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穆拉利上任才几个月，坊间流传已久的福特家族内部矛盾就开始浮出水面。对此霍夫曼也做了深入刻画。当时，持不同意见的家族成员——尤其是比尔•福特的姐姐和姐夫面临危机：他们一时无法支取股票红利，家族视为珍宝的两大品牌——捷豹（Jaguar）和路虎（Land Rover）也即将面临被拍卖的命运。因此，他们开始与精品投资银行佩雷拉•温伯格公司（Perella Weinberg）探讨将股份套现的途径，包括出售公司的控制权。 比尔和他的表亲埃德塞尔挫败了这一企图，并对穆拉利给予了充分信任。由此他们获得了丰厚回报：福特最终迎来了让人叹为观止的全面复兴。2008年福特亏损高达146亿美元，2011年却打了个漂亮的绝地反击，利润高达78亿美元。 通过长时间相处所获得的深入了解，霍夫曼刻画了一位少有瑕疵、近乎完美的穆拉利。他唯一的问题是，自己会在早上5点半就赶到公司，让所有人都不得不早早上班。但是这本书并不是什么圣人传记。霍夫曼并没有试图美化穆拉利所获得的丰厚薪酬，这已成为劳工合同谈判中一个扎眼的问题。【2011年，穆拉利的年薪高达2,950万美元——这是自从1986年李•艾柯卡在克莱斯勒公司（Chrysler）挣得2,360万美元年薪以来底特律最高的年薪。】霍夫曼还充分利用了自己获准深入公司的特权，挖掘了此前曾被忽视的主题，比如2009年那场旷日持久的谈判，当时公司方要求联合汽车工会（United Auto Workers）做出让步。 霍夫曼善于记录谈话，对汽车业拥有丰富透彻的了解。不过在处理他不太熟悉的主题时，有时也会流于俗套。比如，在描写比尔•福特的背景时他写道，福特在一片“时髦的专有领地”内长大成人，就读的是一所“名校”，但他却能“低调务实”，与“普通子弟打成一片”。 美国汽车公司的财运往往会随着GDP的起伏而起伏，而福特汽车也遵循着自己特有的丰年和荒年相交替的发展周期。霍夫曼写道：“在福特历史的长长清单上，超凡绝伦的成功与规模空前的失败轮番上演。排除万难、恢复元气后，又会滑入溃败，回到平庸、管理不善的老路上。” 而福特汽车仍然存在短板。它没有及时布局中国市场，在美国市场的份额正在下降，而其首批两款全球车型嘉年华（Fiesta）和福克斯（Focus）也没能给市场带来惊喜。实际上，穆拉利任期中真正的考验将是，他已实施的一系列变革，包括数据化管理，持续应用达成共识的各项原则和团队合作等是否能在他卸任后还保持活力。如果穆拉利打算退休，比如说到2015年左右，那么我期待着霍夫曼能为本书写出续篇，供我珍藏。 译者：清远 |
Hoffman also provides a full account of a long-rumored rift in the Ford family that surfaced in the early months of Mulally's tenure. With their dividends suspended and family jewels Jaguar and Land Rover headed for the auction block, dissidents members -- notably Bill Ford's sister and brother-in-law -- consulted with the boutique investment bank Perella Weinberg about ways to monetize their holdings, which included selling control of the company. Bill and his cousin Edsel beat back the effort and placed their faith in Mulally. They were rewarded with a spectacular turnaround. After losing $14.6 billion in 2008, Ford snapped back and went on to make a $7.8 billion profit in 2011. The long hours that Hoffman evidently spent with Mulally reveal a man with few flaws, except that he likes to beat everybody into the office by arriving at 5:30 a.m. But this is not hagiography. Hoffman doesn't try to finesse Mulally's ample compensation, which became an issue in labor contract negotiations. (Mulally made $29.5 million in 2011 -- the biggest Detroit payday since Lee Iacocca got $23.6 million from Chrysler in 1986). He's also made good use of his access to dig into previously neglected topics, like the protracted 2009 negotiations required to extract concessions from the United Auto Workers. Hoffman has a good ear for dialogue and a thorough knowledge of the industry, though he sometimes resorts to clichés when dealing with less familiar topics. Describing Bill Ford's background, for instance, he writes that Ford grew up in a "posh enclave" and attended a "prestigious" school, yet was "down-to-earth" enough to "rub elbows with the common man." The fortunes of American auto companies tend to rise and fall with the GDP, and Ford follows its own cycle of good and lean years. "Ford's history is a long list of stunning successes followed by epic failures, of against -- all -- odds comebacks that turn into retreats back into mediocrity and mismanagement," writes Hoffman. The company still has weak spots. Ford has been slow getting to China, U.S. market share is falling, and its first two global cars (Fiesta and Focus) have failed to excite. The true test of Mulally's tenure will be whether the changes he has put in place -- data-driven management, consistent application of agreed-upon principles, teamwork -- survive him. If Mulally ever gets around to retiring -- say around 2015 -- I look forward to adding Hoffman's sequel to my bookshelf. |
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