每当一宗大型杠杆收购交易公布时,坊间都会对所产生的债务和相关杠杆条款进行分析。目的是对交易完成后的公司营运状况有所了解,并判断买方所承担的贷款是否已超出合理水平。 但正如我们过去几年所看到的那样,银行很少愿意让企业陷入违约的境地。原因可能是因为银行不愿因此产生短期损失(即便这会带来长期增益),或者是因为它们缺乏内部团队来管理这样的资产 (尽管它们可以从大型杠杆收购公司聘请到这样的团队)。 事实上,常见的情况是“修订和延期”,银行将贷款到期日延后,换取杠杆收购公司更优厚的偿付条款。 我今天之所以提出这个问题,是因为上周有一位私募股权研究者在讨论行业风险时所作的点评 (主要围绕已接近投资期末的2006-2007年基金。她说她研究私募股权已经20年了,只见过一次基金到期但未要求有限合伙人延期情况 (有限合伙人通常都会批准延期,并对费用做出调整)。 换言之,我们在一宗交易或募资刚刚完成时所作的最初分析往往随着时间流逝而变得无足轻重。别忘了私募股权看重的是结果,而不是开头…… |
Whenever a major LBO deal is announced, there is analysis of the incurred debt and related leverage terms. The idea is to get a sense of how the company will operate post-transaction, and if the sponsors are loading on more loans than a company can reasonably handle. But, as we've learned over the past few years, banks rarely are willing to put companies into default. Maybe it's because they don't want to incur short-term losses (even if it creates long-term gains). Or maybe it's because they don't have in-house teams to manage such assets (even though they could hire such teams from large LBO shops). What we got instead was "amend and extend," where banks take a pinch of flesh from LBO firms in exchange for kicking the expiration can down the road. I bring this up today because of a comment made last week by a private equity researcher, in discussing industry overhang (which is mostly concentrated in 2006-2007 vintage funds that are nearing the end of their investment periods. She noted that in two decades of covering PE, only once had she seen a fund's lifecycle expire without asking LPs for an extension (which LPs almost always provide, typically with fee modifications). In other words, what we originally analyze when a deal gets done or fund gets raised is often rendered irrelevant with the passage of time. Yet another reminder that private equity is about ends, not beginnings… |
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