给摩根大通的利润挤挤水分

    杰米•戴蒙总是喜欢谈论摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）稳固的资产负债表。有些不那么牢靠的是该行的利润表。

    今天，摩根大通在坦帕举行的年度股东大会将表决该行是否应当拆分CEO和董事长职位。目前，戴蒙一人身兼两职。很多股东认为，他应当让出董事长一职。随着去年摩根大通爆出60亿美元交易巨亏，再加上过去12个月来监管机构持续不断的调查，要求CEO和董事长分立的呼声日渐高涨。投票结果预计会很接近。

    戴蒙和其支持者主张由CEO兼任董事长职位，主要理由就是摩根大通的盈利表现出色。银行业分析师迪克•波夫最近指出，去年美国只有3家公司的净利润超过摩根大通。尽管这一年，摩根大通还遭遇了60亿美元交易损失。

    当金融危机中其他银行差点翻船、至今仍颤颤巍巍之际，戴蒙带领着摩根大通赚得盆满钵满。但该行出色的盈利数据至少有一部分是假象。

    以今年一季度为例。摩根大通公布，净利润增长31%至65亿美元。但增加部分有超过2/3是因为摩根大通按揭贷款部门的会计手法，不是银行业务有任何实质性的改善。

    事实上，今年一季度，潜在不良住房贷款的损失为-1.98亿美元。这意味着该行基于未来不良贷款的损失预测，记入了近-2亿美元损失。

    这怎么可能？正如你可能早就知道的那样，会计更多是艺术，而不是科学。即便这样，摩根大通的账簿也更像抽象派画家杰克逊•波洛克，而不是写实派画家诺曼•洛克威尔。

    当贷款人停止偿付时，银行不一定非得冲销不良贷款。他们可以一直等到他们判定这笔钱可能永远也拿不回来时。这通常是在贷款人停止寄送支票数周之后，或者更经常的情况是数月之后。银行在做出这些决定时有很大的灵活度。在这之前，不良贷款会和其他资产一样留在银行的账簿上，延迟损失的发生。

    长期以来，摩根大通在确认不良贷款方面一直迟于竞争对手。例如，去年第一季度，摩根大通为每90美元的不良贷款冲销了1美元。相比之下，当时美国最大的100家银行的平均冲销比率为34:1。今年，摩根大通的比率飙升至178:1，这意味着它冲销不良贷款的速度已降至一年前的约一半水平。以这样的比率、而非行业平均比率来冲销贷款，看上去光是第一季度就为摩根大通节省了6.97亿美元。

    其他大银行业也放缓了他们的冲销速度。但在确认损失方面，没有一家银行像摩根大通那么慢。美国银行(Bank of America)和富国银行(Wells Fargo)的不良贷款/冲销比率分别为124和113。

    Jamie Dimon likes to talk about JPMorgan Chase's fortress balance sheet. What's a little more shaky is the bank's income statement.

    Next Tuesday, at its annual meeting in Tampa, JPMorgan (JPM) will reveal the results of a shareholder vote on whether the bank should split the role of CEO and chairman. Right now, Dimon holds both. Many shareholders think he should give up the chairmanship. The push for the move has gained momentum in the wake of last year's $6 billion trading loss and a litany of other run-ins with regulators in the past 12 months. The vote is expected to be close.

    The main argument that Dimon and his supporters make for why the CEO should keep the chairman role as well is JPMorgan's bottom line. Bank analyst Dick Bove recently noted that only three companies in the U.S. netted more than JPMorgan last year. And that's in a year in which the bank had a $6 billion trading loss.

    Dimon has indeed steered his ship toward the money waterfall while others nearly capsized and have teetered since. But at least part of the bank's profit gusher is an illusion.

    Take the first quarter of this year. JPMorgan said its income rose 31% to $6.5 billion. But more than two-thirds of that gain can be attributed to some nifty accounting coming out of the bank's mortgage division and not any real improvements in JPMorgan's business.

    In fact, in the first three months of the year, JPMorgan's losses from potential bad home loans was negative $198 million. That means the bank booked a near-$200 million gain based on a prediction of how much it would lose from future bad loans.

    How's that possible? Accounting, as you may already know, is more art than science. Even so, JPMorgan's books are more Jackson Pollock than Norman Rockwell.

    Banks aren't forced to write off bad loans when a borrower stops paying. Instead, they are allowed to wait until they have made the determination that they will never get paid back. That typically happens weeks or, more often, months after a borrower ceases mailing in checks. Banks get a lot of leeway in making that determination. Until they do, the bad loan sits on the bank's books just like any other, delaying losses.

    JPMorgan has long been slower than rivals to recognize bad loans. In the first quarter of last year, for instance, JPMorgan wrote off one dollar for every 90 the bank had in bad loans. That compared to an average write-off ratio at the nation's 100 largest banks of 34 at the time. This year, that ratio at JPMorgan has shot up to 178, meaning it is writing off bad loans at nearly half the rate it was a year ago. Writing off loans at that rate rather than the industry average appears to have saved JPMorgan $697 million in the first three months of the year alone.

    Other big banks have slowed their write-off rate as well. But none is nearly as slow in recognizing losses as JPMorgan. The ratio of bad loans to charge-offs at Bank of America (BAC) and Wells Fargo (WFC) was 124 and 113, respectively.