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亲历者详解AMD与英特尔之战内幕

亲历者详解AMD与英特尔之战内幕

Roger Parloff 2013-05-07
2004年到2009年期间,AMD在全球针对英特尔发起了一场战争,指控对方采用不法手段维持自己的市场垄断地位。不过,由于当时的保密政策,这场激烈的斗争并没有进入公众的视线。现在,AMD前CEO亲自著书,回忆了商业史上这场最激烈的诉讼大战。

    作为一个上市公司的CEO,当他的公司决定与极其强大的竞争对手对簿公堂的时候,当它通过举债来进行一次重大战略收购的时候(以56亿美元收购图形芯片制造商ATI),当公司由于一个自已的严重失误(皓龙处理器的下一代产品巴塞罗纳芯片存在设计缺陷)导致财政困难恶化的时候,当公司通过大规模重组才勉强躲过破产之灾的时候(从阿布扎比的投资人那里拉来资金,将所有的芯片制造工厂剥离,建成一个名叫Global Foundries的独立公司),鲁毅智是怎样想的,怎样做的?如果读者对这些问题好奇的话,这本书会提供一些很有趣和刺激的内容。

    不过这本书并没有给我们很多鲜活的教训。书中的叙事也有明显的遗漏,有些结论也没有说服力。比如当鲁毅智在就剥离Global Foundries公司进行谈判时,他需要与IBM解决某些专利问题。当年与他打交道的IBM高管是罗伯特•莫法特。当时,莫法特正与一个叫丹妮尔•奇耶斯的美女传绯闻,而这个叫奇耶斯的大美女则把重要的内幕消息泄露给了帆船集团(Galleon)的对冲基金经理拉杰•拉贾拉特南。(莫法特和奇耶斯后来承认自己有罪。拉贾拉特南于2011年被判刑,后提起上诉)。鲁毅智虽然一直没有被追究法律责任,但在政府的一份对奇耶斯的量刑备忘录中称,她也从鲁毅智那里获得过内幕消息。不过鲁毅智在书中对这些事只字未提。(鲁毅智在一次采访中表示:“在报道中把我的名字和那件事联系在一起,真是一件特别不公平的事……没有任何政府机构指控我有违法行为,我相信我的行为一向都坦坦荡荡,是为了AMD的最大利益,但是我被拉进一场媒体炒作里。”

    描写鲁毅智从AMD离职的那部分也不甚令人满意。据他写道,2008年夏天,关于剥离芯片制造厂的谈判陷入了泥潭,时任AMD欧洲、中东和非洲总裁的朱利亚诺•梅罗尼对鲁毅智说,阿布扎比的投资者们“担心一旦我们做了这笔交易,你就会抛弃这些制造厂,他们就只能靠自己了。”然后梅罗尼建议:“如果你告诉他们,你会跟他们一起走,也就是加入新的芯片制造公司,这就会打消他们的顾虑。”鲁毅智认为梅罗尼说的对,于是他提出将到新成立的Global Foundries公司工作,以确保这笔交易顺利完成,并把AMD从一场可能的破产危机中拯救出来。

    2008年7月,AMD公司宣布已连续七个季度出现亏损,同时宣布鲁毅智将不再担任CEO,但仍将留任董事长一职。与阿布扎比投资者的交易直到2009年3月才能对外公开,因此媒体纷纷写道,鲁毅智是被AMD“逼宫”了——这些传闻在鲁毅智看来对他很不公平。他回忆道,“事实是这是一件更具有合作意味、更复杂而且是事先谋划好的事,”他写道,他抑制住了“公开反击的念头”,因为他想起了父亲的建议:“如果你跟一个傻子吵架,就没人知道你们两人中到底谁是傻子了。”

    不过,读者们还是想知道,为什么让鲁毅智成为Global Foundries公司的非常务董事长对阿布扎比的投资人来说那么重要。鲁毅智只在那家公司待了八个月,他离开那家公司的过程也被省略掉了。(鲁毅智曾在一次采访中表示:“我在那儿的使命完成了。”)那么,鲁毅智离开AMD,究竟是为了确保交易的顺利进行、将AMD拯救出破产深渊的无私之举,还是梅罗尼仅仅是用一套外交辞令说动鲁毅智自行让位,好保住鲁毅智的面子?

    如果还有下一本书讲述鲁毅智在AMD的CEO生涯,我希望那是梅罗尼写的。(财富中文网)

    译者:朴成奎

    On the other hand, if the reader wants to know what it's like to be the CEO of a public corporation when it decides to go to the mattresses against a gigantic competitor; and when it simultaneously incurs debt to make a huge strategic acquisition (purchasing graphics chipmaker ATI for $5.6 billion); and when it exacerbates its resulting financial squeeze with a serious unforced error (a design flaw in Opteron's successor, the Barcelona chip); and when it narrowly averts bankruptcy by pulling off a massive restructuring (obtaining financing from Abu Dhabi investors to spin off all its chip fabrication plants into a new stand-alone company, GlobalFoundries); then this book will provide some compelling and provocative reading.

    The book does not, alas, teach many vivid lessons. The narrative flow is also tripped up by some notable omissions and unpersuasive inclusions. When Ruiz was negotiating the GlobalFoundries spinoff, for instance, he needed to address certain licensing issues with IBM. The executive he dealt with there was Robert Moffat, who, as it happened, was then having an affair with femme fatale Danielle Chiesi, who was, in turn, leaking material inside information to Galleon hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam. (Moffat and Chiesi later pled guilty. Rajaratnam was convictedin 2011, and has appealed.) Ruiz was never charged with wrongdoing, but the government's sentencing memorandum for Chiesi alleged that she also obtained inside information from Ruiz. Ruiz mentions none of this in the book. (In an interview he says, "The association of my name in the media with that was a terribly unfair thing to do … There was never an allegation of wrongdoing made against me by any authority, and I believe that I always acted in good faith and in the best interests of AMD. But I got dragged into a media frenzy."

    The description of Ruiz's departure from AMD is also unsatisfying. During the summer of 2008, with negotiations over the foundry spinoff stalled, Giuliano Meroni, AMD's then president for Europe, Middle East, and Africa, told Ruiz that the Abu Dhabi investors "are worried that once we do this deal, you will leave them, and they will be on their own." Meroni then suggested, as Ruiz recounts it, "If you tell them that you'll go with them -- you'll join the new foundry company -- that will end their worries." Ruiz saw that Meroni was right, offered to go to GlobalFoundries to ensure that the deal went through, and thereby saved AMD from a possible bankruptcy filing, Ruiz writes.

    In July 2008, when AMD announced its seventh consecutive quarterly loss, it also announced that Ruiz would step down as CEO, though he remained as AMD chairman. The impending Abu Dhabi deal would not become public till March 2009. Accordingly, the press wrote -- unfairly in Ruiz's view -- that AMD had "ousted" Ruiz as CEO, Ruiz recounts, when "the reality was something much more cooperative, complex, and premeditated." He suppressed "the urge to publicly fight back," he writes, remembering his father's advice: "If you argue with a fool, no one will know who the fool is."

    Still, the reader wonders why having Ruiz become GlobalFoundries's nonexecutive chairman was so pivotal to the Abu Dhabi investors' willingness to go forward. Ruiz stayed there only eight months. His departure from that company is also omitted from the book. (In an interview Ruiz says, "My work there was completed.") So had Ruiz's departure from AMD really been the selfless act that cinched the deal that saved AMD from bankruptcy? Or had Meroni just found a diplomatic way to finesse Ruiz's ouster in a way that preserved Ruiz's pride?

    The next book I'd like to read about Ruiz's tenure at AMD would be one written by Meroni.

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