一直以来，事关避税问题，通用电气（General Electric）、埃克森美孚（Exxon Mobil）、威瑞森通讯（Verizon）和大型跨国银行这类公司一直是媒体关注的焦点。但某些最聪明、最富创意的避税方式的实施者，却是一家通常跟不法金融手段不搭边的公司——宝洁公司（Procter & Gamble）。

    在时间跨度近10年的3笔交易中，这家拥有汰渍洗衣粉、Bounty纸巾、吉列剃须产品和其他家喻户晓品牌的公司设法重新打通了国会在1997年堵上的一个漏洞。据笔者估算，宝洁公司通过这几笔交易（其中涉及出售该公司打算放弃的品牌），共获取利润60亿美元左右，而且该公司无需为此缴纳税收，其股东也可延期交税，或许会永远延期下去。然而，如果直接售出，将引发一份价值20亿美元的联邦税单和一笔沉重的州级税收。所有这3宗案例都涉及所谓的逆向莫里斯信托（Reverse Morris Trust ）交易，关于这类交易稍后将详细论述。“宝洁公司是这项技术最积极的实践者，”罗伯特•威伦斯有限公司（Robert Willens LLC）的税收专家罗伯特•威伦斯说。

    宝洁公司为什么能躲开税收部门的雷达？一是因为宝洁一直保持低调，此外，还因为这些交易分散在一个较长的时间段内：出售Jif花生酱和科瑞(Crisco)起酥油的交易发生在2002年，Folgers咖啡是在2008年被售出的，出售品客薯片（Pringles）的交易将于今年晚些时候结束。此外，这些交易非常复杂，恐怕只有税务专家（或受虐狂）才能搞清楚其中的来龙去脉。

    在我们继续讨论之前，首先要明白一点：我并不是在指责宝洁公司行为不端。这些交易是完全合法的。跟当前的市场风潮一样，宝洁公司使股东回报最大化的义务超过了纳税以支持社会的义务。“宝洁公司进行这些交易的目标在于为公司股东实现最佳价值，同时也是为正在售出的业务寻求更合适的接手者，”公司发言人詹妮弗•彻璐说。说得没错。

    既然没有舞弊行为，我为什么还要讨论这些交易呢？这是为了证明，税收体系需要改革，为了表明即使像宝洁这样的公司也在实践黑暗的避税艺术，也是为了彰显其中的利害关系究竟有多大。

    2001年，宝洁公司声称要做一笔有税收优惠的交易（把Jif花生酱出售给果冻果酱巨头J.M. Smucker公司）。此后，我一直在关注该公司的各种交易。这些交易会让你情不自禁地微笑。谁能抗拒撰写与花生酱加果冻三明治有关的文章呢？至少我不能。随后是Folgers咖啡交易，现在是品客薯片（Pringles）。

    让我先讲一些相关的历史，再阐述一下这种避税手段的运作方式。莫里斯信托（Morris Trust）直到1997年都一直是公司进行交易时惯常采用的避税策略。某公司将其打算剥离的业务注入一家归其股东所有的新公司，这种交易无需纳税。一眨眼工夫，一位买家又会通过一笔免税的换股交易收购这家新公司。最终的结果是，公司权益持有者既拥有原公司的股份，又拥有被剥离业务买家的股份。

    但在几笔涉及大量现金的交易【最受媒体关注的是，迪斯尼公司（Disney）出售报纸的交易，以及通用汽车公司（General Motors）出售其国防业务的交易。这类交易更像是出售，而不仅仅是为了节税而实施的公司分拆行为】使得莫里斯信托变成主要的税收流失渠道之后，国会收紧了相关规则。钻空子的公司于是转向逆向莫里斯信托。这种交易要求出售方最终需持有收购方多数股权。这会极大地挫伤买家的积极性。但宝洁公司最终还是如愿找到了这样做的买家——2002年和2008年的J.M. Smucker公司，以及2011年的戴梦得食品公司（Diamond Foods）。

    即使当前就“改革”公司税提出的降低税率、扩大税基提案最终成为法律，我们还是可以断言宝洁公司依然会从事逆向莫里斯信托或类似的交易。即便公司税率从当前的35%降为25%，宝洁依然可以从上述交易中少向美国国税局（IRS）上交15亿美元。它会尽一切可能使得出售交易免于税收，除非现存的所有漏洞被结结实实地堵住。但愿如此吧。

    毕竟，如同苹果派和花生酱加果冻三明治一样，公司避税也是美国的一大特色。

    译者：任文科

    The tax-avoidance spotlight has been shining brightly, via the media, on companies like General Electric (GE), Exxon Mobil, Verizon (VZ), and big multinational banks. But some of the most clever and innovative tax avoiding is being done by a company not usually associated with financial wheeling and dealing: Procter & Gamble (PG).

    In three deals spread over almost a decade, the owner of Tide detergent, Bounty towels, Gillette shaving products, and many other household names has managed to reopen a loophole that Congress closed in 1997. By my estimate, P&G's profits on the deals, which involve selling brands it no longer wants, total about $6 billion and are tax-free to the company, and are tax-deferred to its shareholders, possibly forever. A straight-up sale would have triggered a $2 billion federal tax bill and a hefty state tax bill (for details, see my calculations at the bottom of the page). All three involve so-called Reverse Morris Trust transactions, of which more later. "P&G is the most active practitioner of this technique," says tax expert Robert Willens of Robert Willens LLC.

    Why isn't P&G on the tax radar? Because it has kept a low profile, and because the deals have been spread out over an extended period: Jif peanut butter and Crisco shortening in a 2002 deal, Folgers coffee in 2008, and Pringles chips in a deal scheduled to close later this year. Besides, the deals are so convoluted that you have to be a tax techie (or a masochist) to make your way through them.

    Before we proceed, let's be clear: I'm not accusing P&G of wrongdoing. The deals are perfectly legal, and under current market mores, P&G's obligation to maximize its owners' returns trumps its obligation to pay taxes to support our society. "P&G's goal in these transactions is to achieve the best value for company shareholders, while also seeking a good fit for the business being sold," says company spokesman Jennifer Chelune. Fair enough.

    If there's no abuse, why am I discussing these sales? To show that the system needs reforming. To demonstrate how even a company like P&G practices the dark tax-avoiding arts. And to show how big the stakes are.

    I've been following P&G's transactions since 2001, when it announced plans to do a tax-advantaged deal to sell Jif to J.M. Smucker, the jam and jelly giant. It made me smile. Who could resist writing about combining PB with J? Not me. Then came the Folgers deal, and now Pringles.

    Let me give you some history, and show you how this works. Until 1997, Morris Trusts were a routine tax-free dealmaking maneuver. A company would stick a business it wanted to unload into a new corporation owned by its shareholders, which is a tax-free transaction. A nanosecond later, a buyer would acquire the new corporation in a tax-free stock-for-stock deal. Company holders would thus end up with shares in both the original company and in the buyer of the business being unloaded.

    But after several deals that involved lots of cash turned Morris Trusts into major tax drains that were more like sales than mere tax-efficient corporate spinoffs -- Disney's (DIS) sale of newspapers and General Motors' (GM) sale of its defense business got the most ink -- Congress tightened the rules. Loophole openers begat Reverse Morrises, which require that shareholders of the selling company end up with a majority stake in the acquiring company -- a big disincentive to buyers. But P&G has managed to find buyers -- Smucker in 2002 and 2008, Diamond Foods in 2011 -- willing to do that.

    Even if current bids to "reform" corporate taxes by lowering the rate and broadening the base are enacted, you can bet that P&G would still be out doing Reverse Morris Trust deals or something similar. At a 25% corporate tax rate rather than the current 35%, P&G would still keep $1.5 billion away from the IRS. It would do whatever it could to make the sales tax-free unless all available loopholes get nailed shut. Good luck getting that done.

    After all, corporate tax avoidance is as American as apple pie and … well, peanut butter and jelly.