福岛之觞：揭秘核泄露内幕

    紧接着，在东电总部和福岛第一核电站发生的混乱与骚动又导致了一连串不该发生的错误，最终导致三座反应堆出现氢气爆炸，爆炸向大气和海水中释放了破坏性水平的放射性物质。福岛第一核电站站长吉田雅夫回忆道：“我以为我们完了。我以为我们会彻底失去对反应堆的控制。”

驼鸟心态，逃避现实

    日本的核安全标准历来是旨在确保核电厂能够抵御“设计基准事故”，也就是核电厂在设计上能够自动抵御的事故。而一年前的事故的破坏性远远超过了这个标准。核电行业把福岛第一核电站的事故称为“全厂失电”（SBO）。

    在上世纪八九十年代，美国的核电监管机构和核电运营商就开始计划出现“全厂失电”时的对策——也就是核电厂失去所有电力，就像去年福岛第一核电站发生的那样。当时美国核电站就开始安装一套被东京的核电顾问佐藤智（音译）称为“深度防御”的系统，也就是一些冗余、多样的机制，来确保核电站能够应对包括全厂失电在内的各种事故。

    东京电力公司和日本核电监管机构表示，福岛第一核电站的确配备了多余的电力设施——也就是核电站里的柴油发电机，不过它们也在海啸袭击中瘫痪了。（尽管柴油发电机所在的位置离太平洋还有好几百码，但它们的设计却抵御不了水淹。）

    不过日本却从来没有为全厂失电的情况做过准备。佐藤表示，尽管全世界都在向前看，但日本核电业的感觉却是：“全厂失电是不可能的事，想都不要想。”

    日本的核电批评人士表示，这种现象有一个基本的原因。长期以来，日本政府和电力公司把更多的时间和精力用来向公众兜售“核电安全论”，而不是用来做些实事提高核电站的安全。佐藤说道：“我们花在公关上的钱，比花在实际安全措施上的钱多10倍。这是个可怕的事情。”

“艰难的时刻”

    去年3月15号凌晨，当东电总裁清水正孝走进菅直人的办公室时，内阁主要官员以及参与危机处理的各部门负责人都已经到了。

    菅直人告诉清水正孝，从福岛第一核电站撤离的计划是不可接受的。“你们决不能离开核电站。”据菅直人说，清水正孝并没有反对，只是说：“我明白了。”东京电力公司通过其新闻发言人否认了当初曾打算从福岛第一核电站全部撤离的计划，清水正孝本人也拒绝接受媒体采访。不过菅直人在接受《财富》采访时坚称，清水正孝当时的打算就是“撤离”。

    The ensuing chaos and confusion—at TEPCO headquarters and at the plant site—would lead to a series of early missteps that would eventually cause hydrogen explosions at three of the reactor units, blasts that released damaging levels of radioactive material in the atmosphere and seawater. "I thought we were done," recalls Masao Yoshida, the plant manager. "I thought we would lose control over the reactors completely."

Heads in the sand

    Nuclear safety in Japan historically has been predicated on making sure plants could withstand "design basis accidents."

Translation: an accident that the plant has been designed to deal with automatically. What happened a year ago went far beyond that. The industry calls the accident at Fukushima Daiichi a station blackout, or an SBO.

    In the United States, in the 1980s and 90s, regulatory authorities and nuclear operators began planning for the possibility of station blackouts, in which a nuclear plant loses all sources of power, just as Fukushima Daiichi did last year. They began installing what Satoshi Sato, a nuclear industry consultant in Tokyo, calls "defense in depth," which means there are both redundant and diverse mechanisms in place intended to cope with accidents, up to and including SBOs.

    TEPCO and Japan's nuclear regulators say they did have redundant power sources in place—the on site diesel generators that also eventually failed after the tsunami struck. (Despite sitting within a few hundred yards of the Pacific ocean, the generators were not designed to withstand flooding.)

    But Japan never even tried to prepare for station blackouts. Even as the rest of the world moved on, says Sato, the feeling in Tokyo was, "SBOs are not conceivable; don't even think about it."

    Critics of the industry in Japan say there is a basic reason for that. Historically, the government and the power companies spent more time and energy trying to convince the public that nuclear energy was safe than it did actually trying to make nuclear energy safe. Says Sato: "we spent ten times more money for PR campaigns than we did for real safety measures. It's a terrible thing."

"A Tough Moment"

    When Shimizu walked into Kan's office in the early hours of March 15 of last year, the Prime Minister was surrounded by the key officials from his office and various ministries trying to cope with the ongoing crisis.

    Kan told the TEPCO executive that his plan to withdraw from Fukushima Daiichi was unacceptable. "There's no way you can leave the site." Shimizu, according to Kan, didn't protest. "I understand," he replied. TEPCO has denied through its press spokesmen that it ever intended to pull out entirely from the plant and Shimizu has declined to talk to the press. Kan, in his interview with Fortune, was adamant in his language about what Shimizu said he wanted to do: "Tettai," he said in Japanese. Withdraw.