -- and pushed Warner's stock price from the mid-50s to the low 20s.

    On December 29 Ross struck his deal with Chris-Craft Chairman Herbert Siegel. Caught off guard, Murdoch petitioned the Federal Communications Commission and a Delaware court to block the stock swap. But the deal went through on January 18. Though he vows to fight on, Murdoch seems uncharacteristically indecisive about how to proceed. At recent prices, raising his holdings to 50% of Warner would cost him nearly $1 billion, a large sum for a man whose present $130-million investment in Warner is the largest he's ever made. Murdoch's principal adviser, Stanley S. Shuman, an executive vice president of Allen & Co. Inc., an investment banking firm, has been talking to prospective partners for Murdoch in the event he does decide to make a tender offer. But Murdoch appears queasy about getting in a high-stakes bidding contest. In assessing how high he might go, he says, "Atari is the great unknown."

    Murodch seems more inclined to mount a proxy fight if he does anything. He is openly contemptuous of Warner's management -- "those people just love to be loved all the time" – and seems to think widespread investor disaffection with Ross might carry the day for him. Counters Ross, "There's no way Mr. Murdoch can win." Even if Murdoch were to win a majority vote he still could not be certain of victory. Warner's bylaws require an 80% majority to approve any transfer of assets not backed by its board. So Murdoch would still have to buyout Herb Siegel. Meanwhile, Murdoch is still trying to void the ChrisCraft deal in federal court and trying to find a quick way into the entertainment business.

    Given Murdoch's remarkable record, no one can say he hasn't a chance of becoming an electronic media mogul. But as he learned in the Skyband debacle, he can't do it by making the kind of bargain-basement buys that he did as a publisher. Nor can he borrow great sums, considering his already heavy debt load. Unless Murdoch takes in partners or dilutes his ownership of News Corp. by issuing new equity, his dream of creating the world's greatest communications colossus will doubtless remain just that.

    For investors, Murdoch's management of News Corp. demonstrates the bright and dark sides of betting on an impetuous entrepreneur. His controlling interest has allowed him to take big risks and run his properties his way -- for the most part, successfully. But control has also let him indulge his proprietor's penchant for hanging on to losers too long, to the detriment of the public shareholders.