巴克莱分拆或步雷曼后尘

    过去考虑分拆的另一个原因是担心英国将制定严厉的法律法规，强迫所有英国银行剥离投行部门。据一位了解情况的人士称，近月来有多个团队进驻巴克莱对分拆方式进行评估，并把未来将发生何种情况告知了各个部门负责人。但随着政府一个特别委员会否决了全面分拆，对于分拆的担忧有所消退。特别委员会要求银行将它们的商业银行业务“单独圈开”，不受投资银行业务的任何影响。

    那么，如果巴克莱真的分拆了投行业务，又会怎样？这与2008年雷曼兄弟分崩离析前的情况惊人的相似。像雷曼兄弟一样，该行大部分利润将来自兜售固定收益产品。但巴克莱的投资银行部门，或称为“雷曼二代”，并不是通过代理美国国债经济业务大赚其钱。“雷曼二代”的强项是固定收益衍生品——不错，就是金融危机期间惹来太多麻烦的、那些天书一样的投资产品。

    巴克莱在上周提交给美国联邦储备委员会（Federal Reserve）的“生前遗嘱”中，将该行在美国的首项“核心业务”列为“固定收益证券化产品”，并自称是固定收益证券化产品的“主要提供商”，例如机构住宅按揭抵押证券（RMBS）、资产抵押证券（ABS）、商业按揭抵押证券（commercial mortgage-backed securities）、待宣布按揭证券和住宅信贷（非机构RMBS和次贷）。不错，这里提到了次贷。

    虽然证券化产品并不一定坏，但它们已证明是烫手山芋。雷曼大量持有，最终栽倒于此。相对于同时拥有商业银行和投资银行业务的更大规模的银行，雷曼规模较小。政府允许这家银行倒闭，是希望其冲击仅限华尔街，不要影响到整个银行体系。这个想法显然落空了。

    由此，不禁要问假如今天“雷曼二代”陷入困境，美国或英国政府会出手相助吗？很可能不会。但假如巴克莱的投资银行濒于倒闭，即便它仍与商业银行捆绑在一起，保管两国政府都会出手干预。鉴于当前欧洲麻烦缠身、美国正在进行总统大选，这些政府最不希望看到的事情恐怕就是灾难性的银行挤兑了。

    是的，我们是在谈论“道德风险”，不管你信不信，道德风险的确存在。只要看看这些具有“系统重要性”的大银行提交给美联储的“生前遗嘱”，无一计划悄然离世。所有银行都表示，将出售一些资产来填补资产负债表的缺口，但当市场处于恐慌情绪中时，很难这样做。因此，如果这些具有系统重要性的金融机构陷入危机，政府将必须介入。正是这种暗中保护，使得2008年美国银行体系没有出现全面崩溃。雷曼死而复生可能让一些银行家和交易员喜出望外，但至少现在看来，它要靠自身力量走出来仍有很大风险。

    译者：早稻米

    It had also mulled a split on concerns that the UK would be instituting tough regulations forcing all British banks to spin off their investment banking divisions. There have been teams of people roving around Barclays for months evaluating how a split up would work and informing department heads as to what would happen, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. The concern has waned in the last few months, though, as a special government panel decided against a total split. It instead will require banks to "ringfence" their commercial bank from any fallout from the investment bank.

    But what if Barclay's investment bank were spun off? It would look eerily similar to what Lehman Brothers looked like before it crashed and burned in 2008. Like Lehman, it will derive the lion's share of its profits from peddling fixed income products. But the investment banking division, or "Lehman II," doesn't rake in the dough brokering Treasury bills, though. No, Lehman II is a fixed income derivative powerhouse – yes, the same such alphabet soup that caused so much trouble during the financial crisis.

    According to Barclays' "living will," which was presented to the Federal Reserve last week, the bank lists as its first "core business line" in the U.S. "fixed income securitized products." It goes on to say that the bank is a "major provider" of fixed income securitized products, listing examples such as agency residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), asset-backed securities (ABS), commercial mortgage-backed securities, mortgage to-be-announced securities and residential credit (non-agency RMBS and subprime). Yes, they said subprime.

    While securitized products aren't necessarily evil, they have proven to be quite a hot potato. Levered to the heap, Lehman got caught holding it and was mortally wounded. Lehman was relatively small compared to the bigger banks that had both commercial and investment banking. The government allowed the bank to fail thinking that the fallout would just impact Wall Street, not Main Street. That turned out to be a bad assumption.

    That begs the question: If Lehman II found itself in trouble today, would the U.S. or UK governments intervene to save it? Probably not. But if Barclays' investment bank was on the verge of collapse, while it was still paired with the commercial bank, you can bet that both governments would intervene. The last thing either of the two governments want now, with the troubles in Europe and the U.S. presidential election, is some cataclysmic bank run.

    Yes, we are talking about "moral hazard" and believe it or not, it is alive and well. A glance over the living wills submitted to the Fed by the "systemically important" banks show that they have no real plan to fail gently. They all said they would sell some assets to cover the shortfalls in their balance sheet, but that's hard to do when the market is panicking. That means the government will have to step in if there is ever a flicker of trouble at systemically important institution. This latent protection is why the U.S. banking system didn't implode in 2008. So while the thought of Lehman rising from the dead again might make some bankers and traders that bleed green happy campers, it seems, at least for the time being, to be too risky to be out on its own.