高盛全员降薪

    高盛的“宇宙主宰们”正在降低薪酬。但奇怪的是，没什么人对此感到高兴。

    上周四，投资银行高盛（Goldman Sachs）发布了第三季度营收报告。高盛的利润超出了分析师预期，其部分原因在于该公司生意不错。债券、大宗商品和衍生品交易部门的收入增长了74%，首次公开发行（IPO）及其他股票发行的管理费收入上涨了40%以上。

    不过，高盛利润超出分析师预期还有一个原因，那就是该公司给所有银行家和交易员减了薪。

    高盛把百分之多少的销售额用来支付员工薪酬向来备受关注。今年第三季度，该比例为33%。高盛三季度收入为84亿美元，也就是说，高盛员工三个月的平均收入仍高达8.3611万美元。不过，高盛今年前两季度的薪酬比例均为43%，如果该公司在第三季度沿用这一比例，那么其员工季度平均收入将高达10.7654美元。

    薪酬比例下调为高盛省下了8亿美元。如果不下调的话，高盛第三季度盈利将在14亿美元左右，比分析师预期少了约1亿美元，而不是像该公司实际报告的这样，比预期高出7亿美元。

    那么，高盛良好的收益数据是否有“加工”之嫌？

    在某些分析师和投资者看来，的确如此。尽管高盛净利润上涨了近50%，上周四其股票收盘时却股价告跌。（虽然另有言论称，高盛股票遭抛售，是因为人们原以为高盛的债券市场交易收入会更高——该数值同比增长了74%，比分析师预期高出了3亿美元。不过这都是华尔街诡异的“预期”游戏的一部分。）

    在高盛的收益电话会议上，许多分析师向该公司首席财务官哈维•施瓦茨问及薪酬比例下降问题。2013年三季度，高盛也曾下调其薪酬比例，当时是降至了35%。当年另外三个季度，高盛的薪酬比例都维持在40%区间。当时，该行曾被指责用降薪来美化营收数据。在收益电话会议上，就职于区域性证券公司Vinning Sparks的分析师马蒂•莫斯比问施瓦茨，高盛是否会考虑设定一个年度薪酬比率，而不是每季度波动。施瓦茨的回答是：不会。

    尽管如此，分析师和市场对高盛减薪的反应很奇怪。首先，高盛每季度报告的员工薪酬数据某种程度上来说是“加工”过的。高盛员工在七、八、九这三个月的平均收入并没有8.3611万美元。普通高盛员工也并非每两周就能拿到一张1.3935万美元的支票。他们拿到的钱可能比这少得多。

    大多数华尔街员工都是年薪不高但奖金丰厚，而奖金是在每年年底或次年一月初发放。历史上，华尔街员工的收入中，薪水只占20%，而奖金占80%。但金融危机后，由于华尔街的高额奖金遭人非议，薪水与奖金的比例向薪水稍微有所倾斜。更重要的是，如今大部分奖金是以受限股的形式发放。也就是说，大部分收入根本不会以现金的形式发放。

    每季度出现在高盛的财务报表上决定该公司盈利的，其实是高盛为支付员工薪酬预留的资金。其金额大致等于高盛预估的年奖金金额的四分之一。但直到年底高盛真正确定奖金数额并发放奖金时，相关费用才真正产生。因此，可以说高盛是通过操纵自身薪酬支出来抚平收益。

    另外，值得铭记于心的是，员工薪酬是高盛最大的开支项目，因此薪酬支出下降值得欢迎。华尔街向来喜欢削减成本。问题在于，减薪是否是一次性做法。施瓦茨对分析师的回答表明，高盛不会作出承诺。

    高盛或许别无选择。华尔街公司的利润率不比从前，高盛尤其是如此。过去，高盛的股本回报率一贯在20%或更高。去年三季度，高盛的股本回报率仅为8%。但该行给员工发起钱来还是像过去一样大方。高盛要想使自身利润率回升，只有降低员工薪酬。因此，减薪应该不足为奇。令人诧异的是，高盛的宇宙主宰们居然这么久才意识到这一点。不过，现在他们意识到了，这是件好事。如今社会日益关注收入差距的负面影响，减薪不仅对高盛有好处，而且对社会上的所有人都有好处。(财富中文网)

    The Masters of the Universe are taking a pay cut. Surprisingly, few people are happy about it.

    On Thursday, Goldman Sachs GS 2.51% reported earnings for the third quarter. The investment bank’s profits were better than analysts were expecting. That was in part because Goldman’s business was good. Revenue from its bond, commodities, and derivatives trading desk was up by 74%, and fees from managing IPOs and other stock offerings was up more than 40%.

    But the unexpectedly good earnings news was also due in part to the fact that Goldman decided to pay its bankers and traders less.

    Goldman’s closely watched compensation ratio—the percentage of sales it sets aside for pay—in the third quarter was 33%. On $8.4 billion in revenue for the firm, that still equates to a lofty average pay of $83,611 for three months of work for the average Goldmanite. But had Goldman paid its employees the same ratio of sales that it did in the first and second quarter, which was 43%, the bank’s average worker would have received $107,654.

    The pay cut saved Goldman $800 million. Without it, the bank’s third quarter earnings would have been more like $1.4 billion, or about $100 million less than what analysts were expecting, rather than the $700 million more that the firm actually reported.

    So did Goldman manufacture its good earnings?

    Some analysts and investors seem to think so. Goldman’s shares traded down yesterday, despite its nearly 50% reported bottom line jump. (Although some argue that the sell off was due to the fact that some thought the bank’s bond market trading revenue—which was, again, up 74% from the year before, and $300 million more than analysts were expecting—was going to be even higher. But that’s all part of Wall Street’s weird expectations game.)

    On the bank’s earnings conference call, a number of analysts probed Goldman CFO Harvey Schwartz about its compensation ratio drop. Goldman similarly dropped its compensation ratio in the third quarter of 2013, that time to 35%. For the rest of the year, it paid in the 40% range. At the time, the bank was criticized for lowering its pay numbers to make its earnings. At one point in the call, analyst Marty Mosby, who works for a regional brokerage firm Vinning Sparks, asked Schwartz whether Goldman would consider setting one compensation ratio for the year, and not changing it quarter by quarter. Schwartz’s answer: Nope.

    Still, the analysts and the market’s reaction to Goldman’s lower pay is odd. First of all, the compensation numbers that Goldman reports each quarter are sort of made up. Goldman’s employees did not receive an average of $83,611 during July, August, and September. It’s not like the average Goldman worker gets a check every two weeks for $13,935. They probably got a whole lot less.

    Most Wall Street employees get a small annual salary and a big bonus, which comes at the end of the year or in early January. The ratio has historically been 20% salary to 80% bonus. But after the financial crisis, the salary-to-bonus ratio shifted a bit toward salary when bonuses got a bad rep. What’s more, much of that bonus these days comes in the form of restricted stock. So much of that money will never get paid out as an actual cash deposit.

    What shows up in Goldman’s financial statements each quarter, and what is used to determine its earnings, is the amount of money the company sets aside each quarter to pay its employees. It’s an estimate of one quarter of what Goldman thinks those end of the year bonuses will be. But Goldman doesn’t actually incur the compensation expense until the end of the year when the actual bonuses are determined and paid out. So it’s fair to say that Goldman is smoothing its earnings by manipulating its compensation expense. That’s what it always does.

    It’s also worth remembering that compensation is Goldman’s biggest expense. So a drop should be welcome. Wall Street typically loves cost cutting. The question is whether this is a one-time thing. And Goldman, as Schwartz’s answer to the analyst indicates, won’t commit.

    But it may not have a choice. Wall Street, and Goldman in particular, is not as profitable as it once was. Goldman used to consistently have a return on equity of 20% or higher. In the third quarter a year ago, it was 8%. But the bank is still paying like it is making a 20% return. The only way it’s going to get its profitability back up is to pay its workers less. So the pay cuts should not be coming as a surprise. The surprise is how long it has taken the Masters of the Universe at Goldman to realize this. Now that they have, it’s a good thing. And at a time when we are increasingly concerned with the negative effects of income equality, it’s not just good for Goldman, but for all of us.