欧债危机:德国进退两难,抉择影响全球
摆在德国面前的是一道难得让人头痛的难题,其选择不仅会塑造欧洲共同体的未来,还将影响全球经济。现在欧洲债务危机已经蔓延到了多个规模较大的国家,无法再用临时援助手段解决,因此德国必须两害相权择其轻:要么改变长期坚持的反对态度,为麻烦缠身的欧元区伙伴国家的债务提供担保,这将使纳税人的利益承担巨大风险;要么放弃欧元区,逃避保护弱国的义务,这会使德国经济增长引擎突然停止。德国是世界最高效、最庞大的经济体之一,而它现在面临着上述威胁,这正是全球市场震荡不休的主要原因之一。 这种历史性的两难处境几周之前才浮出水面。当时投资者开始攻击意大利和西班牙政府债券,使其收益率屡创新高。意大利债务负担极为庞大,而西班牙财政赤字惊人,因此,两国都无力继续承担如此惊人的收益率。欧洲央行(The European Central Bank)不得不出手救急,在一个周内买入了多达100亿美元的两国债券,将收益率压了下来。欧洲央行已经明确表示,此种买入行动只是短期举措。因此,欧盟正在将原本用于援助希腊、葡萄牙和爱尔兰的欧洲金融稳定基金(EFSF)的规模翻倍,扩大到6,200亿美元,并修改其章程以放宽其权限,允许它在公开市场购入政府债券。 如果债券市场继续攻击意大利和西班牙债券(这种可能性相当大),尽管欧洲金融稳定基金规模已经有所扩大,但凭它拥有的资源仍然远远不够拯救两国债券。唯一的长期解决方案是发行一种新型债券,由欧元区17个国家一起担保,这将保证欧元的存续,给市场吃下定心丸。这种欧洲债券发行后,可用于为各国债务提供一定比例的支持。举例来说,跟据该计划,可以用完全安全的欧洲债券覆盖希腊、爱尔兰或法国50%的借款,剩下的一半则由各国政府发行本国政府债券来解决。 欧洲债券的收益率降低之后,借款利息的总体成本将会下降,从而缓解这些国家的预算压力。如此一来,各国发行的非欧洲债券看起来也会安全得多,至少比他们现在的主权债券好不少。 可是,迄今为止德国坚决地反对欧洲债券解决方案。该方案可能会根据各国国民收入的多少来决定其担保欧元债券的额度,由于德国国内生产总值(GDP)相当于整个欧元区的40%,其公民将被迫承担税收大幅上涨的压力,担保其他国家的违约情形。德国总理默克尔不断强调,这些国家现在的窘境纯属自讨苦吃,完全是这些国家的政府不负责任,大肆借贷、大手大脚所致。 除非德国改变态度,否则欧元区终将解体。至于如何分家则尚未可知,南欧国家或许会恢复本国的货币,留下北方的德国、奥地利、芬兰、荷兰或许还有法国,组成一个缩水版的欧元区;也可能是德国选择主动退出,用本国货币取代欧元,比方说发行“新马克”,这将使其摆脱救援他国的负担——德国国内对此早已怨声载道。 |
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Germany is facing a maddeningly difficult choice that could shape the future not just of the European community, but the world economy. Now that the European debt crisis is spreading to nations far too big for temporary bailouts, Germany must decide between two extremely unattractive options. It must either abandon its stubborn resistance to guaranteeing the debts of ailing eurozone partners, at great risk to its taxpayers. Or, it can escape sheltering the weak by abandoning the eurozone. That would bring the German growth engine to a sudden halt. The threat to one of the world's leanest and largest economies is a major reason world markets are now in turmoil. The historic dilemma arose just a few weeks ago, when investors attacked Italian and Spanish government bonds, pushing rates to levels that made their big debt loads, in the case of Italy, and yawning deficits -- that's Spain -- unsustainable. The European Central Bank came to the rescue, pushing rates lower by purchasing as much as $10 billion a week in their sovereign bonds. The ECB is making it clear that those purchases will be short-lived. So the EU is doubling the size of the European Financial Stabilization Facility, the bailout fund that supports Greece, Portugal and Ireland, to $620 billion, and expanding the EFSF's charter to allow purchasing government bonds in the open market. Even at its new size, the EFSF won't remotely marshal the resources needed to save Italy and Spain if bond vigilantes keep attacking their debt, an excellent possibility. The only long-term solution, the fix that would calm markets by assuring the euro's survival, is a new type of securities backed by all 17 countries in the eurozone. These eurobonds could be issued to finance a fixed portion of each nation's debt. For example, the regime would allow Greece, Ireland or France to cover 50% of their total borrowings with totally safe eurobonds, and the other half with their own government securities. Since the total interest costs would fall because of low rates on the eurobonds, the pressure on their budgets would recede. So the non-eurobonds they issue would look a lot safer than their sovereign debt looks today. But so far, Germany adamantly opposes the eurobond solution. It's probable that the nations would guarantee those bonds in proportion to their national income. Since Germany accounts for 40% of the eurozone's GDP, its citizens would suffer big tax increases to cover defaults by nations that, as Chancellor Merkel keeps pointing out, brought on their own woes through reckless borrowing and spending. Unless Germany changes course, the eurozone will dissolve. It's not clear how the split would happen. Southern countries might restore their own currencies, leaving a northern group of Germany, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands and possibly France in a shrunken eurozone. Or Germany could go its own way by replacing the euro with, say, the Neue Mark, and in the process freeing itself from the shadow of wildly unpopular bailouts. |