辉瑞CEO:收购阿斯利康不是为了避税
周一,辉瑞制药(Pfizer)公开宣布,有意收购英国药业巨头阿斯利康(AstraZeneca)。后者对收购提议一直保持沉默,至少从未公开发表意见。最近突然兴起了一股大型药企并购浪潮,辉瑞的行动是这股浪潮中的最新一步棋。引发药业并购潮的原因是,整个行业畅销药品的开发速度放缓,而且,大型跨国公司需要花掉数千万亿美元的海外收入。(大部分海外收入回到国内必须缴纳巨额税金。) 辉瑞董事长兼CEO伊恩•里德在下面的访谈中谈到,通过将年收入520亿美元的辉瑞和英国竞争对手合并,他希望达成怎样的目的。有一点是肯定的:如果这两家公司完成合并,这个年收入1,000亿美元的庞然大物将成为医药行业史上规模最大的公司。 《财富》杂志(Fortune):为什么选择阿斯利康?为什么是现在? 里德:阿斯利康的产品与辉瑞的产品匹配度很高。阿斯利康在炎症药物方面尤为擅长,在肿瘤和糖尿病药物方面也有很好的表现。如果合并成功,通过利用新兴市场和其他地区的网络,以及合并给我们带来的成熟的产品,我们将会大幅提高生产效率。这一点对我们非常重要。两家公司在科研方面有许多重叠之处。未来,医药行业的整合仍将继续,实现的方式要么是我们现在正在操作的交易,要么是资产交换的形式。 除了股票溢价外,这笔交易对于阿斯利康还意味着什么?双方是否曾进行过正式的讨论? 阿斯利康有一个全新的管理团队,很显然,他们都很优秀,也有非常专注的愿景。我认为,他们需要让自己确信一点,那就是两家公司的结合能够成功。到目前为止,除了我们表示“希望进行交易”外,双方还没有进行任何实质性的谈判。股价出现波动的前一天(1月3日),我们曾经提出过要约。现在,(由于英国的法律规定,)我们有28天时间来决定(是否提出正式要约)。目前还没有收到对方的直接回应。 许多分析师和投资者都认为,辉瑞进行这笔交易的动机是为了税收优惠,而不是战略优势。因为辉瑞想利用包容策略,获得基于英国政策的税务处理。是这样吗? 我说的很清楚,交易的出发点是整合两家公司,以及科研力量,同时为股东创造价值的能力。对比一下在美国进行类似交易需要付出的成本,如果我只看这次交易不利的(税收)协同效应,我会扼杀这笔交易。英国执行的税率是20%,但在美国,由于股息要求,收购阿斯利康的税率可能要达到38%。因此,要想完成交易,我们必须在英国进行支付。 研究一笔交易的时候要看三个因素:潜在收益协同效应,成本协同效应,有些交易还要关注财务协同效应。我们的交易中具备了这三个要素,而且我们并不认为某一个要素占据了主导地位。 辉瑞似乎一直在努力变得更小,而不是更大,比如最近分别出售和分拆了营养健康和动物健康业务。现在为什么要改变这一策略? 我上任时(2010年末)曾经说过,我们是一家医药公司,我们必须确立创新核心,适当地分配资本。我们的医药业务并没有缩小规模。我一直以来的观点都是,公司的规模并不是重要问题。我们只是希望专注于能够为股东创造价值的业务。我(在我的任期内)一直在努力创造这种选择性,还曾经就这个问题与华尔街进行过讨论。我们将向投资者保持透明;而投资者可以通过投资方式来告诉我们,他们对我们的资产管理感到满意,还是认为将资产单独管理会更好。 过去二十年间,辉瑞每一任CEO都曾进行过改变行业格局的大规模并购【2000年收购沃纳-兰伯特(Warner-Lambert),2002年收购法玛西亚(Pharmacia),2009年收购惠氏(Wyeth)】。这次的交易是你对这个传统的延续吗? 大家看一下每笔交易,会发现它们都有各自不同的背景。收购沃纳-兰伯特是因为立普妥(Lipitor)(专利期满),辉瑞的市场份额遭到蚕食。收购法玛西亚的意义远不止止痛药的专营权。作为一个概念,它是成功的。我们获得的专营业务都非常出色,但同时,交易也给我们带来了伐地考昔(Bextra)问题。与默克公司(Merck)的止痛药Vioxx一样,这个药品因为被爆出副作用而退出了市场;2009年,辉瑞因为非法营销伐地考昔和其他药物被处以23亿美元的民事和刑事罚款。收购惠氏是看中了它的技术,进军大分子药物和疫苗市场的机会,以及成本协同效应,这是一箭三雕的好事。收购阿斯利康同样是如此。(财富中文网) 译者:刘进龙/汪皓 |
On Monday, Pfizer publicly announced its interest in acquiring British drug giant AstraZeneca—an overture that the U.K. firm has so far met with silence, at least publicly. It's the latest chess move in a sudden wave of big pharma dealmaking. The push has been driven by an industry-wide slowdown in blockbuster drug development—as well as a need for large multinationals to do something with their hundreds of billions of dollars in overseas earnings. (Much of it can't be repatriated without generating a huge tax bill.) Below, Pfizer Chairman and CEO Ian Read weighs in what he hopes to accomplish by meshing his $52 billion-in-revenues company with its U.K. rival. One thing's for sure: If it happens, the $100 billion behemoth would be industry's biggest company ever. FORTUNE: Why AstraZeneca and why now? Read: AstraZeneca is a wonderful portfolio match with our portfolio. It has tremendous strength in inflammation, a good oncology presence and a good position in diabetes. And we can be far more productive if you look at the match with the established products unit by leveraging the network in emerging markets and elsewhere. That's of critical importance to us. There are a lot of overlaps in science being done, and the secular trend is that the industry will continue to consolidate by the type of deal we're doing, or by an exchange of assets. What's in it for AstraZeneca (AZN), other than the share price premium? Have there been any formal discussions yet? They're a new management team, and clearly they are good people and they've got a focused vision. I think they need to be convinced that the combination of the two [will work]. There have been no real discussions of substance other than 'we'd like to do a deal.' We did give them an offer on the last day we had an undisturbed stock price (January 3). Now [because of UK law] we have 28 days to decide [whether to make a formal offer]. There has been no direct response. A lot of analysts and investors think this deal is motivated by tax benefits rather than strategic advantages, since you would use the inclusion strategy to get a UK based tax treatment. Is this true? I've been very clear that the origin of this deal is the combination of the two companies and the science and the ability to create great value for shareholders. Now when I look at that deal compared with what I would have to pay if I did it in the U.S, the negative [tax] synergies would kill the deal. There's a 20% tax rate in the UK, and here, because of dividend requirements, it would probably be a 38% tax rate. So to get the deal done we have to domicile in the UK. When you look at a deal you look at three components: What are the possible revenue synergies, what are the cost synergies, and some deals also look at financial synergies. We have got all three components in our deal and we don't think any one is dominant. It seems like Pfizer (PFE) has been trying to get smaller, not bigger, of late, with its sales and spinoffs of nutritional health and animal health, respectively. Why the shift in strategy? When I took over (in late 2010), I said we're a pharmaceutical company and we have got to fix the innovative core and get capital allocation right. We haven't gotten smaller in pharma. My discussion point has always been that size is not the relevant question. We just want to focus on what creates shareholder value. [Over my tenure] I have been trying to create this optionality, which we've discussed with the Street, that we're going to give you transparency, and you're going to be able to feed back to us through how you invest whether you believe we're managing [our assets] well or if they would be better managed separately. Every Pfizer CEO of the past two decades has done an enormous, industry-changing merger (Warner-Lambert in 2000, Pharmacia in 2002, Wyeth in 2009). Is this one meant to be your legacy? I think if you look at the deals, each was caused by different circumstances. Warner-Lambert was driven by the [patent expiry] of Lipitor and seeing that share taken away. The Pharmacia deal was more about the pain franchise. As a concept it worked. The specialty businesses we got were wonderful businesses, but we had a Bextra problem [like Merck's Vioxx, it was withdrawn from the market after negative side effects were reported; in 2009 Pfizer paid $2.3 billion in a civil and criminal fine for illegal marketing of Bextra and other drugs]. The Wyeth deal was a deal about technology, about getting into large molecules and vaccines and about cost synergies. That was a trifecta. This one is too. |