信贷失衡危及中国经济未来

    外界纷纷意识到，中国经济内部出现了一些严重的问题。穆迪（Moody's）在近期公布的一份报告中称，中国银行系统全部78，300亿美元贷款中，坏账率将从1.1%上升到12%。日益严重的坏账问题掩盖了一个与此相关且同样需要引起重视的现象：在过去三年中，中国激增的巨额贷款几乎全部流入了国有企业。全球经济危机爆发之后，中国国有银行疯狂地向国有企业发放贷款，希望能够缓和经济危机的影响（尤其是对就业的影响）。据中国银行（Bank of China）一位前高管回忆，去年，他遇到中国中部的一位分行行长，向他询问分行为当地国有企业提供了多少贷款。那位行长的回答是：“要多少给多少。”

    但相比之下，私营部门却一直深受资金匮乏的困扰。（值得注意的是，目前没有可靠数据分析国营部门与私营部门的贷款情况，但肯定是不对称的，这一点可以确定。）即便私营企业能够得到贷款，他们也得付出更高的成本。经纪公司里昂证券亚太区市场（CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets）对中国A股市场的一份研究显示，与国有企业相比，大型私企的总体资本成本（负债与股权融资）平均高出100个基准点。大量事实证明，小型私营企业与国有企业之间的差距更大。

    所以，中国私企高管满腹牢骚也在情理之中。但由于担心激怒政府，因此，极少有人愿意公开表示不满。不过，根据《财富》杂志（Fortune）对中国私营企业CEO的采访可以看出，他们对此愤懑不已。“我们只能寄希望于新一届政府（将于明年上任），希望他们能够了解这种失衡的状况，做出必要的改变。”预计新一任政府将由习近平担任国家主席，李克强担任国务院总理。但他们能否对私营企业的不满做出回应，目前尚不明确。

    既然中国在经济上获得了成功，为什么必须对信贷分配政策进行彻底改革呢？对此，纽约荣鼎咨询公司（Rhodium Group）的负责人荣大聂解释道：“中国还有更大的发展潜力，但动力应该是来自创新，而不是增加像钢铁厂那样的传统重工业。问题在于，哪一种所有权模式（国营 vs. 私营）才能够带来这种增长？”大多数人都认为肯定是私营部门，未来，私企将比庞大的国企更高效、更具创新力。比如汽车行业的吉利（Geely）和电子商务领域的阿里巴巴（Alibaba）和淘宝（Taobao）。但由于中国信贷制度不平衡的顽疾根深蒂固，所以荣大聂不禁要问：“私企拿什么来创新？”

    这个问题至关重要。如果创新受阻，中国多年的经济发展“奇迹”或将终结。

    （翻译 刘进龙）

    The outside world is finally coming to grips with the realization that China has some serious economic problems of its own. Moody's recently issued a report saying that bad debts in the Chinese banking system could rise from 1.1% to as much as 12% of the nation's $7.83 trillion in total loans. The mounting bad-debt problem obscures an equally important, and related, phenomenon: For the past three years, at least, the huge credit explosion in China has overwhelmingly ended up in the hands of China's state-owned companies. In the wake of the global economic crisis, Beijing's state-owned banks have frantically shoveled money to their state-owned brethren in the hope of mitigating its impact (particularly on employment). A former executive at Bank of China remembers meeting with a branch manager in central China last year and asking him how much they were lending to local state-owned firms. The answer: "Whatever they want."

    By contrast, the private sector has been starved of capital. (Remarkably, no reliable data exist that parse state and private sector credit, but no one doubts it's a very lopsided picture.) To the extent that private firms have been able to get credit, they have to pay more for it. A study on China's A-share market by the brokerage firm CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets shows that the overall cost of capital (debt and equity financing) for big private firms is on average 100 basis points higher than for state-owned ones. For smaller companies, anecdotal evidence suggests the gap is much greater.

    Private sector executives in China, understandably, are not happy with this. Few are willing to stick their heads above the parapet and complain publicly for fear of angering the government. But to judge by conversations Fortune has had with CEOs of private companies, they're furious. "Our only hope is that the new government [which assumes power next year] understands this and makes the necessary changes." Whether that new government -- expected to be led by Xi Jinping as President and Li Keqiang as Premier -- will be responsive to those complaints is decidedly unclear.

    Given China's economic success, why does credit allocation need to be overhauled? As Daniel Rosen, principal at the New York consultancy Rhodium Group, puts it: "China has the potential for a lot more growth, but it needs to come now from innovation -- not more steel mills. The question is, Which ownership group [state vs. private] is capable of delivering that growth?" Most people feel it's the private sector, which over time tends to be more efficient and more innovative than big, state-owned companies. Think Geely in autos or Alibaba Taobao in e-commerce. But with the institutional bias in lending so entrenched, Rosen asks: "How do they make that happen?"

    That's the right question. And if it doesn't happen, China's "miracle" years of growth may be over.