希腊退出欧元区前景分析

    但这一灾难性场景并非不可避免。“其他已退出事实上共同货币区的国家没有陷入恶性通货通胀。”持有希腊国债的投资公司Greylock Capital的总裁汉斯•休谟斯说。阿里布认为，希腊的退出将创造出与冰岛、阿根廷同样的增长活力，冰岛、阿根廷都事实上放弃了高估的货币。

    我认为，出现阿里布预测的、相对乐观的情形可能性更大：在恢复德拉克马的最初几天，很多逃离希腊的欧元储蓄将回流。希腊产品将极其热销，售价比一周前欧元换成德拉克马时的价格至少低三分之一。这种突然的资金流入将支撑德拉克马。

    很快，希腊将恢复加入欧元区之前的情形：一个物价不贵的国家。旅游者将取消他们在土耳其的度假（几周前，土耳其的价格在地中海地区还是很低的），改至希腊岛屿游览。希腊的番茄、橄榄油和鱼产品的出口将增加，加工品进口将下降，因为这些加工品的价格相对于国内制造产品出现了上涨。

    希腊主权债务也会违约，这是走向复苏的另外必要一步。欧洲央行（European Central Bank）将承受巨大损失，但私营部门的债券持有人早已承受了大部分痛苦。“我们有20种不同期限的希腊国债已经折价80%。”休谟斯说，“我认为没有任何理由再折价。”

    退出欧元区，这一令希腊和欧洲领导人都害怕的举措，将让希腊恢复温和增长。但这也会恢复希腊在2001年1月1日加入欧元区前的一些负面因素。“未来的问题是我们会看到一个新希腊，还是一个旧希腊，”阿里布说。前者将要求希腊政府摒弃垄断、缩减庞大的公务员队伍、取消禁止邮轮线路从希腊始发和终到的反竞争法规。如果希腊生产率落后于邻国，它将进行更多的进口和更少的出口，降低工人工资和生活水平。为恢复其在国际市场的竞争力，它需要定期将德拉克马贬值。

    这就是旧希腊，不幸的是旧希腊出现的可能性更大。但至少，希腊摆脱了高估至少50%的欧元的重压。欧洲即将让市场而非政客来决定其度假服务和农业物产究竟值多少钱。这很快就会发生。

    译者：早稻米

    But the disaster scenario isn't inevitable. "Other countries have left what's effectively a common currency zone without suffering hyperinflation," says Hans Humes, president of investment firm Greylock Capital, which holds Greek government bonds. Aliber thinks that Greece's exit will create the same growth dynamic that's recharged Iceland and Argentina, both of whom effectively shed overvalued currencies.

    My view is that the relatively optimistic Aliber forecast is the more likely outcome. Here's how it plays out: In the first few days after the drachma's return, much of the savings that left the country in Euros will come back. Greek goods will be screaming buy, selling for at least one-third less that a week before for people exchanging their Euros for drachma. That sudden inflow will support the drachma.

    Overnight, Greece will once again become what it was in pre-Euro days: an inexpensive country. Tourists will cancel their vacations in Turkey –– which a few weeks ago were the Mediterranean bargain –– and tour the Greek islands instead. Exports of Greek tomatoes, olive oil and fish from its fish farms will expand, and imports of manufactured goods will fall as they rise in price versus domestically made products.

    Greece will also default on its sovereign debt, another necessary step towards recovery. The European Central Bank will suffer big losses, but private bondholders have already taken most of the pain. "We've taken an effective 80% haircut on twenty different maturities of Greek government bonds," says Humes. "I do not see a reason for an additional haircut."

    The move that both Greek and European leaders so dread will restore modest growth. But it will also restore the same negatives that saddled Greece before it entered the Eurozone on January 1st, 2001. "The question for the future is whether we see a new or an old Greece," says Aliber. The former would require that the Greek government junk monopolies, trim the gigantic public workforce, and shed anti-competitive rules that prevent cruise lines from starting and ending trips in Greece. If Greek productivity lags that of its neighbors, it will import more and export less, hobbling wages and the living standards of its workers. To restore its competitiveness on global markets, it will have to keep devaluing the drachma at regular intervals.

    That was the old Greece, and unfortunately, it's the old Greece that's more likely to emerge. But at least will escape the grip of a currency that's at least 50% overvalued. Europe is about to let the market, not politics, decide what price it make its vacation packages and agricultural bounty a great deal again. And it will happen soon.