中国房市难逃“硬着陆”

    租金收益率是指用年租金除以市场价格，就好比债券收益是指用固定利息金额除以该债券的当日价格。美国市场的平均租金收益率在6%左右，意味着房价租金比约为17。中国的租金收益率如果提高到5%，房价将下跌60%。

    艾利伯绝对不是唯一一个预言中国房市将崩盘的经济学家。美国传统基金会（Heritage Foundation）的经济学家史剑道（Derek Scissors）表示：“我估计中国的楼市价格会下跌60%甚至更多，这的确是可能的。”

    房价的调整已经开始了。官方数据显示，从去年年末开始房价出现了适度下降，但众所周知，那些数据是靠不住的。我们不妨看看那些试图卖掉房子的房主们。折价30%卖房的现象并不鲜见。事实上，很多在2010年花了60万美元买房的人都愤怒地发现，开发商现在正在同一幢大楼里以45万美元每套的价格销售那些尚未卖出的房子。

    究竟是什么有可能打击到中国引以为傲的经济增长率？我们不妨重新梳理一下中国炒房热的动力。中国政府对利率、政府债券收益和其它国内投资工具施加了严格的限制。2011年的通胀率超过了5%，而10年期债券收益率仅为3.5%。在中国，你很难找到比通胀跑得更快的投资工具。2008年全球金融危机爆发后，随着货币政策由紧转松，大量过剩现金流到了唯一一个能产生巨额回报的地方——房地产。

    在大约四年多的时间里，中国平均每年新建住房面积10亿平方米，为美国的10倍。而要想满足那些有刚性住房需求的购房者——比如说那些从农村搬到城市里的人，每年只需要7亿平方米足矣。

    所以我们不妨按照这个数据来假设需求水平。另外中国还有700万至800万套闲置的房子。如果每年可卖掉其中的200万套，那么中国每年再建造5亿平方米就够了，这只相当于过去几年每年新建住房面积的一半。新建住房面积的下降不仅会影响住房支出，还会影响钢铁、铜和家用电器的产量。

    根据艾利伯的计算，新建住房量的迅速下跌会使中国经济增长率降低整整5个百分点。在他看来，2011年中国经济增长率虽然高达9 .2%，但其中大概有3个百分点都来自泡沫。考虑那些待售的空房，还要再下调2个点，因此中国未来的增长前景远没有官方预测的那么强劲。

    与后危机时代的美国不同，中国在泡沫破裂后还将继续增长，即便增长步伐速度会放缓很多。届时中国会出台另一个庞大的经济刺激计划来弥补房市崩盘的损失，这个刺激计划的效果值得观察。如果随后再次发生通胀，就需要用减缓经济发展的代价来控制通胀。

    或者就像艾利伯所观察到的那样：“中国以10%的增长率高速发展的日子可能将成为历史。”

    译者：朴成奎

    The rental yield is simply the annual rent divided by the market price, just as the yield on a bond is the fixed interest payment divided by the price of the bond that day. In the U.S., the rental yield averages around 6%, meaning the multiple of prices to rents is around 17. The adjustment to a 5% rental yield in China would push prices down by 60%.

    Aliber is by no means the sole China expert to predict that a steep drop is coming. "I estimate that a decline of 60% or even more is the upper end of the range, but is indeed possible," says Derek Scissors, an economist at the Heritage Foundation.

    The adjustment has already begun. While the government's official figures show modest declines starting late last year, those numbers are famously unreliable. A better view comes from owners trying to sell their units. Losses of 30% aren't uncommon. In fact, many owners who paid, say, $600,000 in 2010 are furious that their landlords are now offering unsold units in the same building for $450,000.

    What's the probable hit to China's vaunted growth rate? It's important to recap the forces that caused the frenzy. China imposes tight restrictions on returns on bank accounts, government bond yields and other domestic investments. Inflation for 2011 exceeded 5%, but 10-year bond yields are just 3.5%. It's extremely difficult to find investments that yield more than inflation. When the easy money policies took charge after the worldwide crash of 2008, the excess cash flowed into the only place with big returns -- real estate.

    For around four years, China has been building around 1 billion square meters of housing a year, ten times the figure in the U.S. The amount needed to accommodate real owners -- people moving from farms to the cities, for example -- is 700 million square meters.

    So let's assume that demand goes back to that level. China is also swamped with seven to eight million vacant units. If around two million of those are sold a year, China will need to build just 500 million square meters annually -- half of the total over the past several years. That decline will pound not just expenditures on apartments, but production of steel, copper and appliances.

    By Aliber's reckoning, the sharp decline in housing production could lower China's growth rate by a full five points. In his view, around three points of its 9.2% growth rate in 2011 came from the bubble. Shave two more points for the empty apartments that need to be sold, and future growth looks far less robust than the official projections.

    Unlike the post-crash U.S., China will keep growing after the bubble bursts, though at a far slower rate. What bears watching is the effect of another gigantic stimulus program to compensate for the decline in housing. If renewed inflation follows, so will a slowdown needed to tame it.

    Or as Aliber observes, "China's spurt of a 10% growth rate is likely to be history."