2012年7大选举重塑全球经济

    全球各国大选如此集中于某一个年份，这种情况很少见，甚至绝无仅有。今年将有七个大国举行总统大选——按时间先后依次为俄罗斯、法国、埃及、墨西哥、委内瑞拉、美国和韩国。这份全球热点清单还没算上希腊4月份的选举，以及拟任下一届中国国家主席的习近平（将于10月份正式上任）。大选固然是一国事务，但这七大选举一定程度上将决定全球两大难题接下来的走向：我们还需要多久才能走出全球经济低迷期？国家领导人还能继续沿用压制数百万民众的策略吗？

    成熟的民主国家（法国、墨西哥、美国和韩国）存在的主要问题是经济。有点奇怪的是近几年美国和法国经济表现糟糕，但墨西哥和韩国在全球经济下滑中逆势急速增长。可是，四国选民依然对当前的经济状况不满，而且四国大选事实上将在分别代表“自由”与“保守”这两种经济管理理念的候选人之间展开争夺。利益攸关。

    墨西哥和韩国的选民不满于腐败和收入不均。法国和美国的选民不满于失业和经济停滞。共同之处是对现任领导人的极度不满；民意调查显示，四国的现任领导人或执政党的支持率均处于劣势。选民们可能会把这些废物赶下台。如果他们都如愿以偿，结果将产生巨大的政策效应，因为目前这些国家政府对经济进行保守管理与自由管理的比例为3:1（这个1是美国）。这个比例可能完全颠倒过来。

    俄罗斯、埃及和委内瑞拉的情况与上述四个国家完全不同。经过上一年前所未有的全球群众性革命后，民主的本质是如今这三个国家的主要问题。大选之后的动向至关重要。“阿拉伯之春”革命中最令人鼓舞的埃及如今依然一盘散沙。军方下令进行议会选举，但宪法迟迟未能颁布，估计在6月总统大选前也不会出台。因此，选举结果可能毫无意义，一切都需要取决于宪法如何拟定，或者军方是否会重新掌权。埃及人能忍受多缓慢的过渡期呢？

    幸运的是，埃及是一个新兴的民主国家。而俄罗斯和委内瑞拉则是冒牌的民主国家。在我写这篇文章时，俄罗斯大选还未进行，但当你们读这篇文章的时候，俄罗斯大选应该已经结束了。别担心，我知道结果会怎样。在委内瑞拉，我们也同样可以胸有成竹地认为，现任总统乌戈•查韦斯将像俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔•普京一样使用其近乎独裁的权力确保大选获胜，尽管他面对的是一个强劲的对手。关键问题是大选结束之后会出现什么情况。俄罗斯人和委内瑞拉人能接受领导人名不符实的再选连任吗？虽然他们过去一直是这样，但那是在去年爆发民众示威和公众抗议之前。现在至少存在这样的可能，这三个国家的民众可能站出来，坚持要求实行真正的民主。

    果真如此，那将是最好的结果，正如前面四个成熟的民主国家最好的结果是转向适度、低税率、对市场友好的经济政策。现在存在两个未知因素可能彻底打乱上述七个国家的选举。一个是外国的挑衅。在任政府内阁在选举年绝不能示弱，朝鲜或伊朗很容易与其中几个国家陷入双输的冲突。另一个因素则是社交媒体。我们已经在中东和俄罗斯看到了它的政治力量，但它其实具有更为广泛的英系那个。举例来说，在墨西哥，贬低对手的恶性竞选方式是违法的，但法律并没有覆盖社交媒体，社交媒体依然不受监管。

    七个国家中最后一场大选是12月19日的韩国大选。假如玛雅历法家出错了，他们关于两天后将是世界末日的预言并不会成真（我本人仍会购买青香蕉，放些些日子再吃），届时我们对世界前景将有更清楚的了解。

    译者：老榆木

    Rarely -- maybe never -- has global leadership been more up for grabs in a single year than it is now. Seven major nations are holding presidential elections -- in chronological order, Russia, France, Egypt, Mexico, Venezuela, the U.S., and South Korea. That's a list of hot spots worldwide, without mentioning Greek elections in April or China's presumed next president, Xi Jinping (chosen without the bother of elections), assuming office in October. All elections are local, but these seven big ones will help determine what happens next on two of the world's largest issues: how quickly we'll get through the global economic funk, and whether repressing millions is still a viable strategy for national leaders.

    The main issues in the established democracies -- France, Mexico, the U.S., South Korea -- are economic. That's a bit odd, since the U.S. and French economies have performed terribly in recent years while the Mexican and South Korean economies came roaring out of the global downturn. Yet voters in all four countries are unhappy about their economic situation, and in all four they face a genuine contest between candidates representing fundamentally liberal and conservative management of the economy. Much is at stake.

    Mexican and Korean voters are unhappy about income inequality and corruption. French and American voters are unhappy about unemployment and stagnation. The common factor is profound dissatisfaction with the leaders they've got; opinion polls show the incumbent candidates or parties trailing in all four countries. Voters may just throw the bums out. If they do so across the board, the policy effect will be large, since these countries currently have economically conservative administrations by a ratio of 3 to 1 (the "1" being the U.S.). That ratio could flip.

    The essential issue is much different in Russia, Egypt, and Venezuela. For them, it's the very nature of democracy after a year of unprecedented popular rage worldwide. In each case the most important developments may be what happens after the elections. Egypt, the most inspiring story of the Arab Spring, cannot get its act together. The generals decreed parliamentary elections though the country still has no constitution, nor will it have one before the June presidential election. So the results may be meaningless, depending on how the constitution gets written, or if the generals seize back power. How slow a transition will Egyptians tolerate?

    Egypt is, with luck, a nascent democracy. Russia and Venezuela are bogus democracies. The Russian election hasn't happened as I write this, but it will have happened as you read this. Don't worry -- I know how it turned out. In Venezuela, we can be similarly confident that Hugo Chávez, like Vladimir Putin, will use his near-dictatorial powers to ensure a win, though he faces a credible opponent. The key question is what happens then. Will Russians and Venezuelans accept their leaders' phony reelections? They've always done so, but that was before the past year of demonstrations and public anger. There's at least a chance that the people of all three nations will rise up to insist on genuine democracy.

    That would be the best outcome, just as the best result in the four established democracies would be moves toward moderate, low-tax, market-friendly economic policies. Two wild cards could disrupt elections in any of these countries. One is foreign aggression. Incumbents can never appear weak in an election year, and North Korea or Iran could easily involve several of these countries in no-win conflicts. The other wild card is social media. We've seen its political power in the Middle East and Russia, but the effect is broader. In Mexico, for example, negative campaigning is illegal, but the law never contemplated social media, which are unregulated.

    The last of the seven big elections will be South Korea's on Dec. 19. Assuming the Mayan calendar theorists are wrong about the world ending two days later -- personally, I will still be buying green bananas -- we'll have by then a much clearer picture of where our world is heading.