恩颐投资：风投界最大的秘密

    总的来说，恩颐投资现有285家活跃的组合公司，每家公司的投资额从不到100万美元至5,000万美元以上不等。公司共有13支基金，其中8支的成立时间要追溯到1994年。研究公司Preqin的数据显示，这8支基金中有6只基金（2009基金的表现尚未评估）的内部回报率位列所有风投公司的前25%。恩颐投资长期投资者、雅培资本公司（Abbott Capital）的总裁乔纳森•罗斯表示，“（内部回报率）对外界来说只是一个指数而已。现在同一支基金会从事很多种不同的业务。但如果看看投资者获得的回报就会知道（恩颐投资）的表现要比这些基金好太多了。”

    恩颐投资每一项投资决定遵循的流程都是一样的，由深入了解该行业的员工小组牵头。如果该小组想投资，会把项目提交给恩颐投资所有的合伙人；全体合伙人每周一都会在一间无窗的会议室中开会，经过认真的讨论，然后进行两轮投票。第一次投票，行业专家合伙人可以投YE（积极支持）、YS （有保留的支持）或NO （反对）。如果一项新投资获得YE或YS多数票，或一项后续投资获得YE或YS的超多数票，就会把相关投资计划进而交给公司18位最高级别的合伙人进行最终投票。

    2008年恩颐投资决定投资后来成为Groupon的小型芝加哥创投公司，当时走得也是这样的流程。当初这个项目得到了1999年以来一直执掌恩颐投资的执行合伙人彼得•巴利斯的支持，当时Groupon的名字还是The Point，“让一群人在限定的时间内完成同一件事情”的定位也有些模糊；比如，加入用户对电话公司的附加费心存不满，他们就可以登陆网站，联合起来向电话公司施加压力。

    之前已有两家风投公司拒绝了The Point公司，一部分原因是它希望获得高估值，但仍然缺乏能创造收入的真正战略。“当初（我们讨论时）合伙人们非常担心，”巴利斯回忆称。“有些人担心群体行动可能会有负面影响。而且，就算我们能降低这个风险，我们怎么才从这个项目上挣到钱呢？”

    巴利斯提出：群体行动的理念会产生很大的影响力，而且The Point的创始人之前的一家印刷科技公司InnerWorkings也曾给恩颐投资带来过回报。

    进入投票程序时，巴利斯的所有合伙人都投了YE。第二天，恩颐投资就开出了480万美元的支票，并开始帮助其打造业务。 “我们曾支持展开各种实验，包括让公司大楼里的人通过报名获得一楼汉堡包店内的折扣等等，”巴利斯解释说。“这种模式一发展起来，我就催着【首席执行官】安德鲁•梅森，让他们加快发展。我告诉他们，他们的扩张速度应该达到每个月4个城市，他们确实做到了。直到他们的扩张速度开始提高至10个城市。”

    自从今年6月申请上市以来，Groupon并不顺利，有人认为它的会计方法过于雄心勃勃。但上周四晚，它仍成功筹得了7亿美元的IPO资金，首日上市截至收盘，市值已接近170亿美元。这意味着恩颐投资回报丰厚，其所持14.6%股权当初投资额仅1,480万美元，而且通过分红和非公开转售，早已收回了7,500万美元。

    除了严谨的决策流程，恩颐投资的成功关键还在于公司一直保持资金充足，并能投资不同行业、不同阶段的项目。本世纪初， Benchmark Capital投资公司、红杉资本（Sequoia Capital）等竞争对手纷纷缩减基金规模，恩颐投资却依然维持了大规模。此外，恩以资本还是互联网泡沫破灭迄今唯一一家成功发行逾20亿美元基金的公司，而且它已经发行了两支这样的基金，分别是在2006年和2009年。相比之下，2009年发行的风投基金平均筹资规模仅1.05亿美元。

    当医药业投资者不再重点投资新药开发项目，恩颐投资却继续在医院实验室中仔细搜寻。“我们正在进入一个规模为王的时代，”恩颐投资的一位合伙人戴维•莫特称。“还能整个项目从头跟到尾的风投公司已经不多了。”

    Overall, NEA has 285 active portfolio companies, and its investments range from less than $1 million to more than $50 million. It has 13 funds in total, eight of which have been raised since 1994. Of those eight, research firm Preqin says, six have performed in the top quartile of venture capital firms, based on an industry metric called internal rate of return (the 2009 fund hasn't been assessed yet). Says Jonathan Roth, president of longtime NEA investor Abbott Capital: "To the outside it's an index, because they've got a single fund doing all sorts of different things. But when you look at the returns to investors, you realize that it's much, much better than that."

    In every investment decision at NEA, the process is the same, led by small teams of staffers with detailed knowledge of a particular sector. If that team wants to invest, it will bring it to the full NEA partnership, which meets every Monday in a windowless conference room. After intense discussions, there are two votes. In the first, the industry expert partners vote either YE (yes enthusiastic), YS (yes with reservations), or NO (no). If a majority votes YE or YS for a new deal, or a supermajority does so for a follow-on investment, the deal then moves to a final vote by the firm's 18 highest-ranking partners.

    That's what happened with NEA's 2008 decision to invest in the small Chicago startup that would become Groupon (GRPN). Championed by NEA's managing general partner Peter Barris, who has led NEA since 1999, it was called The Point, with a vague focus on collective activism; phone company customers, say, upset about a surcharge, could connect online and exert pressure.

    Two previous VC firms had turned The Point down, in part because it wanted a high valuation without any real strategy for generating revenue. "There was a lot of heartburn around the table," recalls Barris. "Some people worried there would be negative ramifications from collective action. And even if we could mitigate that risk, how would we monetize it?"

    Barris pushed forward: The idea of collective action was powerful, and The Point's founder had previously made money for NEA with a company called InnerWorkings (INWK), a print-technology company.

    When it came time to vote, all of Barris's partners said YE. NEA cut a $4.8 million check the next day and got to work helping shape the business. "We were supporting different experiments, including a feature where people in the building could sign up to get a discount at a burger place on the first floor," Barris explains. "Once that model got traction, I became a pain in the ass, pushing [CEO] Andrew Mason to grow quickly. I told them they should be expanding to four cities a month, which they did. Until they began expanding to 10."

    Groupon has stumbled since filing to go public this past June, using accounting methods some found overambitious. But it still managed to raised $700 million in its IPO last Thursday night, and close its first day of trading at a valuation of nearly $17 billion. That represents a massive return for NEA, which invested just $14.8 million for a 14.6% ownership stake and already has received $75 million via a dividend and private share sale.

    The key to NEA's success is not only its decision-making process but also its commitment to maintaining very deep pockets and its ability to invest across both sector and stage. When rivals like Benchmark Capital and Sequoia Capital cut back on fund sizes in the early 2000s, NEA stayed big. It is the only firm to have raised more than $2 billion for a fund since the dotcom bust, and it's done it twice, in 2006 and 2009. For context, the average VC fund raised just $105 million in 2009.

    When health care investors began de-emphasizing costly drug development deals, NEA kept scouring hospital labs. "We're entering an era where scale matters," says David Mott, an NEA partner. "There aren't many other firms left out there that can do it from beginning to end."