《沃尔克规则》会打垮高盛吗？

    格拉塞克指出，交易业务约占高盛收入的一半。另外，直接投资对这家公司收入的贡献率为17%，而部分直接投资的渠道是高盛的私募基金和对冲基金。预计《沃尔克规则》将大幅压缩投行向此类投资载体投入资金的规模。我的同事丹•普利麦克已经详细解释了为什么高盛退出这些投资领域的速度比其他投行慢。总之，格拉塞克的观点是，《沃尔克规则》有可能让高盛在这方面的收入减少25%，约占这家公司全部收入的17%。

    但高盛受到的影响可能不止于此。和其他公司不同的是，高盛从未按业务类型对自身利润进行过分解。一般来说，交易业务的利润率往往会高于其他业务。因此，如果这类收入下降17%，由此造成的实际利润跌幅有可能更大，比如，可能达到20%。

    权益回报率是金融公司的关键指标之一，高盛一直无法让自己的权益回报率回到金融危机之前的水平，其他投行也是如此。上个季度，高盛的权益回报率刚刚超过10%。受《沃尔克规则》影响，明年这个数字可能下降到7%，远低于金融危机前高盛经常公布的水平，也就是20%。

    野村证券（Nomura）分析师格伦•肖尔说：“问题在于高盛的方向性风险是否超过其他投行，以及它能否继续开展此类业务。这是个涉及到公平的问题。”

    有一个方案：每个季度，各家公司都公布自己的风险价值。这项数据的作用是追踪各家投行在日常交易过程中可能蒙受的损失。高盛的风险价值低于几年前，但仍高于大多数竞争对手。上个季度，高盛的平均风险价值为8000万美元。而高盛最主要竞争对手的平均风险价值为6500万美元，也就是说高盛交易业务的风险要高于摩根士丹利、摩根大通等公司。

    实际情况也许不是这样。许多人都认为风险价值并不是可靠的数据，而且金融公司可以灵活决定如何在报表中公布这项数据。高盛披露的经营信息不足以打消这些疑问。不过，鉴于《沃尔克规则》再次蓄势待发，我们也许很快就会找到答案。（财富中文网）

    译者：Charlie  

    But the impact could be larger than that. Unlike other firms, Goldman does not break out the profits it gets from its various lines of business. Typically, trading revenue tends to be more profitable than other lines of business. So, a 17% drop in revenue coming from that business could lead to a bigger drop when it comes to the actual bottom line, say 20%.

    Like other banks, Goldman has struggled to get its return on equity, a key metric for financial firms, back to where it was before the financial crisis. Last quarter, Goldman's ROE was just over 10%. The hit from Volcker could take Goldman's ROE down to 7% next year, well below the 20% it used to regularly report before the financial crisis.

    "The question is whether Goldman takes on more directional risk than others, and whether they will still be able to do it," says Glenn Schorr, an analyst at Nomura. "It's a fair question."

    One answer: Every quarter, firms report a figure called value at risk, which is supposed to track how much money a bank stands to lose trading each day. Goldman's VAR is down from what it was a few years ago. But it is still higher than most of its rivals. In the most recent quarter, Goldman's VAR averaged $80 million. That compares to an average of $68.5 million at Goldman's closest rivals, suggesting that Goldman is conducting riskier trading than Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, and others.

    That might not be the case. Many say VAR isn't a reliable stat, and firms have leeway in how they report it. Goldman doesn't disclose enough about its business to figure all this out. But with the Volcker Rule now back on track, we may soon find out.