摩根大通的会计魔术：60亿亏损消失之谜

    我们来看看关于摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）58亿美元交易亏损最有意思的事情吧。乍看一眼公司的整体业绩，“伦敦鲸”的投资失策仿佛从未发生过，尽管它事实上是华尔街历史上最大的滑铁卢之一。

    今年4月中旬，大概在摩根大通交易损失传闻出现之前两星期，分析人士预计该行第二财季每股盈利1.21美元。上周五，该行公布第二财季业绩报告，计入“伦敦鲸”事件造成的亏损后，竟然正好就是这个数。

    从摩根大通用来抵销巨额交易亏损的办法可以看出：银行利润的来历有多么复杂，而它的变更又可以有多么随意，我们又能相信几分。未来一段时间内，摩根大通这一财季的业绩报告应该会给会计师们提供值得回味的谈资。

    农业银行信贷证券（美国）公司（Credit Agricole Securities）分析师迈克•梅奥在摩根大通公布业绩报告后的分析师会议上对戴蒙说：“确实，我看到业绩报告了。只是，我还看到了香肠的制作过程，我现在担心我将来可能会食物中毒。” 梅奥是《流亡华尔街》（Exile on Wall Street）一书的作者。

    摩根大通确实有些业务很强。受益于利率下调，该行的抵押贷款业务盈利增加了大约13亿美元。但是，它利润的很大一部分来自于对亏损的会计调整和基于未来该行及整体经济状况大幅向好的假设。然而，这样的假设有可能对，也有可能落空，从而加剧后期的亏损。

    那么，怎样使近60亿美元的亏损消失于无形呢？第一步，抵税。摩根大通曾表示，“伦敦鲸”的过失仅第二财季就给该行造成了44亿美元的损失。但那是税前。该行称，税后亏损额可减少到略高于27亿美元的水平。这就意味着，摩根大通计划从美国政府获得17亿美元冲销亏损。按照规定，出现亏损时，银行可以用交易亏损额与银行其他业务的应纳税利润额相抵销。问题是冲销比率。若真是17亿美元，则摩根大通的上述交易亏损就冲销了38%。这一冲销率与美国的企业所得税率差不多，但是比大多数美国公司实际缴纳的所得税率要高得多。仅经过抵税这一步，该行就能将 “伦敦鲸”引起的亏损减少到41亿美元。

    我们还没有谈到该行声名显赫的首席投资办公室呢。首席执行官杰米•戴蒙一直都说该部门的投资组合是安全的，如果现在把它们变现的话，可以为摩根大通带来80亿美元的利润。第二财季，他已经卖出了其中一部分资产。抛开“伦敦鲸”管理的那部分资产，首席投资办公室当季盈利6.3亿美元。现在，亏损额下降到35亿美元了。

    下一步：不良贷款准备金。银行一般要计提部分贷款以防出现坏账。而银行少计提一部分贷款的话就能降低费用。第二财季，该行共计提不良贷款准备金2亿美元多一点。这个季度计提的金额不仅是自金融危机以来，也是该行有史以来最低。去年同期计提的不良贷款准备金是18亿美元。

    而且，该行不仅是计提的不良贷款准备金少了，甚至把过去计提的保证金都取了出来。根据会计规则，取出来的不良贷款准备金可以直接计入利润。取出的准备金是13亿美元，相当于该行第二财季总利润的28%，经过这么一调整，它们都变成实实在在的账面利润了。

    当然，这样的调整某种程度上说是有理有据的。该行的贷款资产的质量貌似确实是改善了——无力偿还贷款者的数量下降了。问题的关键再次落在比率上。例如，仅该行零售业务一项，借款人已经停止偿还的贷款就达到80亿美元，只比去年同期下降了4%。该行首席财务官道格•布兰施泰因曾告诉分析师，该行应该不会继续下调信用卡坏账准备金了，这意味着他们在第二财季已经想尽办法从中尽可能多地取出了准备金。

    这样一来，通过调整不良贷款准备金，摩根大通共获得了29亿美元的利润。这个数字非同小可。接下来只有6亿美元的亏损额了。

    现在我们要见识一些更加隐秘的步骤了。抵押贷款债权事务性服务权利——银行所承担的收回付款的义务和将这些贷款出售给投资者时一并转手的义务——即为一种会计规则上所称的无形资产。银行在其资产负债表上将这些权利所做的会计处理仿佛说明它们存在着一定的价值，但其实它们是一种义务。没有银行真正能够出售这种权利，至少不可能以高价出售。然而，摩根大通称，在第二财季，由于风险控制得到改善——不用在意“机器签名”丑闻了——该行抵押贷款债权事务性服务权利的价值已经跃升到2.33亿美元，几乎为该行去年同期所做相同会计处理后产生利润的10倍。这样，亏损额进一步降至4亿美元。

    Here is perhaps the most amazing thing about JPMorgan Chase's (JPM) $5.8 billion trading loss: Take a look at the firm's overall results, and it's like the London Whale's misstep, one of the largest flubs in the history of Wall Street, never happened.

    Back in mid-April, about two weeks before talk of the trading losses emerged, JPMorgan was expected to earn $1.21 a share in its second quarter. On Friday, JPMorgan reported that it had, Whale and all, earned exactly that.

    How the bank appears to have offset the huge trading loss is a prime example of how complex and malleable bank profits actually are, and how much they should be believed. JPMorgan's quarter should give fodder for accountants to talk about for some time.

    MORE: Who will take JPMorgan to task?

    "Yes, I have seen these results, but I have also seen how the sausage is made and I am worried that I might get food poisoning in the future," Mike Mayo of Credit Agricole Securities and author of the book Exile on Wall Street told Dimon in a meeting with analysts following the bank's earnings release.

    Sure some of JPMorgan's businesses were strong. Profits in its mortgage operations, helped by falling interest rates, rose by nearly $1.3 billion. But a good deal of JPMorgan's earnings came from some shifting of losses and an assumption that things for the bank, and the economy in general, are about to get a good deal better. That assumption might prove right, but it could also add to losses in the future.

    So how do you make a nearly $6 billion loss go away? First stop taxes. The bank said that the London Whale's blunder cost the bank $4.4 billion in the second quarter alone. But that's before taxes. After it pays taxes, though, JPMorgan says the loss will shrink to just over $2.7 billion, which means the bank plans to take a $1.7 billion write off from Uncle Sam. Like any loss, banks are allowed to use trading blunders to offset taxable profits elsewhere in the bank. The question is the rate. At $1.7 billion, JPMorgan is writing off roughly 38% of the loss. That's not that out of line with the U.S. corporate tax rate, but it's a far larger percentage of profits than most companies actually pay. Nonetheless, on taxes alone, the bank was able to shrink the London Whale's wake to $4.1 billion.

    We haven't left the firm's vaunted chief investment office yet. CEO Jamie Dimon has long said the portfolio is safe and that if he were to liquidate it today he could produce an $8 billion gain for the bank. In the second quarter, he dipped into some of that. London Whale aside, the CIO took a $630 million gain. Now we're down to $3.5 billion.

    Next stop loan losses. Banks have to put money away for loans they believe are going to go bad. But banks can lower their expenses by putting away less money for future loan losses. In the second quarter, the bank put away just over $200 million for future loan losses. That was not only the lowest amount the bank had set aside in any three month period since the start of the financial crisis, it was the lowest by far. A year ago, the loan loss provision was $1.8 billion.

    What's more, not only did the bank put away less money for future loans, it also pulled back money it had put away in the past. And any money you take out of your loan loss reserves the accountants let you send right to your bottom line. It appears $1.3 billion, or about 28% of the company's total second quarter profit, came from this move, which is again only real earnings to accountants.

    Of course, some of this move may be justified. The bank's loan portfolio does appear to have improved - fewer new people are telling the bank they can't pay their loans. The question is, once again, how much. For example, in the bank's retail business alone, JPMorgan still has $8 billion in loans in which people have stopped paying. That's only down by 4% from a year ago. And CFO Doug Branstein told analysts not to expect any more reduction in reserves from credit cards, which means they probably took all the earnings juice they could get out of that business this quarter.

    Put them together, and JPMorgan appears to have gotten a $2.9 billion boost from changes it made to its loss provisions. Impressive. Just $600 million of the Whale to go.

    Now we get to the more esoteric moves. Mortgage servicing rights - the obligation that a bank takes on to collect payments and pass those along on the loans it sells to investors - are one of those assets that accountants call intangible. Banks hold those rights on their balance sheets as if they are worth something, but it's really an obligation, and no bank could actually sell it, at least not for much. Nonetheless, JPMorgan said in the second quarter, due to improved risk management - never mind the whole robo-signing thing - the value of its mortgage servicing rights jumped by $233 million, nearly 10 times the benefit the bank got from the same accounting maneuver a year ago. And we're down to $400 million.