美女分析师市政债务危机预言成真

    经常关注财经媒体的读者们对下面这个故事并不陌生：15个月前，也就是2010年12月份，华尔街巨星级分析师梅里迪斯•惠特尼在哥伦比亚广播公司著名的电视节目《60分钟》（60 Minutes）中预言，美国市政债券市场将出现一波违约潮。此言一出，震动了整个市场。而且，当时她的预测非常具体：“可能会看到50-100宗较大规模的违约，”她在接受《60分钟》记者史蒂夫•克罗夫特采访时称。“相当于几千亿美元的违约额。”

    美国市政债券市场因此再创新低。2010年12月22日至2011年2月2日期间，市政债券市场资金流出约140亿美元，2010年第四季度的回报率也创下了十六年来的新低。市政债券市场的长期参与者，包括分析师、基金经理以及市政债券经纪人，都怒火中烧——惠特尼这种自以为是的家伙这回居然敢插手他们的领域——在美国按揭贷款危机初显之时，这位美女分析师就曾经因为大呼花旗集团（Citigroup）就是那个“没穿衣服的皇帝”而名声大噪。

    他们说，惠特尼错了。她根本不知道他们的市场是怎么回事。她预测的这种违约永远不会发生。严格按字面意思理解，他们说的没错。自那以来，这个3.7万亿美元的市场中只发生了26亿美元的违约。而且，市政债券市场的下跌也并没有持续很长时间；2011年，巴克莱（Barclay）市政债券指数上涨10.7%，是标准普尔500指数2.1%回报率的五倍多。

    一位高调预言家失手或许大快人心，此后，惠特尼在财经媒体和情绪化更明显的博客界里受欢迎程度确实有所下降。至少在一定程度上，这是她自作自受，但也只是因为她当初的预测太过具体。她当时试图表述的主要意思是，美国糟糕的市政财政状况将每况愈下，这个判断则非常准确。尽情笑话她吧，但是你能找出一两个人来，证明过去一两年地方税收下调、市政服务得到了改善吗？但愿你运气好能找到。

    “美国各州已将越来越多的开支压力推至地方政府，”惠特尼告诉《财富》杂志（Fortune）。“而市政机构根本没有钱填上缺口。这块压力很大，特别是2011年6月美国复苏与再投资法案（American Reinvestment Recovery Act）到期后。”

    惠特尼2010年9月的市政财政报告不光光是对具体的市政债券作出了预测。事实上，这份厚达1,400页的详尽报告《公地的悲剧》（The Tragedy of the Commons）侧重于阐述美国最大的一些州在众多市镇债券上面临的问题日益严重，甚至有些令人恐惧。她说，我们必须作出改变。有些事确实发生了变化。它并不像一批债券直接违约那么简单。

    2011年初，批评宛如暴风骤雨般落到惠特尼头上，但她解释称，她指的不只是“技术性”债券违约，她采用了一些更感性的词语，还包括“社会责任违约”（如垃圾清运频率降低）和“雇佣合同违约”（如政府雇员不得不自己缴纳养老金）等。不管你认为她是在事后试图转换话题，还是阐明事实，事实上都不重要。因为所有这一切都已经变成了现实。市政债券经纪人可能仍然有时间嘲笑惠特尼自食其果，但如果你真正需要应对市政财政恶化的现实影响，恐怕不太能笑得起来。

    To readers of the business press, the story is a familiar one: fifteen months ago, superstar analyst Meredith Whitney rocked the world of municipal finance with a December 2010 prediction on 60 Minutes that a wave of municipal debt defaults was headed our way. Her forecast was quite specific: "You could see fifty to a hundred sizable defaults," she told her interviewer, correspondent Steve Kroft. "This will amount to hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of defaults."

    The bottom fell out of the muni bond market as a result. Investors pulled some $14 billion from muni bond funds between December 22 and February 2, 2011, and returns in the fourth quarter of 2010 were the lowest in 16 years. Long-time players in the space, including analysts, fund managers, and muni brokers, reacted with indignation that an arriviste such as Whitney—the woman who made her name calling out Citigroup (C) as an emperor with no clothes at the dawn of the mortgage crisis—dared to try to expand her analytical purview into their cozy little corner of the capital markets.

    She was wrong, they said. She didn't know squat about how their market worked. The kind of defaults she called for were never going to happen. And they were right, in the most literal sense. Since then, there have only been $2.6 billion in defaults from the $3.7 trillion market. And the muni bond swoon didn't even last very long: in 2011, Barclay's muni bond index returned 10.7%, more than five times the 2.1% return of the S&P500.

    Nothing satisfies like a comedown of a prominent prognosticator, and Whitney has taken her lumps in both the business press and the more unbridled blogosphere ever since. She deserves at least some of it, but that's only for being overly specific. The more general point that she was trying to make—that municipal finances in this country were a mess that was only going to get messier—was dead on. Laugh at her all you want, but then try this: go find one person who says their local taxes are falling or their municipal services have improved in the past year or two. I wish you luck in your endeavor.

    "States have pushed more and more expenses down to the local level," Whitney tells Fortune. "And municipalities don't have the money to make up the difference. That is where you see the real strain, especially after the American Reinvestment Recovery Act expired in June 2011."

    Whitney's September 2010 report on municipal finances didn't contain a single call on a specific municipal bond. Indeed, the 1,400-page beast of analysis, titled "The Tragedy of the Commons," was instead focused on delineating the myriad—and slightly terrifying—financial obligations that the largest states in the country were having increasing trouble meeting. Something had to change, she said. And something did. It just wasn't as simple as a bunch of outright defaults.

    When the criticism came raining down on her in early 2011, Whitney explained that she didn't just mean "technical" bond defaults but also mushier terms such a "social contract defaults"—e.g. less frequent trash removal schedules—and "employment contract defaults"—e.g. government employees being forced to contribute to their own pensions. Whether you think she tried to change the conversation after the fact or was merely elaborating is really neither here nor there. Because all of that is happening, and more. Municipal bond brokers may still find the time to chuckle about Whitney's comeuppance, but if you're someone responsible for actually dealing with the real-life implications of deteriorating muni finances, the mirth becomes a little harder to come by.