埃及危机蕴藏希望

    一些新的世俗政党匆匆组建，希望能赶上总统和议会选举，这些选举后来看来还是相对公平和自由的。但绝大多数此类政党都是从零开始。与它们竞争的是一些伊斯兰政党，特别是穆斯林兄弟会，后者有着完善的地方网络和高效的信息传递机制。

    而且也不存在外部靠山。穆巴拉克被推翻后，国际盟友的惊讶程度不亚于埃及国民。另外，这些政党曾在穆巴拉克近30年的独裁统治期间给予其支持，这也导致它们在埃及一些选区的可信度受损。

    这些最初的情形基本上确立了后来混乱的转型期，期间反复出现的两大显著特征是：当权者决策难；街头示威，时而升级为暴力冲突。

    埃及蹒跚挣扎的经济也对国内形势于事无补。就业和经济活动尚未完全恢复到革命前的水平。预算赤字的压力仍然存在。外汇储备减少。国内外投资者都心有忌惮，不愿全力投资。

    所有这些让埃及政府确信，应该向国际货币基金组织（IMF）求助，最终促成了上周的初步协议。除了推动埃及人建立自行改革的框架，国际货币基金组织还能快速提供相当的金融援助，并且帮助从其他官方渠道获得更多资金。但很多埃及人担心，国际货币基金组织的介入可能意味着埃及会回到过去金融依赖国外的局面。

    眼下，埃及人民迫切希望看到革命的成果，所有这些无一不让人忧虑，因为这场革命的主旨可是要在埃及实现普遍小康以及更大程度的社会公正。如今，外国朋友和盟友们谈起这个国家时，总是担忧中夹杂着失望。

    但如果要说对这个国家的民主转型丧失希望，现在还为时尚早。

    不要因为反复而气馁，利益相关方应该意识到，道路崎岖是不可避免的，努力保持革命势头。就此而言，这朵新近笼罩在埃及头上的政治乌云也镶着五道光明的金边。

    • 第一，政府将越来越意识到，埃及不再是一个可以强行推行有争议措施的社会，他们也不应该这样做：如今制约和平衡已作用于多个层面；它们很可能导致上周的新宪法声明被部分废除。现在，确实有很多的声音——但鉴于埃及最初的状况，它们也是民主转型成功的关键。

    • 其次，埃及的政治领导人们尝试进行更大范围地合作：在这方面，最近的一些倡议令人鼓舞，可进一步深化。

    New secular political parties scrambled desperately to organize in time for what turned out to be relatively fair and free elections for both the presidency and parliament. In the vast majority of cases they started from scratch. And they were competing with Islamic parties – particularly the Muslim Brotherhood – with well-structured local networks and highly-effective messaging.

    There were also no external anchors to speak of. Egypt's friends and allies were just as surprised as its citizens by the Mubarak overthrow. And their credibility among some domestic constituencies was undermined by the support that they had provided Mubarak over the nearly 30 years of his uncontested rule.

    These initial conditions virtually guaranteed what has proven to be a very messy transition – one dominated by two visible and recurrent characteristics: clumsy decision-making by those in positions of power; and street protests that sometimes succumb to violence.

    The internal dynamic is not helped by Egypt's struggling economy. Employment and activity have yet to regain fully pre-revolutionary levels. The budget deficit remains under pressure. Foreign exchange reserves have declined. And both domestic and foreign investors are hesitant to engage fully.

    All of this has convinced the government to turn to the International Monetary Fund for help, culminating last week in an initial agreement. In addition to contributing to a framework for an Egyptian-owned reform program, the IMF can provide significant quick-disbursing financial assistance and help mobilize additional funding from other official sources. Yet many in Egypt worry that the IMF's involvement could signal the return to the old days of external financial dependency.

    All this speaks to concern among Egyptians eager to harvest the revolution's quest for widespread economic well-being and greater social justice. Concern, mixed with disappointment, also dominates conversations among the country's external friends and allies.

    Yet it is too early to give up yet on Egypt's democratic transition.

    Rather than be discouraged by recurrent potholes, stakeholders should recognize the inevitable bumpiness of the journey and work hard to maintain momentum. In this regard, there are five silver linings in the new political cloud that now hangs over Egypt.

    • First, the government's growing realization that Egypt is no longer a society in which controversial steps can be rammed through, nor should they: Checks and balances are now operating at multiple levels; and they could well force the rescindment of part of last week's decree. They certainly are noisy today – but they are also key for a successful democratic transition given the country's initial conditions.

    • Second, renewed attempts at greater collaboration among leading political personalities in Egypt: The recent initiatives in this regard are encouraging and could be usefully deepened.