高盛盛况不再

    对高盛来说，挑战在于：虽然11%的净资产收益率目前尚可接受，但一旦美国利率上调，这就远远不够了。当美国国债回到4%或5%的历史标准收益率水平，高评级的公司债券也又多上涨了几个百分点，那时投资者就会希望能从高盛这些投资银行获得更好的回报。高盛的利润主要来自于交易，这一块仍很容易遭遇急遽下滑。例如在2011年，高盛的净资产收益率就仅有3.6%。相比之下，随着利率上调，其他大银行基本可以确保利润和净资产收益率大幅增长。如果加息，他们将可以在低成本存款和抵押贷款、以及公司贷款利率的息差扩大中获得丰厚利润。

    如果高盛的收益率能够上涨，将大大提振市场的信心。但是事实却恰恰相反。高盛很难找到利润丰厚的领域进行再投资。实际上，该公司承认自2011年以来回购了高达122亿美元的股份。不过，仍然有相当一部分收入投入到各项业务上，这些新鲜的投资产生的回报差强人意。自2005年以来，其普通股的基数从235亿美元增加到744亿美元，增幅为510亿美元。但是这八年里，高盛的盈利仅增加了32.5亿美元。所以，新增股本的回报仅为6.4%。

    最近的情况同样让人担心。从2013年6月到2014年6月这12个月里，高盛的股本增加了16亿美元，而同期，该公司的盈利则从84亿美元跌至76亿美元。由于股本增加而利润下滑，其净资产收益率从11.8%跌到了10.6%。

    高盛的主营交易业务令疲弱的回报雪上加霜。目前，高盛从客户手中购买的库存股约为3,500亿美元，该公司力求以最大的利润率转售。2008年至2010年，高盛的交易账户平均回报为3.8%。但是自2011年以来，利润率严重缩水到1.2%至1.3%。

    问题很简单：库存的“周转”无法达到以前的水平，因为对冲基金、共同基金和其他客户的交易均已放缓。息差也无法达到金融危机之后的水平。

    要重现往昔的辉煌，高盛需要大幅提升其交易账户的回报。这是推升净资产收益率，从而在未来加息的环境中抢占优势的关键。

    在2013年的股东委托书中，高盛设定了12%的净资产收益率目标，以能够完全支付公司的长期薪酬方案。这一比例仅略微高于之前的10%，对于高盛强硬的管理层来说，这个目标可以说是非常卑微。但是，即便是12%，对于高盛来说也不容易。

    “12%的目标仍然是很低的。”戴维斯说，“我认为应该是14%到16%。”他相信高盛可以达到目标。“如果某项业务达不到15%的净资产收益率，他们可能就会放弃这块。这可能需要好几年的时间才能理顺。但是，如果其他人能找到出路，那么他们也能。”

    事实上，如果利率上调，投资者会涌向债券市场，交易可能会暴增。这一趋势正是高盛所急需的：增加周转率，并且大型的证券投资组合利润上扬。高盛的支持者们还提出，美国新的银行资本充足率要求，导致大银行已退出固定收益、外汇和大宗商品交易。所以，高盛可能会发现它在这些领域可以“一览众山小”。

    这种情况完全有可能发生。另外的一个变数是，高盛占据优势的债券交易业务可能会重蹈股票交易的覆辙。股票交易业务曾经极为赚钱，但是现在已经沦为在电子平台执行的低利润率商品化交易。新的银行规定要求衍生品也进行电子交易。如果不透明的债券市场的竞争因此有增无减，高盛将难以保住过去的一流盈利能力。但是，如果固定收益市场盛景再现，尤其是高盛如果能杀出重围，成为债券交易界无可匹敌的霸主，那么这将是一条引领其走向伟大复兴的道路。这就好比洋基队在世界职业棒球大赛（World Series）中再一次扬眉吐气。（财富中文网）

    For Goldman, the challenge is that an 11% ROE may be acceptable for now, but it will be far from adequate once interest rates rise. With treasuries back at their historic norms of 4% or 5%, and highly rated corporate bonds offering a couple of points more, investors will want better things from the likes of Goldman. Its profits, dominated by trading, are still vulnerable to sharp declines. In 2011, for example, Goldman earned a puny ROE of 3.6%. By contrast, the big banks can practically guarantee large increases in profits and ROE as interest rates increase. When that happens, they’ll benefit handsomely from the rising spread between the low-cost deposits and the rates on their mortgages and corporate loans.

    It would bolster confidence if Goldman’s numbers were headed in the right direction. They’re not. Goldman is having difficulty finding profitable places to reinvest its earnings. It has essentially admitted as much by re-purchasing $12.2 billion in its own shares since 2011. But it’s still investing much of its earnings in the businesses, and those fresh investments are garnering sub-par returns. Since 2005, its common equity base has increased from $23.5 billion to $74.4 billion, an increase of $51 billion. But over those eight years, it’s added just $3.25 billion in earnings. So the return on newly added equity is a mere 6.4%.

    Nor is the recent story reassuring. In the 12 months from June 2013 to June 2014, Goldman added $1.6 billion in capital. Its 12-month trailing earnings during that period, however, declined from $8.4 billion to $7.6 billion. So its ROE, driven by higher capital and lower profits, actually dropped from 11.8% to just over 10.6%.

    These sluggish returns have been weighed down by Goldman’s primary franchise, trading. Today, Goldman holds an inventory of around $350 billion in securities that it has purchased from clients, and seeks to resell, at the widest margins possible. From 2008 to 2010, Goldman earned an average of 3.8% on its trading book. But since 2011, the margin has dwindled to a slender 1.2% to 1.3%.

    The problem is basic: That inventory isn’t “turning over” nearly as fast as it used to, because hedge funds, mutual funds, and other clients have slowed the pace of their trading. Nor are spreads nearly as rich as in the aftermath of the financial crisis.

    To return to its glory days, Goldman will need to generate far higher returns on that trading book. That’s the ticket to driving returns on equity to heights that would prove alluring in the coming, rising-rate environment of tomorrow.

    In its 2013 proxy statement, Goldman revealed that it has set a 12% ROE target for a full payout on its long-term compensation plan. That’s an increase from just 10%, a surprisingly modest goal for such a hard-charging management team. But to reach even 12%, Goldman still has a ways to go.

    “The 12% target is still a low bar,” says Davis. “I’m thinking 14% to 16% is where they should be.” He believes Goldman will get there. “If they can’t get to a 15% ROE in a business, they’ll get out of it,” he says. “It will take them a couple of years to get through it. If anyone can figure it out, they can.”

    Indeed, when interest rates rise, trading could explode as investors pile into bonds. That trend would produce what Goldman needs most: A jump in turnover and margins in its big securities portfolio. Goldman fans also argue that because of the new capital requirements, big banks have exited fixed income, currency, and commodities trading. Hence, Goldman could find itself in a more commanding position than at any time in its recent history.

    That scenario is certainly possible. It’s also possible that bond trading, Goldman’s strength, could go the way of market making in equities. Once highly lucrative, stock trading has become a low-margin, commoditized field executed on electronic platforms. New banking regulations mandate that derivatives go electronic as well. If the opaque bond market becomes more, rather than less, competitive, Goldman will fail to restore its once-sovereign profitability. If fixed income booms again—and especially if Goldman emerges as the unchallenged king of bond trading—it will be on the road to a great restoration. Think of it as the Yankees capturing yet another World Series.