叙利亚：战火围城中的经济帐

战火中的物价

    收紧包围圈的过程中，反政府武装没有让这座城市挨饿。其中显然有政治考虑：起义的目的是为了赢得民心。但这样做也有赚钱的考虑。战争创造出了新的市场，战争长短取决于他们（而且在一定程度上也是被他们延长的。）起义者需要获得资金支持。围城带来了大量的商机。市中心仍需要食物，尤其需要电力和汽油。控制供应线的反对派寻租团体从围城开始就对进城货物征收附加费，加剧了战时通胀。

    西红柿价格已经涨了两倍。燃料价格是过去的四倍。在去年12月和今年1月的面粉短缺时期，过去只卖25叙利亚镑的面包一度涨到了500叙利亚镑。电力短缺带动了利润丰厚的发电机买卖。

    阿勒颇的消费者已经感受到了这种压力。由于经济制裁和货币贬值，西方进口商品不是买不到，就是买不起。虽然叙利亚镑在街上还能用，但它迅速贬值的趋势导致了外汇需求剧增。战前，1美元兑换约50叙利亚镑，如今已升至近140叙利亚镑。

    资金支持(以汇款形式)仍在流入阿勒颇。很多公司都已关门，但银行继续营业。据西联汇款（Western Union）的一位女发言人称，虽然2012年向叙利亚的汇款有所减少，但汇款仍是阿勒颇的一条重要生命线，为围困阿勒颇的战斗提供资金支持。

    在围城经济中，常规做法往往行不通过，取而代之的是权益变通之道。自去年冬季出现食物短缺后，反对派武装已准许面粉运抵这个城市的面包店。而且在夺下阿勒颇的发电厂之后，他们也与政府协商如何和政府控制的城区共享电力。实际上，政府和反对派武装已建立起一套秩序，让这个城市中的生活能够继续下去，即使双方现在仍然在斗个你死我活。

为革命筹资

    叙利亚的反对斗争也转变成了一场筹资竞赛。据叙利亚博客BSyria和Edward Dark称，一些有想法的反对派已经制作了推广视频，并以富有的海湾酋长为自己命名。在更大层面上，反对派领导人正对外部国家施压，要求加大财力支持。像土耳其等地区强国已对此作出了回应。

    虽然近几周美国一直在推进要为反对派武装提供更多援助，但奥巴马政府绝不会承诺为反对派提供超出“非杀伤性”援助外的任何帮助，他们的担心可能是这些武器最终会落入反西方的伊斯兰教主义者手中。

    这样的担忧不是毫无根据。叙利亚当政政府固然残酷，但反对派也同样残酷，而且越来越激进。上个月，知名的反对派al-Nusra Front就公开宣称拥护伊拉克基地组织。渴望获得西方支持的竞争对手叙利亚自由军立即表示，不支持al-Nusra。但是，叙利亚自由军也很难撇清与宗教的干系：它的士兵和高级指挥官都是伊斯兰主义者。正如《纽约时报》(New York Times)上个月所强调的那样，叙利亚谈不上有真正意义上的非宗教反对派。与此同时，整个叙利亚境内那些由反对派控制的城镇正在建立伊斯兰法庭，要求妇女佩戴伊斯兰头巾。

    “我知道Blond Duck是独裁者，”一名要求匿名的叙利亚年轻人表示，Blond Duck是阿萨德总统的绰号。“但反对派，他们也不是为了自由。你真的相信伊斯兰武装份子能够带来自由吗？”

    像很多深陷当权政府和反对派争斗的叙利亚年轻人一样，他表示，他只想要安定。

    无论结果是什么，他可能都会非常失望。对于大多数分析师而言，问题不是叙利亚政府会不会倒台，而是什么时候倒台。在这之后，借用法国作家雅克•马莱•迪庞的名言，持续的担忧是革命将吞噬自己取得的成果。“如果Blond Duck垮台，”那位叙利亚年轻人说，叙利亚将进入全面的无政府状态。

    如果是这样，这场在阿勒颇市中心外围进行了数月的战争最终依然会将战火烧入称重这片尚且和平的土地。（财富中文网）

    What price civil war?

    Even as they tighten the vise, the rebels are not starving the city. There are obvious political reasons: An insurgency's aim is to win hearts and minds. Yet there is also a profit motive. War creates new markets, it depends on them (and in some cases is prolonged by them). Insurgents need to be financed. Conveniently, a siege generates ample commercial opportunities. The city center still needs food, and it badly wants electricity and gasoline. Rent-seeking opposition groups, which now control supply lines, have imposed surcharges on goods going in since the start of the siege, exacerbating natural wartime inflation.

    So the price of a tomato climbed 200%. Fuel prices quadrupled. During a flour shortage in December and January, a loaf of bread -- which once cost 25 SYP -- shot up to 500. Electricity shortages animated a profitable trade in power generators.

    Aleppo consumers have felt the squeeze. Amid economic sanctions and currency depreciation, Western imported goods are unavailable or unaffordable. While the Syrian Pound (SYP) is still used in the streets, its downward spiral has sharply increased demand for foreign currencies. Prior to the war, the U.S. dollar bought around 50 SYP. Today, it buys closer to 140.

    Financial support, in the form of remittances, still flows to Aleppo. Many businesses have closed, but banks remain open. While money transfers to Syria declined in 2012, according to a Western Union (WU) spokeswoman, remittances remain an important lifeline to the city, and feed the war raging around it.

    In a siege economy, formal institutions often break down and are replaced by unsustainable improvisations. Since last winter's shortages, opposition forces have allowed flour to reach the city's bakeries, and, after capturing Aleppo's power plant, negotiated the sharing of electrical current with regime-controlled neighborhoods. In effect, regime and opposition forces have established procedures that allow life in the city to continue, even as they work tirelessly to kill one another.

Fundraising for revolution

    The Syrian opposition's campaign has also turned into a race for funding. Enterprising rebel units have developed promotional videos and named themselves after wealthy Gulf sheikhs, according to Syrian bloggers BSyria and Edward Dark. On a larger scale, opposition leaders are pressing outside states to step up their financial support. Regional powers like Turkey have answered that call.

    While the U.S. has been pushed in recent weeks to provide greater assistance to rebel groups, the Obama Administration is loathe to pledge anything more than "non-lethal" aid to the rebels, likely out of fear that arms would end up in the hands of anti-Western Islamists.

    Such fears are not baseless. While the Syrian regime is brutal, the rebels are just as brutal, and increasingly radical. Last month, a prominent opposition group, the al-Nusra Front, openly declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda of Iraq. The rival FSA, keen to win Western support, swiftly disavowed al-Nusra. However, the FSA is hardly secular: Its ranks and senior command posts are filled by Islamists. As the New York Times emphasized last month, Syria has no meaningful secular opposition groups to speak of. Meanwhile, throughout the country, rebel-controlled towns are establishing Islamic courts and requiring women to wear hijab.

    "I know the Blond Duck is a dictator," said one young Syrian who requested anonymity, using a common nickname for President Assad. "But the opposition, they're not about freedom, either. Do you really think that Jihadists will bring freedom?"

    Like many young Syrians caught between the regime and rebels, he said, he simply wanted stability.

    Whatever the outcome, he may be sadly disappointed. For most analysts, it's not a question of whether the regime will fall, but when. Following that, the persistent fear is that the revolution, to use Jacques Mallet du Pan's phrase, will devour its children. "If the Blond Duck falls," the young Syrian said, "there will be complete anarchy."

    And if that happens, a war that has for months swirled around the still-peaceful center of Aleppo will finally rush in.