创业公司：知晓你的出路在何方

    3.在评估备选方案时，拷问自己如何面对截然不同的环境：就在我们达成和惠普的交易之前几天，道琼斯指数升至历史最高点14,087。之后几个月内，对冲基金和按揭公司纷纷倒闭，我们进入大萧条以来最严重的经济衰退。仅仅三个月后，要以每股8美元的价格出售公司都已经不可能了。

    4.如果你决定出售公司，细心执行的竞价流程是成功并购的关键：向SEC提交的委托声明书详细描述了我们和10家公司的讨论，长达9页。每个接洽过程都经过缜密思考仔细安排以获得最终成功。

    5.创造并引导收购者的适当心态至关重要：巧妙地说服收购者，除了收购你的公司，他们别无选择，而你还有多个诱人选项。不管每次进步有多小，一定要通过每次接触不断强化这个印象，直至最终达成交易。

    “最佳出口可能在你身后”

    如同我在之前的文章里所讨论的，最好的CEO利用战略性业务开发来保护薄弱的关键侧翼，比如帮助公司渡过难关、推动收购和战略合作、推进国际扩张。伟大企业家创业的目的从来都不是为了被收购，但随着公司不断成长，拥有更多出路并真正了解这些选项是非常重要的。 战略性业务开发的最重要作用也许在于：主动积极地确保公司有其它选择，CEO和董事会知晓出路何在。在飞机上你会被告知“最佳出口可能在你身后”，但那不是你在商业运作里想听到的，（因为那意味着你并未看到那个出口）。

    战略评估：2005年11月

    在Opsware，90%的时候董事会讨论的当然只是建设一家伟大公司所需的那些日常运作：比如季度订单、盈利和损失、产品计划和挑战、财务等等。然而，每年我们都会坚持跳出日常争论，对公司现状做一次战略评估。作为评估的一部分，我们将思考一些更基本的问题。比如：

    • 我们如何看待公司的市场？

    • 我们处于何种竞争位置？

    • 公司有哪些潜在收购者，他们目前对收购的态度如何？

    • 我们面临的主要机会和风险是什么？

    • 底线：相对于通过收购来退出，继续运营的价值何在？

    在董事会讨论之前，我们都会正式拜访惠普（HP）、BMC、甲骨文（Oracle）、EMC这类大型公司，通报公司业务的进展。虽然公开目的是为了探讨可能的合作机会，我们其实想去了解（或刺探）他们对公司业务的兴趣，以保证一旦我们决定出售公司时不会吃闭门羹。

    3. In evaluating your alternatives, ask yourself how you would feel if the environment were to change radically: Days before we signed the HP deal, the Dow hit 14,087—its highest level ever. Within months, hedge funds and mortgage companies started imploding and we entered the worst recession since the great depression. Just three months later, a sale at even $8/share would not likely have been achievable.

    4. If you do decide to sell, a meticulously executed competitive process is key to a successful M&A outcome: This SEC proxy statement description of Opsware's process details discussions with 10 companies, stretching over nine pages. Every one of those contacts was tightly scripted and carefully orchestrated to drive to the ultimate successful outcome.

    5. Creating and managing the acquirer's psychology is critical: The key is subtly to convince the acquirer that they have no option but to acquire you, but that you have multiple attractive alternatives—and to reinforce that impression in every interaction, no matter how small, until the deal is definitively done.

    "Your best exit may be behind you"

    As I've discussed in previous posts, the best CEOs leverage strategic BD to cover critical flanks not well covered by other functions—helping to navigate crises, driving acquisitions and strategic partnerships, leading international expansion. No great entrepreneur sets out to build a company to be acquired, but as the company grows, it's important to have options and to understand them well. Perhaps the most important role of a strategic BD exec is proactively to make sure the company always has options and that the CEO and board always know where the exits are. They tell you on an airplane that "your best exit may be behind you", but that's not something you ever want to hear in business.

    Stepping back from the fray: November 2005

    At Opsware, 90% of our board discussions were naturally about the day-by-day work of building a great company: quarterly bookings, wins and losses, product plans and challenges, financials and so on. However, about once a year we would make a point of stepping back from the daily battle for a more strategic review of our situation. As part of this review, we would address more fundamental questions. For example:

    • How do we feel about our market?

    • How is our competitive position?

    • Who are potential acquirers of the company, and what's their current state of mind?

    • What are the major opportunities and risks facing us?

    • Bottom line: What's the likely value of staying the course versus exiting?

    Prior to these board discussions, we would make a round of senior visits to HP, BMC, Oracle, EMC and other behemoths to give them an update on the business. While our ostensible purpose was to explore the potential for a partnership, our real objective was to understand (and pique) their interest in our space and to make sure we'd have an open door if we should ever decide to explore selling.