中国太阳能产业为何危机频发？

    去年占据全球太阳能模块和面板10％市场份额的尚德电力公司也有自身的麻烦。上周早些时候，尚德电力声称，该公司或许已经被GSF Capital公司欺骗了5.56亿欧元，后者是尚德电力在一家名为环球太阳能基金公司（Global Solar Fund S.C.A，下文简称GSF公司）的意大利太阳能企业的普通合伙人，尚德电力持有这家企业80%的股权。2008年的信贷危机爆发之后，传统的融资渠道日渐枯竭，环球太阳能基金公司转向国家开发银行（the China Development Bank，一家由中国国务院运营的国有银行）求助。为了给环球太阳能基金公司提供一笔贷款，国家开发银行需要一位中国的担保人。2010年5月，尚德电力同意拿出5.54亿欧元作为贷款担保金。为了保护自己，尚德电力要求环球太阳能基金公司为这笔担保金提供抵押品，该公司的确这样做了，抵押品为价值5.6亿欧元的德国债券。尚德电力首席财务官大卫•金上周表示，环球太阳能基金公司声称已经把这些债券存放在了一家“享有盛誉的托管银行”之中。

    快进到现在：饱受巨额债务之苦，明年将要偿还巨额到期债务的尚德电力一直在寻求将手中的环球太阳能基金公司股权“货币化”的机会，也就是说，它希望兑现这笔股权，用来偿还将于明年到期的部分债务。但尚德电力发现，本该由环球太阳能基金公司提供的抵押品（即德国债券）并不存在。上周，在纽约证券交易所上市的尚德电力的股价大幅跳水至1美元以下，对于这家据说要继承这个星球的公司而言，这无疑是一个屈辱的时刻。一度高达140亿美元的市值现在已经缩水至区区1.88亿美元。尚德电力现在正在起诉环球太阳能基金公司。

    并非所有中国太阳能公司的境遇都像尚德电力那般可怕，但它们的日子也好不到哪里去。然而，太阳能产业遭受重创并不仅限于中国公司——第一太阳能公司（First Solar，位于亚利桑那州坦佩市）的股价去年暴跌了87%。长期以来，令外国竞争者非常恐惧的是，中国太阳能企业将甩开它们，一骑绝尘：在一个世人都认为最终将成为世界最大的国内市场上，这些中国公司不仅可以获得政府的支持，还可以把不差于其他任何公司的技术与低至极限的成本结合在一起。

    那么，这些举世无双的公司为什么会沦为资本摧毁机器？它们未来的命运又将如何演变呢？正如桑福德伯恩斯坦公司(Sanford Bernstein)高级分析师迈克尔•帕克今年年初所言，太阳能产业是“一个从西欧和北美的政府中提取250亿美元补贴的机制。”也就是说，鉴于与煤、水电和天然气相比，太阳能一直缺乏竞争力，这项产业的生存严重依赖于政府以环境保护之名给予的补贴。全球金融危机、以及随之而来的经济大衰退，引爆了太阳能产业赖以生存的那个世界。首先，正如我们在尚德电力的案例中所看到的那样，这个资本密集型产业几乎不可能获得巨额资本。更糟糕的是，这意味着由于财政预算的压力增加，德国和西班牙这样的国家已经不得不削减补贴。后来，美国方面针对某些中国造太阳能产品设置了关税，欧洲也提出了自己的反倾销申诉，进一步增加了中国太阳能产业的下行压力。

    就短期而言，所有这些肯定会带来伤害，但并不一定构成致命一击。原因是，过去几年以来，在减少太阳能的安装成本方面，中国公司及其海外同行已经取得了巨大进步。这一产业的“圣杯”在于，达到所谓的“市电同价（grid parity）”，即在不接受补贴的情况下，太阳能能够直接抗衡煤、天然气或水力发电厂。根据桑福德伯恩斯坦公司的估算，市电同价将把太阳能从一个涉及250亿美元的寻租产业转化为一个向全球发电市场（价值高达5万亿美元）发起有力挑战的竞争者。尽管财务状况日益恶化，但尚德电力这样的公司正在越来越接近这个神奇的节点。

    太阳能产业的问题是，几乎所有其他的主要竞争对手也在接近这个节点。正如桑福德伯恩斯坦公司今年初的长篇研究报告所言，从投资者的角度来看，“好”产业是那些出现明显的赢家，输家出局，进而使赢家获得更大利润和更高资本回报率的产业。迄今为止，太阳能还不是一个“好”产业。在这个产业中，大量竞争对手不断投入资本，压低成本，但赚不了多少钱（如果真能赚到的话），亦无法驱使许多竞争者离开这个行业。

    在这方面，桑福德伯恩斯坦公司的分析师们提出了一个令人（当然是对太阳能投资者而言）心跳停止的观点——太阳能正在转变为一个类似动态随机存储器（DRAM）的产业。数十年以来，动态随机存储器一直是一个资本密集型产业，日本竞争者和后来加入的由三星公司（Samsung）领衔的韩国公司展开了一场低利润拉锯战，三星最终成为明确的行业领导者。

    正如桑福德伯恩斯坦公司的分析师详尽指出的那样，这样的比较令人信服，这种情形很有可能成为中国太阳能企业的梦魇，更不用说为它们提供支持的中国政府了。原因是，把太阳能确认为未来五大核心业务之一的公司不是别人，正是三星公司。三星庞大的资产负债表规模足以让中国当前任何一家竞争对手望尘莫及。这意味着，三星公司可以复制其在内存芯片产业的做法：甚至在市场持续低迷期间，投下巨资促使技术升级，压低成本，以便在未来某一天将竞争对手横扫出局。在这样一个许多人推测将由中国企业主宰的产业中，目前还看不出哪家公司有能力与三星展开长期的较量。

    这意味着中国需要发生一两件事情：要么政府允许（甚或促进）太阳能产业的整合——尽管太阳能产业的市值出现如此惊人的下跌，但这一幕还没有出现。要么政府施加壁垒，阻止三星和其他意欲进入这一领域的外国大公司——桑福德伯恩斯坦公司认为通用电气公司（GE）可能有此想法——进入庞大的中国市场。

    但就长期而言，即使这样做可能也无法奏效。永远要铭记的是，“市电同价”这一太阳能产业的终极梦想是一个不断变化的目标。天然气价格在北美发现巨额储藏之后出现惊人下降就体现出了这一点。桑福德伯恩斯坦公司的分析师迈克尔•帕克准确地指出，中国的天然气价格现在依然比美国高5倍。重点在于，虽然在美国，太阳能还远远不具备成本竞争力，但在中国，太阳能依然能够获得这一优势。果真如此的话，潜力巨大的国内市场就将成为中国太阳能公司的救世主。

    或许吧。但需要铭记的是，就“潜在”的天然气储量而言，在这个星球上，只有一个国家超过美国，那就是中国。虽然中国的地质条件比北美更加困难，此外还有其他约束条件（水资源缺乏是最大的问题——水是水力压裂开采过程的关键所在），但接受本文作者采访的石油和天然气行业高管相信，这些突出问题都是可以克服的。这意味着，在大约10年之后，中国的天然气价格或许要比现在低得多。

    因此，中国太阳能企业股价的集体跳水或许既显示了过去4年来发生的事情，也同样预示着它们的未来走向。太阳能或许是中国的未来产业——一个永远都属于未来的产业。

    译者：任文科

    Suntech, which accounted for 10% of the solar module and panel market globally last year, has its own troubles. Earlier this week it alleged that it may have been had been defrauded of 556 million euros by GSF Capital, the general partner in an Italian solar firm called Global Solar Fund S.C.A, of which Suntech owns 80%. After the credit crunch of 2008, when traditional sources of financing dried up, GSF turned to the China Development Bank, a state owned institution run by the State Council in Beijing, the country's central policy-making body. In order to provide a loan to GSF, the CDB needed a Chinese guarantor. Suntech, in May of 2010, agreed to put forward 554 million euros as a loan guarantee. In order to protect itself, it then asked GSF Capital to post collateral for the funds, which it said it did, in the form of 560 million euros worth of German bonds. GSF claimed to have placed the funds in a "reputable custodian bank," as David King, Suntech's chief financial officer put it this week.

    Fast forward to the present: Suntech, laboring under a huge debt burden, with large payments coming due next year, was looking to "monetize" its investment in GSF; that is, it wanted to cash out in order to pay down some of its debt next year. But Suntech discovered -- allegedly -- that the German bonds supposedly put forth as collateral by GSF capital didn't exist. Suntech's stock slumped to less than $1 on the NYSE earlier this week, a humiliating moment for a company that was supposed to inherit the earth. A market cap that was once north of $14 billion has now been slashed to a mere $188 million. Suntech is now suing GSF Capital.

    Not all Chinese solar companies are in quite as dire shape as Suntech; but they're close. And while it's true that the rout in solar is not limited to just Chinese companies -- Tempe, Ariz.-based First Solar's (FSLR) stock has plunged 87% in the last year -- the longstanding fear among their foreign competitors was that the China-based firms were going to separate themselves from the pack; they could combine technology no worse than anyone else's with rock bottom costs, as well as government support in a domestic market that would eventually, everyone assumed, become the world's largest.

    So why did these alleged world-beaters instead become the capital destruction machine they've turned into, and what does the future hold for them? The solar industry has been, as Michael Parker, a senior analyst at Sanford Bernstein put it earlier this year, "a $25 billion mechanism to extract subsidies from Western European and North American governments." That is, given that solar has been uncompetitive relative to coal, hydro and natural gas, it relied on government subsidies—granted in the name of environmental protection—to exist. The global financial crisis, and the deep recessions that have ensued, blew that world apart. First—as we have seen in Suntech's case— for a time it made access to capital nearly impossible in a capital-intensive industry. Worse, it meant countries like Germany and Spain, out of necessity, had to slash subsides as pressures on their national budgets increased. Later, the U.S. placed tariffs on some China made solar products, and Europe filed its own anti-dumping complaint, adding to the downward pressure on the Chinese industry.

    In the short run all that hurt, to be sure; but it wasn't necessarily a deathblow. Because over the past few years, Chinese companies and their global counterparts made enormous progress in reducing the installed cost of solar energy. The Holy Grail in the industry is to meet what's known as "grid parity," the point at which solar could go mano a mano with coal or gas or hydro-driven power plants, without subsidy. Grid parity, Sanford Bernstein estimates, would transform solar from a rent seeking $25 billion industry to a serious competitor in the $5 trillion global power generation market. Companies like Suntech, despite its deteriorating finances, have been drawing closer and closer to that magical place.

    The problem for the industry is that almost every other major competitor has too. As Bernstein's lengthy research report earlier this year argued, "good" industries (from an investor's standpoint) are ones in which clear winners emerge, and losers exit, thus enabling the winners to earn bigger profits and generate positive returns on capital. Solar to date has not been a "good" industry. It's one at which any number of competitors keep throwing capital, driving down costs, but not making much (if any) money, and not driving many competitors out of the business.

    In this, the Bernstein analysts put forth the heart stopping (for solar investors, that is) notion that solar is turning into the DRAM industry: a business which for decades was a capital intensive, low profit tong war, waged between Japanese competitors and, later, Korean companies, led by Samsung—which eventually emerged as the clear industry leader.

    The comparison, as the Bernstein analysis notes at length, is compelling; and it's a potential nightmare for Chinese solar companies, not to mention for the government that has supported them. For none other than Samsung has identified solar energy as one of its five core business going forward. And Samsung has a balance sheet which absolutely dwarfs that of any current Chinese competitor. That means, just as it did in memory chips, it can invest heavily even during frequent downturns in the market, upgrading its technology and driving down costs so that someday it clears the field of competitors. In an industry in which so many speculated that Chinese firms would dominate, there isn't a single one out there at the moment that seems capable of competing long-term with Samsung.

    That means one of two things needs to happen in China; either the government needs to allow-- or even prompt -- consolidation in the industry, something that hasn't happened yet despite the astonishing declines in market cap. Or, it could wall off the massive Chinese market from powerful foreign companies, like Samsung and others who might be tempted to play in the space (Bernstein suggests GE may be tempted.)

    But even that might not help in the long run. Remember always that grid parity, nirvana for the solar industry, is a moving target. The stunning price decline for natural gas, coming in the wake of huge discoveries in North America, demonstrates that. Bernstein analyst Michael Parker notes, accurately, that the natural gas price in China is still five times higher than what it is in the U.S. The point being that while solar is simply not close to being cost competitive in the United States, it still can get there in China, and it if it does, the potentially massive domestic market will provide salvation for Chinese solar companies.

    Maybe. But remember that in terms of potential natural gas reserves, the United States is only surpassed by one country on the planet: China. And while the geology here is more difficult than in North America, and there are other constraints (a lack of water being the most significant-- water being critical in the fracking process), oil and gas industry executives interviewed for this story believe these issues are eminently surmountable. Which means, in ten years or so, the price of natural gas in China might be much lower than it is now.

    So the crash in solar equity values in China -- China's solar eclipse -- might be telling us as much about the future as it is about what's happened over the past four years. It's just possible that solar is the industry of the future in China—and always will be.