壳牌阿拉斯加采油船搁浅带来的启示

    2012年3月那次参观库鲁克号带给我的个人感受是，尽管壳牌公司精心准备，防备类似英国石油公司（BP）在墨西哥湾深水地平线钻井平台井喷防护器失灵事故再度发生——库鲁克号的井喷防护器具备超强切断阀门和精湛的安全性能——但似乎对阿拉斯加独特的天气条件缺乏准备。壳牌公司负责阿拉斯加海上钻探项目的副总裁皮特•斯莱比曾在北海工作过，他相信北海地区恶劣的条件能让他自如应对阿拉斯加的状况。

    由于石油公司缺乏在北冰洋地区开采的经验，很难将北海和北冰洋的开采环境进行比较。但是，据钻井专家介绍，在北冰洋海域钻探风险更大。熟悉冰流和极端海洋气候的阿拉斯加本地人严重质疑壳牌公司能否安全操作钻井和生产平台。

    访问库鲁克号之前两天，我来到美国最北的市镇阿拉斯加州巴罗市，与因纽皮特爱斯基摩人（Inupiat Eskimo）领袖及北坡自治区（North Slope Borough）（包括巴罗市和普拉德霍湾油田[Prudhoe Bay]）前区长爱德华•伊塔见面。伊塔上任初期曾坚决反对海上钻井采油，但随着壳牌公司在因纽皮特人年度北极露脊鲸捕猎期暂停钻井采油等问题上同意让步，他的立场也开始松动。

    交谈过程中，伊塔对壳牌公司的计划及他支持的态度相当纠结。他坦言经常失眠，担心漏油事故会毁掉族人的渔猎文化。身为捕鲸船的船长，伊塔给我讲了不少北极飓风和冰流的故事，他认为这些自然现象将给位于其行进路上的任何钻井船或固定石油生产平台带来威胁。由于没有配备内部推进系统，库鲁克号必须通过拖船才可移动，所以更显脆弱。

    准确来说，伊塔并不是反矿石燃料的环保分子。北坡自治区几乎所有的税收都来自开采石油和天然气，伊塔明白发现新油田取代产量不断下滑的普拉德霍湾油田，对确保不断提高巴罗市的生活水平至关重要。伊塔认为，在环保分子视为圣地的北极国家野生动物保护区（Arctic National Wildlife Refuge）内进行陆上石油开采，也比在北冰洋波弗特海（Beaufort Sea）和楚科奇海（Chukchi Sea）进行海洋石油开采更合乎情理。“在陆地上清理油污更容易些，”伊塔告诉我说。“两者间的风险更是不可同日而语。”

    我前往阿拉斯加和西雅图采访之前特意致电一位熟识的能源投资分析师——他在一位持有大量皇家荷兰壳牌公司股票的基金经理手下供职。上次接触时，这位分析师对壳牌公司的技术能力和在科研方面投入大笔资金的英明决策大加赞赏。意识到他对壳牌公司的情愫后，我问这名分析师对壳牌公司阿拉斯加计划的看法。他的回答让我吃惊。

    “依我看，”那位分析师当时这样说。“这看起来像一家经营不错的公司做出的错误决定。”他并不怀疑阿拉斯加石油储量或担心造成环境灾难。他的担忧颇具战略眼光：短暂的夏季开采期（海冰消融露出宽阔的海面），留给壳牌公司犯错的时间不多，同时也让壳牌公司按时挣到投资回报的难度变得更大。

    One personal takeaway from my March 2012 tour of the Kulluk was that while Shell seemed incredibly well-prepared for avoiding a repeat of the blowout protector failure that doomed BP's Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico -- the Kulluk's blowout protector boasts a extra cut-off valve and other state-of-the-art safety features -- Shell seemed less worried about the unique weather conditions in Alaska. Pete Slaiby, the Shell executive in charge of the Alaskan offshore drilling project, used to work in the North Sea, and Slaiby believed the harsh conditions in the North Sea helped prepare him for what his crews would face in Alaska.

    Comparing drilling conditions in the North Sea to those in the Arctic Ocean is difficult because oil companies have so little experience drilling in the Arctic. But the drilling experts I spoke with expected the Arctic to be much more challenging. Also, Native Alaskans familiar with ice flows and extreme offshore weather had serious doubts about Shell's ability to safely operate drilling rigs and production platforms.

    Two days before my Kulluk tour, I traveled to Barrow, Alaska, the northern-most municipality in the U.S., to meet with Edward Itta, an Inupiat Eskimo leader and the former mayor of the North Slope Borough (which includes Barrow as well as the Prudhoe Bay oil hub). Itta had started his mayoral term as a staunch opponent of offshore drilling but eventually softened his stance after Shell agreed to concessions such as halting drilling during the Inupiat's annual bowhead whale hunt.

    During our conversations, Itta was obviously quite conflicted about Shell's plans and about his own decision to endorse them. He confided he was having a hard time sleeping, fearful that an oil spill could destroy his people's hunting-and-fishing culture. A whaling-boat captain himself, Itta told me stories of Arctic hurricanes and crushing ice flows he thought would pose a threat to any drilling ships or permanent oil-production platforms in their paths. The Kulluk seemed especially vulnerable since it has no internal propulsion system and had to be towed in order to be moved.

    For the record, Itta is not some anti-fossil-fuel greenie. Nearly all the North Slope's tax revenues derive from oil and gas production, and Itta understands that finding new oil to replace the declining production out of Prudhoe Bay will be crucial to maintaining the improved standard of living in Barrow. But in Itta's view, it makes more sense to allow onshore drilling in ANWR (a.k.a. the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge -- sacred ground for many environmentalists) than to proceed with offshore drilling in the Arctic Ocean's Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. "You can clean up oil so much easier onshore," Itta told me. "The risks are not even comparable."

    Before my reporting trip to Alaska and Seattle, I called up one of the wiser energy analysts I know -- someone employed by a money manager with a large equity stake in Royal Dutch Shell. On previous occasions, this analyst had expressed admiration for Shell's technological prowess and its large investment in R&D. Aware of his fondness for Shell, I asked the analyst what he thought of Shell's Alaska plans. His answer surprised me.

    "To me," the analyst said at the time, "it looks like a bad decision by an otherwise well-run company." It wasn't that he doubted there was a lot of oil up there or that he feared an environmental catastrophe. His concern was strategic: The short summer drilling season (when sea ice gives way to open water) gave Shell too little margin for error and made it too hard for Shell to earn a timely return on its investment.