“现在应该加大投资，还是急踩刹车？”

    本周早些时候，一位投资组合经理向我提出了这个问题。他投资了数十家风险投资基金，包括业内最优秀的投资基金。我没有自负到以为他会因为我的一点小小建议便做出涉及数百万美元的投资决定，但他确实非常真诚。如今，投资风险资本，正处在过去二十年间最难以捉摸的时期，

    需要明确的是，我并不是说投资收益正在缩水。事实恰恰相反。近几年，风险投资基金的估值在持续攀升，而生气勃勃的IPO（首次公开募股）和并购市场，推动风投基金派发的股息达到历史新高。例如，哈佛大学（Harvard University）的捐助基金昨天宣布，其2014财年的风险投资回报率为32.8%——而其投资组合的总体回报率为15.4%，标准普尔500指数（S&P 500）的同期回报率为21.38%。

    但问题在于：有限责任合伙人并未投资现货价格。他们选择的投资对象，是（有望）能够在几年之后开始产生回报的长期基金。他们担心，即便市场现在尚未触顶，也必将在基金带来收益的时候到达顶峰——结果是，风险投资基金经理的投资组合定价过高，却只有相对较少的退出机会。

    大多数有限责任合伙人都经历了上一个科技周期，并且信誓旦旦地表示，再也不会陷入同样的困境。如今他们看到风险投资公司激增，不仅筹集的资金动辄超过10亿美元，融资周期也大幅缩短【最明显的是老虎环球基金（Tiger Global），这只基金上一次募集了15亿美元之后仅仅5个月，又再次募集了15亿美元】。因此，有许多历史数据支持现在退出这一领域。但如果我们现在的情形类似于1997年或者1998年上半年，而不是1999年，情况又会如何？如果你太早离开，结果导致数以百万计的资金无所作为，怎么办？如果更好的基本商业模式、更多的潜在买家和更温和的经济复苏，意味着现在确实是一个“不同的”时代，我们又该怎么办？但是，等等，想到“现在是一个不同的时代”难道不是应该立刻退出的明确信号吗？

    所以，我给了那位投资组合经理最诚实的回答：我不知道他应该做什么，但如果有人言之凿凿地回答这个问题，绝对不能轻信。（财富中文网）

    译者：刘进龙/汪皓

    “Is now the time to double down, or to slam on the brakes?”

    That was the question posed to me earlier this week by a portfolio manager who has investments in dozens of venture capital funds, including some of the industry’s most illustrious names. I’m not (quite) so egotistical as to think he would make multi-million decisions on my two cents, but the inquiry was sincere. This is an extraordinarily tricky time to be investing in venture capital, perhaps more so than at any other time in the past two decades.

    To be clear, I’m not saying that investment returns are underwater. Quite the opposite. Venture capital fund valuations have been climbing for years, and distributions appear to be at record highs thanks to vibrant IPO and M&A markets. For example, Harvard University’s endowment reported yesterday that its VC return for fiscal 2014 was 32.8% — compared to a 15.4% return for its total portfolio and the S&P 500’s 21.38% gain over the same time period.

    But that’s the very problem: Limited partners are not investing a spot prices. They are committing to long-term funds that will (hopefully) begin generating returns several years out. And they worry that if we aren’t at a market top today, we’ll be there when it comes time to begin harvesting — leaving their VC managers with overpriced portfolios that have relatively few exit opportunities.

    Most limited partners were around for the last tech cycle, and promised to never again get sucked down the same rabbit hole. Now they see a proliferation of VC firms not only raising $1 billion funds, but also a shortening of the fundraising cycle (most notably Tiger Global seeking $1.5 billion just 5 months after closing its last $1.5 billion pool). So there are all sorts of historical data points to support pulling back right now. But what if this is really 1997 or the first half of 1998, instead of 1999? What if you bail to soon, and leave millions of dollars on the table? And what if this time really “is different,” due to both better fundamental business models, a larger pool of prospective buyers and a milder economic recovery? But, wait, isn’t even considering that “this time is different” a definitive sign to hit the road?

    So I gave the portfolio manager my most honest response: I have no idea what he should do, except perhaps to avoid anyone who answers the question with any degree of certainty.