美航还是单飞好

    鲨鱼们已经开始围着美国航空（American Airlines）打转，但各位不必期待会有什么结果——至少短期内不会。当前的形势下，美国航空不论是与达美航空（Delta Air Lines）还是与全美航空（US Airways）合并，不仅缺乏战略意义，还可能给所有卷入的公司都带来巨大的麻烦。同时，美国航空也并不需要来自德太投资（TPG）或其他私募股权公司注资来走出破产困境尚。

    美国航空于去年11月申请了破产保护，以其为主角的各种传言纷纷开始涌现——这只是时间问题。据报道，达美航空已经聘请了黑石集团（Blackstone Group）研究交易的可能性，而全美航空也聘请巴克莱（Barclays）银行从事同样的工作。同时，总部位于达拉斯的私募股权公司德太投资显然也在考虑将该航空公司私有化或分拆的可能性。

    美国航空母公司AMR的新任首席执行官汤姆•霍顿去年12月曾警告员工，称可能会出现“机会主义者”，威胁公司重组的努力。这番严厉的辞令乃是为了向市场发出明确信息：我们打算独自完成重组工作。至此以后，还没发生什么可能促使霍顿改变主意的事情，恐怕需要重大的变故才会出现这种情况。

    交易背后的理由本身也值得怀疑，媒体举出的最大理由是：美国航空不知怎的“错过了”过去十年左右民航界格局的并购狂潮，如果这家公司想要实现盈利的话，必须扩大规模。这当然完全站不住脚。事实上，正是美国航空2011年收购环球航空公司（TWA）的交易引爆了这一轮并购风潮。这宗收购造就了当时全球最大的航空公司，直到2008年达美与西北航空（Northwest Airlines）合并及2010年美联航（United Airlines）与大陆航空（Continental Airlines）合并后，美国航空才失去了这个地位。

    美国航空之所以没有再进行其他并购，是因为其规模已经足够庞大。事实上，过去十年来该公司多数时间都在削减运力，以求提高脆弱的利润率。

    实际上，美国航空正是因为打响了民航并购战的第一枪才吃尽了苦头。美国航空的对手在并购时都尝到了节约成本的甜头，而美国航空却未能获得这样的好处，在劳动和飞机租赁合同方面的问题尤其严重。与竞争对手达美和美联航不同，美国航空收购环球航空之前，并未通过破产保护重组成本结构，意味着该公司成本高昂的劳动合同仍然有效，甚至还拓展到了覆盖环球航空的全部员工。此外，美国航空也未能就其他高价合同——比如价格过高的飞机租赁合同——重新谈判，结果被迫继续为相对较老且油耗更高的机型买单。

    分析人士和媒体描绘了一幅美好的画卷，仿佛只要美国航空与规模更大的达美或稍小的美联航合并，利益就会滚滚而来。可是，他们恰恰弄反了。美国航空只有通过破产保护程序削减成本，而不是进行并购，才能得到这些好处。没有证据表明民航公司的并购确实能够提高营收，事实上，排除通货膨胀因素影响后，现在机票价格反而比2001年便宜了20%. 这意味着，民航公司通过并购行动显著增长营收的尝试已经归于失败。

    The sharks have started to circle American Airlines, but don't expect anything to come of it -- at least in the near term. A tie up involving American with either Delta Air Lines or US Airways makes little strategic sense at this point and would end up creating major headaches for all the parties involved. Meanwhile, a cash infusion from either TPG or another private equity firm isn't needed for the airline to work its way through bankruptcy.

    It was just a matter of time before rumors would start about American Airlines being in play following its trip to the bankruptcy court in November. Delta has reportedly hired the Blackstone Group (BX) to look into a possible deal while US Airways (LCC) has hired Barclays (BCS) to do the same. Dallas-based private equity firm TPG is also apparently looking into the possibility of taking the airline private or splitting it up.

    Tom Horton, AMR's new chief executive, warned employees in December that there would be "opportunists" who would threaten to destabilize the airline's attempt at reorganization. Such harsh language was meant to send a clear message to the markets: we are going to do this alone. Nothing has changed so far to alter Horton's thinking and it would probably take a lot to do so.

    The rationale behind the deal talk is itself questionable. The biggest one touted in the media was that American somehow "missed out" on the airline merger mania over the last decade or so and that they need to be bigger if they ever want to be profitable. This, of course, is a total fallacy. American actually set off the consolidation craze by acquiring rival TWA in 2001. This merger created what was the largest airline in the world until Delta merged with Northwest Airlines in 2008 and United Airlines merged with Continental Airlines in 2010.

    American chose to stay out of the other mergers because it was already big enough. In fact, it has spent much of the last decade paring down its capacity in order to boost its fledgling profit margins.

    In fact, American has suffered because it was the first mover in the airline consolidation game. It did not attain the cost savings its rivals received when pairing up, especially when it came to labor and lease agreements. Unlike rivals Delta (DAL) and United (UAL), American acquired TWA before it was able to reorganize its cost structure in bankruptcy. That meant that American's expensive labor contracts remained intact and were then extended to all TWA employees. The airline wasn't able to renegotiate other high-priced contracts like its expensive airline leases. It was stuck paying off planes that were older and less fuel efficient.

    Analysts and the media paint a picture of merger bliss if American would just pair up with larger rival Delta or smaller rival US Airways. But they seem to have it backwards. The bliss will come when American slashes its costs in bankruptcy, not if it merges. There is no evidence that airline mergers actually enhance revenue. In fact, airline travel is actually 20% less expensive than it was in 2001, after adjusting for inflation. That means that airlines have failed in their attempt to achieve any meaningful top-line growth by combining operations.