埃及危机蕴藏希望

    蹒跚挣扎的埃及经济最不愿看到的就是国内政治危机：党派领袖针锋相对，司法体系与政府势不两立，街头抗议一点就着。但自11月22日埃及总统穆尔西颁布新宪法声明、赋予总统更多权力以来，埃及恰恰是走上了这样一条路。

    结果是在埃及国内外引发了更深的忧虑，有些人甚至开始怀疑这个国家还能不能完成这两年来从独裁专制到民主和尊重人权的转型。近日，穆尔西总统在以色列和巴勒斯坦官员之间斡旋、最终促成加沙停火所引发的全球一片推崇之声，也已让位于对埃及国内权力斗争的担忧。

    这些担忧可以理解。它们本质上与当前埃及复杂微妙的局势相关：埃及正在进行历史性的革命转型。这两年埃及的革命转型之路一波三折，新宪法声明引发的这场政治危机就好比是一朵新飘来的乌云，但即便是这朵乌云，仍然有可能会透出一线光明。

    关于这场革命的总结陈词早已广为人知。埃及草根革命以勇敢的青年运动为先锋，以相对和平的方式迅速推翻了穆巴拉克的统治。此后，这个国家经历了从革命到建设的艰难转型：从废除过去根深蒂固的残余，到建立起一个民众追求的美好未来。

    埃及缺乏组织和领导人来推动迅速有序地转变。

    除了武装力量，几乎所有政府组织（和几家私营组织）多年来都被用于为少数利益服务。将这些组织重新定位，为多数人的利益服务，同时得到整个埃及社会的接纳，这些需要时间，还要克服种种困难。

    2011年埃及革命爆发之初，颇被看好的埃及军方未能赢得广泛的信任和支持。

    埃及军方明智地避开了内战陷阱；随后在利比亚爆发的内战以及目前仍在继续的叙利亚内战都造成了巨大的人员伤亡。但埃及军方在处理穆巴拉克被推翻后的复杂微妙局面时多有失误。

    埃及也缺乏像曼德拉那样德高望重的领导人，迅速带领这个国家“宽恕过去，但始终铭记”。

    突然爆发的草根革命缺乏有组织能力的革命者。而那些渴望担当这一角色的人们在最初的政治真空期未能给予自己适当的定位。

    The very last thing a struggling Egyptian economy needed is a domestic political crisis that divides its leading personalities, pits the judicial branch against the executive, and ignites street protests. Yet this is exactly where the country finds itself following Thursday's decree that grants more power to the president.

    The result is greater anxiety, both within and outside Egypt – so much so that more people seem to be giving up on the country's ability to complete its bumpy multi-year transition from dictatorship to greater democracy and respect for human rights. Moreover, in the short term, widespread global admiration for President Morsi's crucial role in brokering a ceasefire in Gaza between Israeli and Palestinian officials has given way to concern about an internal grab for power.

    These concerns are understandable. They are intrinsically related to the delicate conditions under which Egypt is navigating its historic revolutionary transition. But even this new cloud now hanging over the country's already-difficult multi-year journey could end up having a silver lining.

    The conventional summary narrative is well known by now. Egypt's grassroots revolution, led by courageous youth movements, overthrew President Mubarak in a quick and relatively peaceful manner. Thereafter, the country has had a challenging time navigating the trickiest revolutionary pivot of all: from dismantling the past and its deeply-entrenched remnants, to building a better future that commands broad-based popular buy-in.

    Egypt has lacked both the institutions and the leaders for a rapid and orderly transition.

    Apart from the armed forces, virtually all public institutions (and several private ones) were coopted over many years to serve narrow interests. Re-orienting them to enable and support the greater good, and to do so with acceptance across Egyptian society, is inherently challenging and time consuming.

    The one institution that commanded broad admiration at the outset of revolution in 2011 – Egypt's armed forces – failed to build on its widespread credibility and support.

    The armed forces brilliantly avoided the tragic trap of fueling a civil war, as subsequently happened in Libya and is now occurring in Syria with horrid human casualties. But they stumbled when it came to the delicate task of handling well the immediate and complicated aftermath of Mubarak's overthrow.

    Egypt was also short of a Mandela type leader who could credibly and rapidly move the nation forward by "forgiving but not forgetting the past."

    The sudden grassroots revolution lacked well-recognized revolutionaries. And those who aspired to this role tripped in positioning themselves properly during the initial political vacuum.