卡尔•伊坎昨日发布了举债筹资52亿美元竞购戴尔公司（Dell Inc.）股权的细节。事实证明伊坎自身需要支付高达31亿美元的巨款，而他原先估计的是最多只需要20亿美元。换句话说，这次收购非常艰难。

    所以我发表了一篇文章，我的观点是，尽管伊坎希望债务承诺能够加强他的地位，实际上却让他显得更加弱势。毕竟，如果潜在的借款人拒绝这一请求，伊坎怎么知道持股人不会同样反对呢？尤其是考虑到股东会采取更多的保护措施（一旦遇上麻烦，还有类似的终止费用）。此外，大量股票现在极有可能在套汇经纪人手中，他们对每股13.65美元的价格很满意，而且无意长期持有戴尔股票。

    然后今天早上，就有许多媒体报道说，戴尔的特别委员会请求迈克尔•戴尔提高他13.65美元的股价。看起来对现有股东的非正式调查表明，他们对收购计划的态度莫衷一是，有明显迹象显示代理权顾问公司ISS将出面反对（也许会动摇足够的股权，让事态发生转变）。而鉴于特别委员会泄露了其要求以给迈克尔•戴尔增加额外压力【尽管不是针对有所退缩的银湖投资集团（Silver Lake）】，他们理应感到担忧。

    不过不要以为迈克尔•戴尔就一定会在这点上与特别委员会合作。让我们暂时假设收购遭到否决，伊坎随后组建了他的董事会（我仍然不认为会发生这种事）。届时，迈克尔•戴尔仍然还有选择：

1、他可以把大多数股份出让给伊坎，这样可以给自己留下约11%的股权（同时稀释给其他人的派息）。

2、迈克尔•戴尔可以不出让任何股份，这样可以留下约41%的股权。如果戴尔公司在伊坎的管理下经营不善，迈克尔•戴尔就能展开自己的代理权之争，也可以提出新的收购价格（很可能低于13.65美元的股价）。或者伊坎也可以继续执掌戴尔公司，迈克尔•戴尔的账面财产也能有所增加。

3、迈克尔•戴尔可以选择折中的办法（部分出让），具体取决于他认为什么样的比例能产生最好效果。

    诚然，如果迈克尔•戴尔在主要由伊坎持有的戴尔公司中仍身居要职，会产生许多重大风险。比如，伊坎可以在迈克尔尝试重新获得控制权之前出售一系列业务部门，以打消他的这种想法。而随着公司的宫廷阴谋持续下去，员工的士气也会衰退，这会是个更宽泛的问题。

    不过我的基本观点是，即将到来的股东表决对迈克尔•戴尔和卡尔•伊坎来说并不是零和博弈。实际上，这可能会让他们成为一对怨偶式的合作伙伴。（财富中文网）

    译者：严匡正

    Carl Icahn yesterday laid out the details of his $5.2 billion in debt financing for Dell Inc. tender offer. Turns out Icahn himself had to put up a whopping $3.1 billion, after originally suggesting that he'd be good for $2 billion in a worst-case scenario. In other words, it was a tough sell.

    So I wrote a post arguing that while Icahn hoped the debt commitments would strengthen his position, it actually made him look weaker. After all, if prospective lenders are saying no, why does Icahn think equity holders will be any different. Particularly given that the bondholders would have greater protections (and a quasi-termination fee for their troubles)? Moreover, there's a high likelihood that the stock is now largely in the hands of arbs who are content with the $13.65 per share price, and have no interest in a longer-term hold.

    Then this morning came numerous media reports that Dell's (DELL) special committee has asked Michael Dell to raise his $13.65 per share price. Seems that informal surveys of existing shareholders have indicated the buyout vote is a toss-up, and there are strong hints that ISS will come out in opposition (something that may sway just enough shares to matter). And the special committee must be legitimately worried, given that it leaked its request as a way to put extra pressure on Michael Dell (albeit not on Silver Lake, which is stretched thread-thin as it is).

    But don't be so sure that Michael Dell is going to play ball with the special committee on this. Let's assume, for a moment, that the buyout is voted down and that Icahn subsequently gets his board installed (something I still don't believe will happen). At that point, Michael Dell still has some options:

1. He could tender most of his shares to Icahn, thus leaving him with around an 11% stake of the remaining float (and also diluting the payout for everyone else).

2. Michael Dell could tender none of his shares, thus leaving him with around a 41% ownership stake. If Dell struggles under Icahn's control, then Michael Dell would be in position to launch his own proxy fight and/or propose a new buyout offer (likely at a lower price than $13.65 per share). Or Icahn could succeed with Dell, thus buttressing Michael Dell's paper fortune.

3. Michael Dell could go for some sort of middle ground (partial tender), depending on what math he thinks works the best.

    To be sure, there are serious risks to Michael Dell remaining a major part of an Icahn-owned Dell. For example, Icahn could sell certain business units before Michael can begin trying to regain control, thus scuttling his desires to do so. And there is the broader issue of weakening employee morale as corporate palace intrigue drags on.

    But my basic point is that the upcoming shareholders vote isn't a zero sum game for either Michael Dell or Carl Icahn. In fact, it may turn them into uncomfortable partners.