与巨人共舞
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根据我的经验，一个架构良好、极具影响力的合作伙伴关系胜过100个平庸的分销合作。分销伙伴关系需要花费巨大的努力方能产生效果。同时拥有众多分销伙伴根本就不切实际，正是因为这个原因，选择合适的分销伙伴、精心打造合作关系才是最为重要的。过去8年间，Opsware公司只有一个重要的分销伙伴，但它对公司产生了非常大的积极影响。 该找一个分销伙伴了 2005年初，当时成立仅3年的Opsware公司开始步入良性发展轨道。我们刚刚完成了对Rendition Networks公司的收购，这项耗资3,300万美元的收购案为我们带来了一个轻量级、但功能强大的网络自动化软件产品，我们将其命名为Opsware NAS（网络自动化系统）。NAS使得我们在该领域占得了一席之地，并迅速地为新客户创造出价值，尔后说服它们购买我们公司另一项级别更高、同时也更加昂贵的产品：服务器自动化系统SAS。NAS的销售合同一般价值11.5万美元，销售周期需要1个月，安装需要几个星期，而SAS的销售合同一般价值76.5万美元，销售需1年时间，安装调试需6到12个月）。 对于我们来说，积极推广和销售NAS是一个明智之举，但我们当时面临着一项挑战：我们的直销团队规模很小，只能覆盖美国和英国市场，而且缺乏跟网络买家的业务关系。我们需要一个拥有买家关系和销售团队覆盖全球（这些都是我们欠缺的）的大型合作伙伴。 合适的合作伙伴 显而易见，合适的合作伙伴是思科公司，而合适的产品则是NAS。 得益于我们在战略性商业拓展方面的投资，自Opsware公司成立之日起，我们就一直拜访思科公司，其中既包括最高管理层，也包括处于中层的数据中心经理。现在，我们终于可以开始跟思科谈生意了。尽管思科公司在路由器和交换机硬件市场占据着主导地位，但我们从客户那里得知，思科管理软件对其自身设备的管理能力让人不敢恭维，对客户网络系统中其他公司、比如瞻博网络公司（Juniper）的设备则根本就发挥不了任何作用。而我们的产品不仅在市场处于领先地位，还能跨平台应用。完成对Rendition Networks公司的收购之后几天，我们就拜会了思科公司负责管理软件的高级副总裁，向他提供了他的客户们需要的解决方案。 明确任务 筹划一份极具影响力的协定之前，首先得搞清楚你想从中获得什么。我们事前花费了大量时间让公司内部明确我们通过这次合作所要达成的目的，并就这一问题在公司上下达成了共识。我们的主要目标如下： • 思科公司真心致力于推广，并以对我们具有吸引力的利润率销售大量的NAS产品。 • Opsware公司有权面向Cisco NAS 的所有客户推销 Opsware SAS 。 • Cisco NAS产品需注明Opsware 公司的标识。 • 最小幅度的产品调整，单一的代码库。 • 思科方面必须保证足够大的销售额，这样我们才能投入资源，支持思科实现销售目标。 |
In my experience, one well-constructed, high-impact partnership is better than a hundred run-of-the-mill arrangements. Distribution partnerships take an enormous effort to make work. It's just not realistic to have many of them, which is why picking the right one and constructing it intelligently is fundamental. At Opsware, we only had one significant distribution relationship over eight years, but it had a massively positive impact on the company. Time to find a partner It was early 2005, and things were starting to go pretty well for three-year-old Opsware. We had just closed our $33 million acquisition of Rendition Networks, giving us a lightweight but powerful network automation software product that we christened Opsware NAS (Network Automation System). NAS would allow us to penetrate and rapidly deliver value to new accounts, then upsell them to our considerably heavier and more expensive Server Automation System. (Our average NAS deal size was $115k, took a month to sell and a couple of weeks to deploy, whereas SAS deals averaged $765k and could take a year to sell and six to twelve months to deploy.) It made sense to market and sell NAS as aggressively as possible—but we faced a challenge: Our direct sales force was small, only covered US and UK, and had few relationships with network buyers. We needed a big partner with the buyer relationships and global coverage we lacked. The right partner The right partner was obvious: Cisco. So was the product: NAS. Thanks to our investment in strategic BD (see Part I and Part II of this series), we'd been calling on Cisco since the founding of Opsware, from the C-suite to mid-level data center managers. Now we finally had something to talk about. For all its pre-eminence in router and switch hardware, we knew from customers that Cisco's management software capability was weak for its own devices and non-existent for, say, Juniper devices in the customer's network. We had the market-leading, cross-platform product. Within days of closing the acquisition, we visited the Cisco SVP responsible for management software and offered him the solution his customers were demanding. Mission clarity Before you can construct a high-impact deal, you have to be crystal-clear on what you want to achieve. We spent a substantial amount of time up front to achieve internal clarity and consensus across the company on what we wanted from a partnership. These were our main objectives: • A real commitment by Cisco to market and sell a lot of NAS product, at an attractive margin to us. • Opsware's right to target every Cisco NAS customer for an Opsware SAS sale. • Opsware branding on the Cisco NAS product. • Minimal product changes and a single code base. • Enough assurance of financial potential to allow us to invest in the support Cisco would need to succeed. |
