退出欧元的诱惑与日俱增

    那么，在阿根廷和拉脱维亚在“退出”和“坚持到底”两者间做出抉择后，两个国家的情况又如何呢？2002年1月，阿根廷施行本币贬值后，GDP 直线下降，失业率升至20%，比索跌至4比索兑1美元。但令人惊奇的是，到2002年第四季度，阿根廷经济已重现增长活力。到2004年（距陷入大萧条仅10个季度），GDP已重新回到了此前的峰值。从2002年至2011年，阿根廷产值跃升了94%，经通膨调整的增幅也超过了40%，成为西半球增长最快的国家，增速是巴西的两倍。

    当然，阿根廷绝非什么经济奇迹。它的通膨率已再度飙升，1,000亿美元的外债违约至今仍然让该国遭到国际投资者的唾弃。实际上，它是将巨大的痛苦转嫁到了其他国家和债权人身上。如果能获得像阿根廷这样的复苏，很难保证希腊或意大利不会采取同样的做法。

    拉脱维亚的GDP在2008年和2009年下降了22%以上，但它依然选择将货币与欧元挂钩，特别是在国际货币基金组织和欧盟向它提供了75亿欧元（相当于拉脱维亚当前GDP的约40%）的救助资金之后。通过引导投资进入计算机、制药等领域，拉脱维亚在提高生产率方面也做得不错。2011年拉脱维亚经济增长了约5%，虽然今年预计将下滑至1%甚至更低。

    但是，拉脱维亚仍坚持欧元联系汇率，虽然欧元汇率太高，无法给拉脱维亚带来阿根廷式的出口增长。拉脱维亚还需要一些年头，才能获得阿根廷迅速恢复的那种经济繁荣状态。拉脱维亚的失业率现在高居12%，而且国际货币基金组织预计，至少在2016年之前，拉脱维亚经通膨调整的总产值将无法恢复到2008年的峰值。

    问题是欧洲弱国是否愿意像拉脱维亚一样选择漫长而痛苦的道路，慢慢恢复竞争力。迄今为止，它们的改革还远远不够。

    “这就是希腊和其他国家目前面临的两难选择，”斯坦萨说。“危机国家开始思考（阿根廷）另一条道路，而且这非常有诱惑力。这条道路是痛苦的，但也只能从矬子里拔将军。”

    如果这些国家不顾外界的压力，执意采取对自己最有利的行动，“退出路线”就会成为首选。欧债危机多拖一个月，退出的吸引力就会增加一分。

    So how have Argentina and Latvia performed since choosing between the "Exit" and "Tough it out" approaches? After its devaluation in January of 2002, Argentina's GDP went into freefall, unemployment reached 20%, and the peso dropped to four to the dollar. But amazingly, Argentina was growing briskly again by the fourth quarter of 2002. And by 2004 -- a mere ten quarters from the onset of its recession-turned-depression -- its GDP had climbed back to its previous peak. From 2002 to 2011, its output jumped 94%, or over 40% adjusted for inflation, the fastest number in the Western Hemisphere, and twice the pace of Brazil.

    Argentina is far from a miracle. Its inflation is surging again, and it's despised by international investors since defaulting on $100 billion in foreign debt. Indeed, it put plenty of pain on other nations and creditors. Don't bet that a Greece or Italy will refrain from doing the same if it can stage an Argentinian-scale comeback.

    In Latvia, GDP fell over 22% in 2008 and 2009. But it still chose to remain tied to the euro, especially since the IMF and EU granted it 7.5 billion euros in bailout funds, almost 40% of current GDP. It's done a good job increasing its productivity by guiding investment into such areas as computers and pharmaceuticals. It also grew about 5% in 2011, though the rate is projected to fall to 1% or less this year.

    Still, Latvia is stuck with a currency that's far too expensive to allow the kind of export explosion that rescued Argentina. It faces years of slogging to get back to the kind of prosperity Argentina regained so fast. Unemployment stands at 12%, and the IMF projects that Latvia won't see a return to total output it posted at the peak in 2008, adjusted for inflation, until at least 2016.

    The question is whether Europe's weaklings are willing to suffer through the kind of long, grueling process Latvia adopted to slowly restore its competitiveness. So far, their reforms are scant.

    "It's the dilemma that Greece and the others are now facing," says Stancil. "The ailing nations are starting to figure out what the other path is, and that it's extremely tempting. It's painful, but it may be the best of only bad options."

    If those countries decide to do what's best for them, not what they're being told, the "Exit route" will prevail. For every month the crisis lingers, the more alluring the exit looks.