醒醒吧，欧洲！这次该动真格的了！

    存款外流这个问题很难解决，因为在欧元区，要将希腊银行中的存款转到其他银行太容易了。将资金转到另一个欧元区国家不存在任何的汇率或利率风险，所有国家执行同一货币政策。即便希腊政府实施限制存款的资本管制措施，资金仍能流到其他欧元区银行。

    而且，即便蒙蒂的计划以某种方式获得批准，平息了当前的恐慌情绪，可能也无法截断希腊存款缓慢外流到欧元区核心成员国的过程。如果资本持续外流，希腊银行状况堪忧。而且最重要的是，只有希腊银行愿意贷款给希腊人，这基本上扼杀了这个国家经济增长的希望。

    法国新任总统弗朗西斯•奥朗德支持蒙蒂的计划，但周三他将忙于推进自己的议程。除了银行存款保障计划，奥朗德希望建立统一的债券工具——由欧洲央行发行，并由欧元区所有17个成员国共同担保的欧元债券。

    欧元债券将有效缓解外围国家的风险，将其转移至核心成员国。它将允许外围国家以远低于当前主权债券发行利率的水平借入更多现金。欧元债券将由欧洲央行持有，因此不会增加外围国家的债务和负担。这些债券将为多种用途提供资金，从意大利和希腊的财政赤字到法国、西班牙的大型资本项目不等。

    德国和其他财政谨慎的欧元区成员国一直强烈反对共担债务机制，因为它们会立刻受累于此。在外围国家借贷成本下降的同时，核心成员国的借贷成本将上升。别指望德国会在对资金用途毫无发言权的情况下，任由外围国家用德国的良好信用和资产负债表为其买单。

    两个计划看来大方向都正确，但鉴于欧元区当前的状况，它们成功实施的机会渺茫。欧元区成员国大多都难以接受成员国之间风险和责任的转移，它们可以清楚地看到这种一体化对本国经济的负面影响。因此要想所有成员国都能举手赞成，外围国家也需要将权力移交给核心成员国。

    德国提供了一个很好的例子。1990年西德合并东德，权力交给了西德，资金转到了东德。为此，西德经历了十年的缓慢增长期，因为过去用于西德的资金被用于东德重建。但这一牺牲看来是值得的，因为合并后的德国大大提高了生产率，也给原西德很多公司提供了令人振奋的商机。

    但设想一下，假如东德既想要钱、要支持，又想保持自身财政政策的独立。西德将数十亿的资金转至东德就能让它恢复活力吗？肯定不会。

    因此，毫不奇怪，德国并不热衷于牺牲自己的信用和经济增长来帮助提振欧元区外围经济体。德国和其他富有的欧元区成员国需要看到一些好处来证明承担如此庞大的债务和风险是值得的。空口承诺财政自律不管用了——欧洲这次必须面对现实了。

    译者：早稻米

    There is no easy fix to this problem. It is simply too easy to move a deposit from a Greek bank to another bank in the eurozone. There is no exchange-rate or interest rate risk in moving funds to another eurozone nation, since they all share the same monetary policy. Even if the Greek government instituted capital controls limiting deposits, money could still flow to other eurozone banks.

    Furthermore, even if Monti's plan somehow gets approved and quells the current panic, it probably won't stop the slow leak of Greek deposits to core eurozone members. If the capital flight continues, Greek banks will be crippled. And since, for the most part, only Greek banks are willing to lend to Greeks, it basically dooms any hope of economic growth in the country.

    Francois Hollande, France's new president, supports Monti's plan, but he will be busy pushing his own agenda on Wednesday. In addition to a bank deposit scheme, Hollande wants to create a common debt instrument, which would be issued by the ECB and backed by all 17 members of the eurozone -- the eurobond.

    The eurobond would effectively mitigate risk at the periphery by transferring it to the core. This allows countries on the periphery to borrow more cash at much lower rates than they currently can through issuing sovereign debt. The eurobond debt would be held at the ECB, so it won't add to the debts and burdens of the peripheral nations. The bonds could end up funding anything from fiscal deficits in Italy and Greece to large capital projects in France and Spain.

    Germany and the other fiscally prudent eurozone members have been vehemently opposed to the idea of a shared debt instrument. After all, they would turn out to be the instant loser in the deal. While borrowing costs would drop at the periphery, they would go up at the core. Germany cannot be expected to simply let the periphery use its good credit and its balance sheet to run up a tab without any say as to what the money is being used for.

    Both plans seem to be steps in the right direction, but they have a slim chance of being implemented successfully given the state of the eurozone today. The transferring of risk and liabilities between member states will be a hard pill to swallow for many eurozone members who could see their economies negatively impacted by the unification. To get all the members to buy in will therefore require a transfer of power from the periphery to the core.

    Germany provides a good example of such a trade-off. In 1990, when West Germany absorbed East Germany, power was transferred to the west and money was transferred to the east. As a result, the west experienced a decade of sluggish growth as cash that would have been used in the west went to go rebuild the east. The sacrifice, though, seems to have been worth it as the country has become more productive than ever. It also offered many exciting business opportunities for West German companies.

    But imagine if East Germany wanted the money and support but also wanted to remain independent with its own fiscal policies. Would West Germany still transfer billions to help the east get back on its feet? Surely not.

    It should therefore come as no surprise that Germany isn't too keen on smudging up its credit and taking hits to its growth rate to help lift up the eurozone periphery. Germany and the other wealthy eurozone members need some upside to justify taking on such a massive amount of debt and risk. Promises of maintaining fiscal discipline simply won't do anymore – it's time for Europe to get real.