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摩根大通CEO真的值2000万美元年薪吗?

摩根大通CEO真的值2000万美元年薪吗?

Stephen Gandel 2014-01-27
摩根大通去年丑闻缠身,还被监管机构开出了天价罚单,但这家银行的董事会却决定给CEO吉米•戴蒙涨工资,从去年的1150万美元左右涨到了今年的2000万美元。他真的值这么多钱吗?

    大多数研究都表明,CEO薪酬的基础是投资者对他们所在公司的估值,或者说市场价值,而不是实际的利润,也不是股价的走势。2011年底,摩根大通的市值为1360亿美元,而现在的市值为2120亿美元。按照2011年的市值-酬劳比例,戴蒙的2013年年薪应该达到3500万美元。也许就是出于这个原因,董事会才认为他们的CEO只应该得到2000万美元。欣然接受吧,戴蒙。

    但在我看来,更聪明的做法应该是效仿瑞信银行(Blackrock's),后者遵从的是欧洲银行监管部门的建议。据报道,2013年瑞信的奖金是所谓的有条件纾困债券(bail-in-able bonds)。这种债券的有趣之处在于,今后三年内,一旦瑞信的一级资本充足率下降到7%以下,这些债券就会变得一文不值。

    摩根大通董事会本可以采取同样的方式来支付戴蒙的酬劳。用这样的模式,戴蒙的年薪会上升,但董事会可以说,他们惩罚了戴蒙,方法是把他的奖金,或者部分奖金,和他能否满足监管机构的要求挂钩。在面对这么多监管问题的情况下,还能想出比这更好的惩罚措施吗?

    当然,这样做确实有点儿公关色彩。瑞信的一级资本充足率已经达到10%左右。因此,那些有条件纾困债券在到期时不太可能变得毫无价值。摩根大通同样可以把标准定得低一点。同时,这些债券的持有人会获得利息,而具有讽刺意味的是,利息水平取决于伦敦银行同业拆借利率(Libor,这会给他们更多的理由来操纵这项利率)。因此,和只拿现金相比,债券持有人最后得到的酬劳可能多一些。同时,这确实比股权报酬的风险低。此外,这些债券还能以应急资本的形式出现。这样,它们自身还能提高公司的资本充足率。

    不利的一面是,把资本金要求作为CEO的酬劳基础基本上就意味着他们要为监管机构工作。当然,2013年摩根大通向监管部门支付了约220亿美元罚款,而这家银行的股东只获得了180亿美元的利润。从这个角度来说,戴蒙其实已经在为监管机构打工了。(财富中文网)

    译者:Charlie

    Most studies show that CEOs are paid based on what investors think their company is worth, or market capitalization, not actual earnings or stock price movement. Back in the end of 2011, JPMorgan had a market cap of $136 billion. The company now has a market cap of $212 billion. Based on the 2011 ratio (market cap to salary), Dimon should get paid $35 million this year. Perhaps that's why the board felt he should only get $20 million. Take that, Dimon.

    But I think it would have been smart if JPMorgan had followed the lead of Credit Suisse (CS), which was following a recommendation from European bank regulators. Credit Suisse is reportedly paying bonuses this year in so-called bail-inable bonds. What's interesting about the bonds is that they become worthless if Credit Suisse's common capital ratio falls below 7% at any time in the next three years.

    JPMorgan's board could have done the same with Dimon's pay. In that way, they could have upped Dimon's pay, but still still say they were penalizing him by paying him a bonus, or a portion of his bonus, tied to whether he was able to keep regulators happy. Can you think of a better punishment for getting in so much trouble with regulators?

    Of course, it's all a bit of a PR move. Credit Suisse already has a common capital ratio of around 10%. So it's unlikely that the bonds would expire worthless. JPMorgan could set a similarly low threshold. In the meantime, the bonds pay the bankers interest, which ironically is based on Libor (more reason to manipulate). So bankers would end up making a bit more than if they were just paid in cash. And it's actually less risky than getting paid in stock. What's more, you can structure the bonds as a form of contingency capital, so they actually end up boosting the company's capital ratios all on their own.

    The downside is that by paying bankers based on levels of regulatory capital, you are basically saying that bankers are working for the regulators. Of course, last year, JPMorgan paid regulators fines of about $22 billion. Shareholders got $18 billion in earnings. So, in a way, Dimon is already working for the regulators.

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