美航还是单飞好

    航空公司通过控制成本和寻求额外收入来赚钱。最近，收取包裹费、餐饮费、座位选择费甚至是电话订票费帮助很多航空公司维持了盈利。这些费用在整个民航系统中都有触及，看起来与并购狂潮也没什么关联。

    公平地讲，并购行动刚完成时确实可以带来一些好处。合并总部及削减管理成本的确对最终保留下来的民航公司起到作用，不过，效果可能有限。例如，一位熟悉美联航事务的人士向《财富》杂志（Fortune）透露，为了吸引大陆航空的雇员从休斯敦搬到芝加哥，美联航被迫为其加薪20-30%. 就算考虑税收减免的问题，将总部留在这样一个成本高昂的城市，理由也相当奇怪，这表明民航界的并购并不总是理性的。

    美国航空与美联航合并的话，显得尤其不合理。由于美联航以匹兹堡、夏洛特、费城和凤凰城等地为枢纽运作，其国际化努力顶多可说是边缘性的。美国航空的网络要发达得多，其债权人也明白这一点，因此，美联航要想完成任何交易，都必须提供大量现金作为甜头，而它并没有这种财力。

    从表面上看，与达美合作要合理得多，可仍然有一些重大障碍，可能导致交易失败。首先，由于两家公司在65个美国国内城市航班中有重叠，这将引发反垄断问题，而美联航与大陆航空提出合并时，双方只有14个重叠的国内直达航班，达美与西北航空合并时更是只有12个重叠航班。这是个重大问题，因为反垄断监管部门倾向于重点分析各航班的市场占有率，而不是整体情况。

    国际航线方面，达美与美国航空分别隶属天合联盟（Sky Team）及寰宇一家（One World）这两大国际飞行常客联盟，而且是各自联盟在美国的支柱，它们之间的合并将使谨慎追求平衡的联盟系统遭到挑战。如果一家放弃原有联盟，转投另一家，将会严重打击客流量。

    此外，两家公司与其各自联盟的欧洲主航空公司之间的联系超越了通常的伙伴关系，因为两者都在大西洋彼岸获得了反垄断豁免。美国航空实际上可以合法地与英国航空（British Airways）就利润颇丰的纽约至伦敦航班合谋，而达美可以合法地与法航荷航集团（Air France/KLM）就同样利润可观的纽约至巴黎航班协同。合并之后这些协议是否仍然有效？目前还不得而知。

    归根结底，决定美国航空命运的是其债权人。无担保债权人委员会的九名成员中，三名属于工会，如果管理层降低劳动力成本幅度太大，工会很可能加以反对。可是，考虑到达美和美联航的成本结构更低，合并很可能也无法解决他们在经济利益问题上的忧虑。

    美国航空申请破产保护之时，银行户头上还有40亿美元现金，使其有充裕的时间来权衡所有选项。目前，管理层有120天时间来向法院提交重组计划，法院还可以将该期限额外延长18个月。因此，就算将来有任何交易，那也还是很遥远的事情。最大的可能性是，美国航空浴火重生，维持独立航空公司的地位，同时资产负债状况也会显著改善。一旦理清头绪，美国航空或许还能召集银行家来按照自己的条件做笔交易。

    译者：小宇

    Airlines have made money by controlling their costs and seeking additional revenue. Fees for bags, food, seat assignments and even for the cost of calling to book a ticket have helped keep many airlines in the black recently. Those fees have been instituted throughout the airline system and seem to have little to do with the consolidation craze.

    To be fair, there are some initial benefits to combining operations. Merging headquarters and slashing management costs does help the surviving airline, although it can be limited. For example, United has had to hike the pay of Continental employees by 20% to 30% to entice them to move up to Chicago from Houston, a person close to the company told Fortune. The bizarre reason to remain headquartered in such an expensive city, even with tax breaks, shows that airline mergers aren't always rational.

    An American combination with US Airways seems to be an especially irrational choice. Its attempts to grow its international business have been marginal at best as it operates from hubs like Pittsburgh, Charlotte, Philadelphia and Phoenix. American's network is far superior and its creditors know that. US Airways would therefore need to offer a lot of cash to sweeten any deal, something it doesn't have.

    A pairing with Delta on the surface seems like a more rational choice, but there are a few major obstacles that sour the deal. First, the merger could create an antitrust issue as the two overlap in 65 nonstop domestic city-pairs. United Airlines and Continental only shared 14 domestic city-pairs when they proposed their merger, while Delta and Northwest shared even less at 12 city-pairs. That's important as antitrust regulators tend to look at city-pair concentration as opposed to overall market concentration.

    On the international front, a Delta-American deal would upset the carefully balanced frequent flyer alliance system, since they are both the U.S. anchors for their respective alliances, Sky Team and One World. If one leaves to join the other it could be a big hit to passenger volume.

    And the connections that the two have with their respective European frequent flyer anchor airlines go beyond the typical partner arrangement as both have attained antitrust immunity over the Atlantic. American is effectively able to legally collude with British Airways on the lucrative New York to London route, while Delta is able to legally collude with Air France/KLM on the equally lucrative New York to Paris route. It's unclear if those contracts would continue after a merger.

    In the end it will be American's creditors that will decide the company's fate. Of the nine members on the unsecured creditors committee, three belong to labor unions. The unions will likely move against management of they cut too much. But given that the cost structures at Delta and US Airways are lower, it seems unlikely that a merger would solve their money worries.

    American's decision to go bankrupt with $4 billion in cash in the bank has given it enough time to weigh all its options. For now, management has 120 days to present a plan of reorganization to the court. A judge could extend that period out by an additional 18 months, so a deal, if any, is still a ways away. American will most likely emerge as an independent airline with a much stronger balance sheet. Once all cleaned up, it may be American calling the bankers to do a deal on their terms.