18世纪阿姆斯特丹金融危机启示录

    为什么会有这样的不同？原因并不是因为双方获得的信息不同。正如库迪斯和沃斯所指，荷兰金融圈里的每个人都知道和了解所发生事件的严重程度。也不是因为Seppenwolde的贷款机构不得不重建自身财务。违约几周后，贷款机构就知道他们没有损失一毛钱。

    但是折幅差异持续了整整两年。事实上，Seppenwolde贷款机构的悲观和避险情绪降低了阿姆斯特丹总体可用杠杆。

    库迪斯和沃斯在孜孜不倦分析荷兰金融记录的过程中得出了结论，悲观者和乐观者之间真正的区别在于他们是否亲身经历过这样的痛苦过程。库迪斯认为，可以类比的是那些经历过大萧条的人们的行为：这些人在大萧条梦魇过去后的几十年里，一直回避金融风险。

    荷兰危机牵涉到成熟的金融专业人士，那些惯于分析金融和经济趋势的人们。但是，他们过于看重个人经验。

    “它说明人们看重个人经验，胜过其他可用信息，”库迪斯表示。人们离一个重要事件的中心越远，此事对他们的风险胃口影响就越小。

    不清楚到底是荷兰哪一方贷款机构错了。有可能Seppenwolde的贷款机构忽略了更大范围内的金融状况，过于悲观。有可能另一方贷款机构在忽略东印度危机的冲击意义时过于随意。无论是哪一种情况，荷兰危机都说明，即使是成熟的投资者也会因为个人原因而变得乐观或悲观。

    库迪斯认为，这一点在预防21世纪的泡沫和破灭方面具有重要的监管意义。

    “如果贷款机构在市场繁荣时过于乐观，而在市场下行时过于悲观，这或许是当局设定保守的资本金要求的一个最好理由，”他说。“加大折幅可能会抑制最初的涨幅，但当市场转向，它们也能抑制随后的跌幅。”（财富中文网）

    本文作者彼得•库迪斯是斯坦福大学商学院助理金融教授。

    译者：早稻米

   Why the difference? It wasn’t because of a difference in the available information. As Koudijs and Voth point out, everybody in Dutch financial circles knew and understood the magnitude of what had happened. Nor was it because the Seppenwolde lenders had to rebuild their own finances. Within weeks of the default, the lenders knew they hadn’t lost any money.

    Yet, the disparity in haircuts lasted for almost two years. In fact, the pessimism and risk-aversion of the Seppenwolde lenders reduced the overall availability of leverage in Amsterdam.

    In a rigorous analysis of Dutch financial records, Koudijs and Voth conclude that the only real difference between the pessimists and the optimists was whether they had gone through a harrowing personal experience. Koudijs compares it to the behavior of people who lived through the Great Depression, and who avoided financial risk for decades after trauma had passed.

    The Dutch case involved sophisticated financial professionals, people accustomed to analyzing financial and economic trends. Yet, they too focused on their personal experience.

    “It suggests that people put more weight on what happened to themselves and less weight on other information that might be available,”Koudijs says. The more personally removed people are from an important event, the less it is to affect their appetite for risk.

    It’s not clear which group of Dutch lenders was wrong. It’s possible that the Seppenwolde lenders ignored the evidence about broader financial conditions and were too pessimistic. It’s also possible that the other lenders were too casual in brushing off the implications of the East India mess. Either way, the Dutch episode suggests that even sophisticated investors become optimistic or pessimistic for myopic reasons.

    To Koudijs, this has important regulatory implications for heading off 21st-century bubbles and busts.

    “If lenders are too optimistic during market booms and too pessimistic in downturns, that could be a good reason for authorities to set conservative capital requirements,” he suggests. “Higher haircuts might dampen the initial run-ups, but they could also dampen the subsequent fallouts when tides turn.”

    Peter Koudijs is an assistant professor of finance at Stanford Graduate School of Business.