伦敦鲸前老板喊冤

    德鲁和该信用衍生产品首席交易员、人称伦敦鲸的布鲁诺•伊科西尔似乎鲜有联络。相反，她赖以了解情况的渠道似乎一直是伊科西尔的上司——阿基里斯•麦克瑞斯和哈维尔•马丁-阿塔霍以及那些现在看来存在缺陷的风险模型。4月初德鲁曾表示，麦克瑞斯和马丁-阿塔霍告诉她，2012年第二季度摩根大通的信用衍生产品投资可能出现2.5亿美元（15.525亿元人民币）的亏损。但他们也说，这项投资还可能带来3.5亿美元（21.735亿元人民币）利润。而实际上，这项投资当季亏损超过了40亿美元（248.4亿元人民币）。

    德鲁称，调整风险模型是导致摩根大通巨亏的原因之一，但她并没有参与这件事。不过她承认，2012年初自己知道上述信用衍生产品投资所具有的风险经常超过摩根大通设定的上限。参议院的报告指出，这种情况连续出现了71天。德鲁还表示，本来有一项措施可以防止这笔投资在2012年初急剧扩张，但摩根大通高管层决定暂缓采取这项措施。

    莱文牢牢抓住了这一点。他据此指出，真正的问题在于摩根大通管理层，而不是风险模型。他说：“出现问题的不是风险上限，而是风险管理人员并没有针对已知风险采取控制措施。”

    从德鲁的证词中还能看出摩根大通首席投资办公室的业务规模之大和盈利水平之高。德鲁说，从2007年到2011年，她的部门为摩根大通贡献了230亿美元（1,428.3亿元人民币）利润，占同期总利润的近三分之一。信用衍生产品投资出现亏损时，该部门对冲掉了7,000亿美元（4.347万亿元人民币）的潜在借贷损失。

    由于摩根大通完全有能力在不靠政府帮助的情况下消化这些损失，有人认为这次调查是参议院在罗织罪名。和伦敦鲸事件及其损失公告发布前相比，摩根大通的股价已经开始反弹。但莱文表示，本次调查是一项关键措施，它能发现美国金融业承担了多少风险以及摩根大通和其他金融机构在如何使用由政府提供担保的存款资金。

    他说：“显然，摩根大通对衍生产品交易过于投入，以至于无暇通过发放贷款来促进美国经济复苏。”

    译者：Charlie

    She seems to have had little contact with Bruno Iksil, the chief trader of the portfolio who has been nicknamed the London Whale. Instead, she appears to have relied on the trader's bosses, Achilles Macris and Javier Martin-Artajo, and risk models that now appear to have been flawed. In early April, Drew said Macris and Martin-Artajo told her the most the bank's credit portfolio could lose in the second quarter of 2012 was $250 million. They also said there was a possibility it could produce a $350 million profit. Instead, the portfolio lost more than $4 billion.

    Drew said she played no role in revising the risk model that, in part, led to JPMorgan's (JPM) huge loss. Nonetheless, she admitting knowing the portfolio was regularly in "breach" of the firm's risk limits - on 71 straight days according to the Senate's report's findings - in early 2012. She also said that "senior management" at JPMorgan signed off on delaying a move that would have stopped the portfolio from growing significantly in early 2012.

    Levin seized on that fact to say the real problems were with JPMorgan's management and not its risk models. "It wasn't that the risk limits were wrong," said Levin. "It was that risk managers didn't manage the risks they knew they had."

    Drew's testimony also shed light on how large and profitable the bank's chief investment office had become. From 2007 to 2011, Drew said her division contributed $23 billion to the bank's bottom line, or nearly a third of JPMorgan's total profit during the period. At the time of the credit losses, Drew said her division was responsible for hedging $700 billion in potential lending losses.

    Some have called the Senate investigation of JPMorgan a witch hunt, considering the bank was more than able to swallow the losses without any help from the government. JPMorgan's stock is now higher than it was before the announcement of the London Whale losses. But Levin said the investigation was key to uncovering the riskiness of the nation's banks and how JPMorgan and others use deposit money that is insured by the government.

    "Apparently, JPMorgan was too busy betting on derivatives to make loans that would have sped the U.S. recovery," he said.