汉堡王：船大难掉头

    而面对全新的行业态势，汉堡王却无动于衷，结果陷入了举步维艰的境地。随着消费者的消费标准日益提高，汉堡王必须在未来几年内投资数十亿美元，才有可能获得理想的品牌认知度。

    当然，事情总有积极的一面，比如比尔•阿克曼肯定会从此次交易中获利。但作为独立观察员，我们不得不考虑，在他获利之后可能会发生的事情。我们需要考虑促使Justice Holdings公司进行此次交易的动机所在。作为一家上市一年多的专项收购公司，它必须在2014年2月之前完成一笔交易。笔者认为，Justice Holdings公司与之前的那些私募股权投资者一样，也看到了汉堡王的特质：它就像是屡试不爽的自动提款机，恰好符合Justice Holdings的要求。

    看看那些真正位列“顶级品牌”同行们的估值水平，我们就能理解为何要在现在进行交易了。笔者认为，唐恩都乐（Dunkin' Donuts）去年夏天首次公开募股，对于其内部人员和从交易中获益的投资者来说，无疑都是一个成功，而这应该是此次汉堡王交易时机的最大决定因素。

    但目前公司的策略似乎并不关注品牌投入。餐馆改建计划并未得到特许加盟店层面的赞许。问题是，如果当前的策略失败，是不是就等于敲响了汉堡王品牌的丧钟？对此，笔者认为并没有这么悲观。目前，最合理的猜测是，为了实现增长，汉堡王最好收缩阵线。按照公司的现状，扭转颓势仍然是非常艰巨的任务。关闭效益不佳的店铺，提高平均单位销量，或许才是公司实现重新崛起的第一步。

    根据阿克曼《Justice公司与汉堡王的完美联姻》（Justice is Best Served Flame Broiled）一文，笔者总结出汉堡王（从某种意义上而言）需要解决现有问题的十大理由：

    1. 资金流失：2011年4月，汉堡王发行了价值6.85亿美元的债券，收益达到4.015亿美元，其中有2.94亿美元以股息的形式流进了3G资本的账户。

    2. 人才流失：去年，公司管理层在行政管理上的开支达到1.07亿美元，而且裁员40%，虽然这一举措使公司的折旧摊销前利润提高了50%，但为了实现这一目标，必须在各方面进行一次性调整。

    3. 专利权转让/改建计划：公司的餐厅拥有量减少了3%，进而减少了资本支出。然而，到目前为止，（按店面估算）仍有85%的特许经营店没有接受改建计划。

    4. 新菜单方案：汉堡王采取防守策略，推出了一款新菜单，其中的产品与麦当劳似乎大同小异。

    5 同店销售额正向增长：从2月份某个额外交易日开始，再加上史上罕见的暖冬，其同店销售额在连续3年下降之后，经历了长达四个月的正增长。

    Burger King has done none of that and is facing a difficult reality in this new world. As consumers demand higher standards, Burger King is going to have to invest billions of dollars in capital over a period of years to get its brand perception to where it needs to be.

    We have to give credit where it is due – Bill Ackman is going to make money on this deal. But as independent observers, we have to wonder what happens after his payday. It's worth bearing in mind the factors driving the decision of Justice Holdings to make this transaction. Having been public for over a year, the company – as a SPAC – was compelled to complete a transaction by February 2014. We think Justice Holdings saw in Burger King the same attributes that many PE investors have seen in the past: BK is a tried and tested cash machine and it fits the bill perfectly for Justice Holdings.

    Looking at valuation levels of peer companies that could accurately be labeled as "brand royalty", it makes sense for a deal to be done now. We believe that the success of the Dunkin' Donuts (DNKN) IPO last summer – for the insiders and others that got a piece of the deal – is the biggest driver behind the timing of the Burger King deal.

    But the current strategy does not seem to be focused on investing in the brand. The program to remodel restaurants is not yet being embraced by the franchisee base. If the current strategy fails, the question is whether that could be a death knell for the Burger King brand? We don't think that's as dramatic as some might believe. Our best guess at this point is that Burger King may be better off shrinking in order to grow. As it currently exists, the turnaround may be too great a task. Closing underperforming stores and bringing the average unit volume higher may be a good first step on the road to recovery.

    Below are our top 10 ten reasons why, according to the Ackman's "Justice is Best Served Flame Broiled" slide deck, Burger King is fixed (so to speak):

    1. CAPITAL DRAIN: In April 2011, BK issued $685 million of notes, yielding $401.5 million of proceeds, of which $294 million was returned to 3G in the form of a dividend.

    2. BRAIN DRAIN: Last year, management gutted the company of $107 million in administrative expenses and cut head count by 40%, taking EBITDA up 50% but various one-time adjustments have to be made to get there.

    3. ROYALTY STREAM/REMODEL PROGRAM: The company has reduced store ownership by 3%, reducing the need for capital spending. Unfortunately, 85% of the franchisee-base (measured in stores) has not bought into the remodel program thus far.

    4. NEW MENU INITIATIVES: BK is introducing a new menu that is defensive and looks just like products that McDonald's is selling.

    5. POSITIVE SAME-STORE SALES: On the back of an extra trading day in February and the warmest winter in generations, the chain is seeing four months of positive SSS after three years of declines.