福岛之觞：揭秘核泄露内幕

    （时年66岁的清水正孝还不习惯被政府官员训斥。他是日本商界保守派的中流砥柱，一辈子都在东京电力公司任职。他在全球核电行业也有着良好的声誉，不到一年前，他还被选为世界核电运营商协会< World Association of Nuclear Operators >的理事，这个协会的宗旨是确保“最高可能性的安全标准”。）

    菅直人自己也想听取清水正孝的想法，不过在清水正孝到来之前，菅直人已经与他的核事故紧急小组讨论过了，他已经做出了决定：“我不会让它（大规模疏散）发生的。它不在考虑之列。”

视而不见，养虎为患

    袭击福岛第一核电站的地震和海啸破坏力之大，是史无前例的。但这种灾难并非难以想象。事实上，东电公司的工人也经常私下讨论福岛第一核电站的选址。有一名工人说道：“我经常在想，为什么有人会在大洋边上，在这样一个地震带里建造一个规模这么大的核电站。”由于东电公司没有给他接受媒体采访的权利，因此这名工人要求匿名。他在福岛附近的南相马市的一家卡拉OK厅里接受了我们的采访。2011年3月11日灾难发生时，这名工人就在福岛第一核电站，而且整个春天、夏天和秋天几乎都连续地坚守在那里。

    这名工人表示，东京电力公司的高管层和日本的核电监管机构也对核危机感到疑惑。当1966年和1972年福岛第一核电站获得核电许可证时，东电高层和核电监管机构要求福岛第一核电站必须能够抵御3.1米高的大浪——这个数据是参考智利1960年的一次海啸得来的。

    根据日本政府去年年底发布的一份报告，就在离大海啸发生只有三年的2008年，东电公司还曾重新评估过福岛第一核电站的海啸风险。东电公司最新的技术模拟显示，一旦发生海啸，该地区最高可能会遭受15米的巨浪——令人心寒的是，这差不多正好就是3月11日下午袭击福岛海岸线的最大浪高。

    不过东京电力公司当时并不相信这个模拟结果的可靠性。

    就像日本政府对核事故的一份调查报告所总结的那样：由于东电不相信该模拟结果所采用的新模型，所以“东京电力公司仍未针对海啸的可能性采取具体措施。”

    该报告对日本的核电监管机构也同样表示了不满。报告写道，在确定福岛第一核电站是否采取了适当的抗海啸措施的问题上，“调查委员会没有发现监管机构做出相关努力”。日本注定要为此付出巨大代价。3月11日，七波海啸向福岛第一核电站轮番袭来，两名正在检查四号机组的东电员工在最大的一波海啸袭击中当场殒命。备用发电机发生故障后，反应堆的冷却系统和乏燃料池随即陷入瘫痪。

    (Shimizu, then 66, was not accustomed to being called on the carpet by government officials. He was a pillar of the conservative Japanese industrial establishment, and a TEPCO lifer. He had also been a member in good standing of the global nuclear power industry; less than a year earlier he had been elected to the board of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, a trade group ostensibly devoted to ensuring the "highest possible standards of safety.")

    Kan himself wanted to hear what Shimizu was thinking, but he had already decided, after talking to his nuclear emergency team before the TEPCO president arrived, that "I could not let it [an evacuation] happen. It just wasn't an option."

Turning a Blind Eye

    There was no precedent for the magnitude of the quake and tsunami that wreaked havoc at Fukushima Daiichi. But the disaster wasn't unimaginable. In fact, workers periodically discussed among themselves the risks of the facility's location. "I always wondered why you would build a nuclear site this size in an earthquake zone right on the ocean," said one worker, who requested anonymity because TEPCO had not granted him permission to speak to the press. Sitting in a small karaoke bar in the nearby city of Minami-soma, the worker was at the plant on March 11, 2011 and worked almost continuously through the spring, summer and autumn to try to contain the crisis.

    TEPCO's senior management and Japan's nuclear regulators wondered about the risks, too, this worker noted. When the licenses for the Fukushima Daiichi generating stations were granted in 1966 and 1972, they called for the plant to be able to withstand a wave cresting at 3.1 meters in height—a figure based on the size of a tsunami in Chile in 1960.

    As recently as 2008, according to the Japanese government's interim report into the accident released at the end of last year, TEPCO reevaluated the tsunami risks at the plant. New simulations the company ran showed waves could reach as high as 15 meters—chillingly, almost the exact height of the biggest wave that smashed into the coastline on the afternoon of March 11.

    TEPCO didn't believe the simulation was reliable.

    As a Japanese government investigation into the nuclear accident concludes, in understated but withering prose: "TEPCO still did not take concrete measures against the possibility of tsunami," because it didn't trust the new model that had generated that result.

    The report is equally critical of the nuclear regulatory agencies in Japan. "The investigation committee is unable to find efforts of the regulatory organizations concerned" to determine whether adequate defenses against possible tsunamis were in place.

    Japan would pay dearly for that. Two TEPCO workers, in the process of inspecting unit number four, were killed instantly when the largest of the seven waves struck the plant site. The cooling systems for the reactors that were operating and the plant's spent fuel pools were disabled when backup generators failed.