欧洲：雷曼式破产幽灵徘徊不去

    银行通过多种手段为其活动融资，涉及各种各样的货币。对银行来说，最稳定的资金来源是普通股本，其次是储户通过支票和储蓄账户存放于银行的款项。但在欧洲，尤其是在法国，银行的一大资金来源是货币市场基金、货币市场投资者和其他银行提供的短期贷款。有些时候，这类短期融资每晚都会滚存，作为资金来源它是非常不稳定的，极易引发动荡。法兴银行之所以成为欧洲最早出现股价大跌的银行，原因之一可能就在于该行73%的债务都将于一年内到期，这一比例超过了欧洲其他任何大型银行。

    雷曼兄弟2008年的崩溃给全世界上了生动的一课：依赖短期融资是极为危险的。有谣言称该行即将崩溃，交易员们纷纷撤回短期融资，几天内这家百年老店就真的破产了。同样一出戏码看起来正在欧洲重演，只不过这次是慢动作。举例来说，据德意志银行（Deutsche Bank）的统计，在8月11日之前的三个月里，美国货币市场基金已将向法国银行提供的资金减少了40%，这迫使法国银行从欧洲央行（the European Central Bank）那里寻求美元贷款，以支持其在资本市场和融资方面的活动，尽管这意味着必须承担更高的利率。

    据巴克莱银行（Barclays）统计，截至2010年底，法兴银行和法国农业信贷银行以美元计价的资产分别占到其总资产的19%和14%。根据规定，银行一定比例的资产必须以现金和高流动性证券形式持有，以在融资来源不足时保护自己，缺乏足够美元正是可能引发此种资金问题的原因之一。

    周四，欧洲央行与美联储（the U.S. Federal Reserve）和其他几大央行携手采取行动，宣布将把美元贷款的期限从七天延长到三个月，这有助于防止法国银行股继续暴跌，但只是一种临时性措施，以便给这些银行留出充裕的时间，供其出售资产或筹集永久性资本。值得一提的是，贝尔斯登（Bear Sterns）公司于2008年春季破产之后，美联储向经纪商和券商大开贴现窗口，投资者普遍认为，这一举措使所有美国银行免受流动性危机的困扰，但未能解决引发此种流动性危机、导致贝尔斯登崩溃的根源：偿付能力和信心问题。当然，美联储贴现窗没能拯救雷曼兄弟，欧洲央行的上述临时性措施也无法挽救欧洲银行——除非他们以资本打造一个强劲的缓冲带。

    2008年以来，各大银行已经加厚了这一缓冲带，即所谓的一级资本（Tier 1 capital），但法国银行行动缓慢，因此也就更容易受到短期融资波动的影响。法国农业信贷银行这方面的表现是全欧大型银行中最差的，2007年上半年其一级资本率为8.1%，到2011年上半年也只不过提高到了8.9%；同一期间，法兴银行将一级资本率从6.4%提高至9.3%，但仍徘徊在一级资本率最低的行列。相比之下，瑞士银行巨头瑞银集团（UBS）在同一期间将一级资本率从10.8%提高到了16.1%的高水平。

    一家银行的一级资本率到底该有多高？这倒没有什么通行的标准，关键是要足够高，使投资者信赖银行，相信它们能够抵御未来出现的亏损。

紧急充实资本

    Banks fund their activities in many ways and through a myriad of currencies. The most reliable source of funding for a bank is common equity capital, followed by the money received from depositors through checking and savings accounts. But in Europe, especially in France, a large chunk of funding comes in the form of short-term loans from prime money funds, money market accounts and other banks. This short-term funding is rolled over nightly in some cases, making it an extremely unreliable and volatile source of funding. One reason Société Générale may be the first bank in Europe hit hard is because 73% of its total debt has maturities of less than one year, the highest ratio of any large bank in Europe.

    The Lehman collapse in 2008 showed the world how dangerous it was to depend on short-term funding. Rumors of the bank's imminent collapse caused dealers to pull their short-term funding and within days the bank was insolvent. A similar situation seems to be taking place in Europe, but in slow motion. For example, U.S. money market funds have cut their funding levels to French banks by 40% in the three months through August 11th, according to Deutsche Bank (DB). This has forced the French banks to take out U.S. dollar loans from the European Central Bank at a higher interest rate in order to have enough U.S. dollars to fund their capital markets and financing activities.

    Société Générale and Credit Agricole's U.S. dollar-denominated assets represent 19% and 14%, respectively, of their total balance sheet at the end of 2010, according to Barclays. Banks are required to hold a certain percentage of their assets in cash and other liquid securities to protect themselves from funding shortfalls that could be caused by not having enough dollars on hand.

    On Thursday the ECB, in coordination with the U.S. Federal Reserve and other central banks, said that it would extend maturities on its dollar loans from seven days to three months. This has helped to quell the violent downswing in French bank stocks, but it is only a temporary measure to give the banks enough time to sell assets and raise permanent capital. It should be noted that the Fed discount window was opened fully to broker dealers after Bear Sterns fell in the spring of 2008. It was widely believed that a liquidity crisis had been taken off the table for all U.S. banks, but it failed to address the root causes of the liquidity crisis that took Bear down to begin with: solvency and confidence. Of course, the Fed discount window was not enough to save Lehman Brothers and this temporary measure by the ECB won't save European banks either if they fail to build a strong capital buffer.

    Since 2008, banks have beefed up this buffer, known as Tier 1 capital, but the French banks have been slow to do so, making them more vulnerable to a short-term funding blip. Credit Agricole is the worst performer of the large banks in Europe in this regard, increasing its Tier 1 capital ratio from 8.1% in the first half of 2007 to just 8.9% in the first half of 2011. Société Générale has increased its Tier 1 ratio from 6.4% to 9.3% over the same period, but it remains at the bottom of the pack. In contrast, Suisse banking giant UBS has increased its Tier 1 ratio from 10.8% to a whopping 16.1% over the same period.

   There is no magic number when it comes to the amount of Tier 1 capital a bank should hold. It just needs to be high enough in which investors feel confident that the bank can withstand future losses.

Urgent recapitalization